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ABSTRACT
This "thesis" is a study of Assad's foreign policy and
the factors that helped him consolidate his power and trans-
fozaL his country from a proxy state to a regional power.
Syria's relations with its neighbors and the two "super-
powers" are discussed in detail.
Syria's strategic significance is accentuated here; it is
a remarkable specimen in the Middle East political aquarium.
Syria had a glorious history. The Syrians are working
very hard to restore that glory--the glory of Great Syria.
Syria's modern history has been a saga of coups and counter-
coups. After leading a bloodless coup in 1970, Assad took
over. Under the leadership of President Assad, Syria has
been transformcd from a weak, shaky and vulnerable country
into an apparently strong and stable state, a regional power
in the Middle East.
What the Syrians and their president want is precisely
what nationalists have always wanted in every part of the
world: an integrated (Syrian) society, which is industrial-
ized, modernized, centralized, socialized and populated by
proud and bplrited masses; which enjoys the benefits of
economic prowess; and which is capable of sustaining its
independence in the anarchic, chronically unstable, perva-
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is a study of Assad's foreign policy and the
factors that helped hi consolidate his power and transform
his country from a proxy state to a regional power. Syria's
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II. SYRIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
In terms of natural resources, Syria is hardly as
important as other Middle Eastern nations like Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Iraq, or the countries of the Gulf. In terms
of human resources, its ten million inhabitants hardly
compare to the tens of millions of Egyptians, Iranians, and
Iraqis. Yet, in terms of overall strategic significance,
Syria is the prize of the region and, as Patrick Seal
observes, no one can control the Middle East without ...
having first gained control over Syria. There are two
principal reasons for Syria's critical importance: its
pivotal geographical position and its importance in the
Arab and the Islamic Worlds as a religious, cultural, and
intellectual center and a source of political ideas and
movements. "Looking at Syria," says Seal, "is like examin-
ing a remarkable specimen in the Middle East political
aquarium." Many of the political principles and trends in
the Arab World today either originated there or could there
be seen at work with special clarity.
Either the north-south axis or the east-west axis of
Syria would by itself be sufficient to give Syria crucial
regional importance. From north to south, Syria links
Turkey and the peninsula of Asia Minor with Saudi Arabia
and the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula. From east to west, it
constitutes the natural corridor between the most powerful
3
1
nations in the Arab World, Iraq and Egypt. Concerning
natural or "Greater Syria", the peerless historian Philip K.
Hitti notes,
"Especially because of the inclusion of Palestine and
Phoenicia within its ancient boundaries, it [Syria] has
made a more significant contribution to the moral and
spiritual progress of mankind than any other comparable
land. Small as it appears on a map or a globe, its
historical importance is boundless; its influence is
universal."2
To politicians and cartographers, Syria is an invention
of the 20th century. To scholars, however, the term also
refers to a once vast, occasionally powerful, always proud
empire. Greater Syria, as historians call the broad area
east of the Mediterranean, has a long and bloody past. The
region, which included the territory of contemporary Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, was situated at the approximate
point where Europe, Asia and Africa converge. As such, it
was a traditional meeting place and killing ground for
peoples of both the East and the West.
Over the millenniums, Syria has repeatedly been over-
run by conquerors from the desert or the sea: Canaanites,
Phoenicians, Hebrews, Aramaeans, Assyrians, Babylonians,
1Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria,
Syria: Its Make-Up and Recent History, Its Strategic
Importance, Mizan Press, Berkeley, 1983, pp 29-30.
2Richard F. Nyrop, "Syria 
- A Country Study,"The
American University, Washington DC Third Edition, First
Printing, 1979, p. 3.
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Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabatoeans, Byzantines, Arabs.
During the seventh and eighth centuries A.D., Damascus
flourished as the capital of the Umayyad Empire, which
stretched from Spain to India. In the 12th century, the
Crusaders' brief reign came to a violent end at the hands of
the warrior Saladin, who remains a Syrian folk hero to this
day. After Saladin's death, his domain fell to strong powers.
Damascus was sacked and plundered in 1401 by Tamerlane, the
Turkic conqueror, and in 1517 it came under the rule of the
Ottoman Turks, where it languished for most of the next 400
years.
That period ended at last in 1920 when Syria became an
independent monarchy under King Faisal I of the Hasemite
royal family. But Britain and France were at work redraw-
ing the region's boundaries. Faisal's sovereignty ended
after only a few months when the French claimed Syria under
a League of Nations' mandate. To weaken the Arab nationalist
movement, the French created contemporary Lebanon by carving
from Syria the Christian region around Mount Lebanon, Bekaa
Valley and the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and
Tyre and later on gave Alexandretta to Turkey and Mussel to
Britain that merged it with present Iraq. In the same way,
Britain claimed Jordan and Palestine also under a League of
Nations' mandate. Even as they never forgave the Crusaders
who overran their homeland, the Syrians have never absolved
the French and the Britains for dividing their homeland.
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After World War II, France reluctantly departed and Syria
became an independent republic. The Syrians still celebrate
April 17, the date of the 1946 French withdrawal, as
Evacuation Day.
As with so many countries born in the past 50 years,
Syria's modern history has been a saga of coups and counter-
coups. From 1946 to 1958, the traditional Syrian politicians
put Syria for adoption and squabbled and wrangled among each
other for selecting the proper foster parent. In 1958,
Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser won the bid and merged
his country with Syria to form the United Arab Republic but
the union lasted only three and one half years. In 1963, the
Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party overthrew
President Nazem Koudsi and seized power in Damascus.
6
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III. ASSAD'S BIOGRAPHY AND HIS TACTICS IN
SEIZING THE 'LEADERSHIP' IN SYRIA
After leading a bloodless coup in 1970, Hafez Assad took
over. His name in Arabic means "Protector of Lion". He has
trod through the carnage of Middle Eastern politics with the
cunning and stealth of a big cat. He fought the Yom Kipper
War, signed a disengagement agreement with Israel over the
Golan Heights in 1974. He sent his army into Lebanon in 1976
to save the Maronite from Muslim forces. He told Time
Correspondent Wilton Wynn in 1977 that he was ready to make
peace with the Israelis if they would withdraw from the ter-
ritory they had captured in the 1967 War. He sabotaged the
Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty that U.S. brokered. He is
disenchanted with U.S. diplomacy and believes that foreign-
ers had trifled with Syria long enough.3 The political
observers rate Assad as a first class statesman, strong
ruler with great dreams of the past glory, trying to be
Saladin's heir and successor. It is appropriate to shed the
light on Assad's background and achievement in Syria.
Under the leadership of President Hafez Assad, Syria has
been transformed from a weak, shaky and vulnerable country
into an apparently strong and stable state, a regional power
in the Middle East. Indeed, in a country which for genera-
tions had been torn by vigorous centrifugal forces and
3 Time, Saladin's Shaky Successors, Dec. 19, 1983, p. 33.
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jolted by military coups and countercoups, the Ba'ath Party
has been able during the last two decades to establish an
unchallenged, highly centralized reign in Damascus. Syria,
which for decades had been an object of annexationist tenden-
cies from several of its Arab neighbors and threatened by
Israeli military might, has become under Assad's leadership
one of the most influential, assertive powers in the region.
Not only has Damascus managed to turn part of Lebanon into
its protectorate and part of the PLO into its instrument,
Syria has also challenged Egypt's Arab policy, Iraq's Fertile
Crescent ascendancy, and Israel's military superiority, and
it has threatened Jordan's rapprochement with Arafat's PLO.
Finally, while securing massive Soviet military and strategic
guarantees, but without becoming a Soviet client, Damascus
has caused the USA to acknowledge its powerful position in
4
the region.
Hafez Assad is a native of the small town of Qardaha or
(Kirdaha) in Latakia Province, Syria. According to an
official source, he was born in 1930; other sources give the
year as 1928. The oldest son of a farming family with
modest land holding, he grew up as a member of the Alawite
sect a secretive Shi'ite Islamic religious community concen-
trated in hillside towns clustered near the Mediterranean
4Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, "Syria under Assad" The
Emergency of Modern Syria, St. Martin's Press, New York,
1986, p. 9.
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port of Latakia in Northwestern Syria and in sporadic
villages in the central plain of Syria around the City of
Homs. Alawites comprise about 13 percent of the Syrian
population of ten million. They make up about half of the
Syrian army and occupy most of the top posts in the armed
forces and the ruling Ba'ath Party.
After completing his primary education at the Qardaha
School, Assad attended the Latakia Secondary School, where
he was a student in the scientific section. Early in his
student years, he joined the Ba'ath Party, formally known as
Hizb al-ba'ath al-arabi al-istiraki (Arab Socialist Renais-
sance Party). As a student activist, Assad was reportedly
jailed for a time by the French, who occupied Syria until
1946, when the country attained full independence. In 1952,
after completing his secondary education, Assad enrolled in
the Homs Military College. Later, he studied at the Air
Academy, from which he graduated in 1955 as a pilot officer
with the rank of lieutenant. In 1958, he was sent to the
Soviet Union for specialized instruction in night combat.
In 1957, the year after Syria merged with Egypt in the
United Arab Republic under the leadership of Egyptian
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Assad was assigned to Cairo as
a squadron leader in the UAR air force. There he and two
other 'Alawi officers - Muhamad'Umran and Salah J'did
founded and led a clandestine group of Syrian officers known
as the Military Committee who were sympathetic to the Ba'ath
9
principles. The UAR was, however, not destined to last
because the Union between the countries turned out to be not
the Arab love affair projected in Ba'ath literature but the
military overlordship of Syria by the Egyptian Army. Syrian
soldiers, who became directly subordinate to Egyptian com-
mands, were particularly alienated - especially officers who,
on suspicion of being against union were ordered to Egypt and
placed under surveillance, and in 1961, when the Syrians
threw off the yoke of union, the Ba'ath Party which emerged
as a leading force, was divided. Aflag and Bitar remained in
control as founders, but the secret Ba'ath military committee
was full of doubts about the civilian leadership. There lies
a good circumstance that distinguishes Assad from the
ordinary strongman. Not only does he represent a religious
minority, and not only is he associated with a highly ideo-
logical political party, but he comes from a minority wing of
that party which usurped power from the Party's founders.
Assad was a key figure in a coup d'etat staged by the
Military Committee on March 8, 1963 that toppled the
secessionists, brought the Ba'ath to power in Syria, and
inaugurated an ambitious program of socialist reorganization.
He was appointed Commander of the Syrian Air Force and
elevated to the rank of General of Division in December,
1964. But the Ba'ath, unaccustomed to ruling, was plagued by
a factionalism that erupted into another coup by a radical
wing of the Party on February 23, 1966. The success of the
10
radicals seemed assured when Assad switched to their side,
repudiating his allegiance to the moderate incumbents headed
by Lieutenant General Amin of Hafiz. Following the removal
of Hafiz from power, Assad was appointed Minister of
Defense, at the same time retaining command of the Air
Force. During the six-day Arab-Israeli War of June 1967,
which ended with two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force
destroyed on the ground and with Israel in control of about
one-seventh of Syrian territory, Assad's military leadership
was put to a severe test, and he regarded himself personally
responsible for the defeat.
During the late 1960's, the Ba'ath Party was racked by a
power struggle between its "military wing", led by Assad,
and its "civilian wing", headed by Major General Salah
J'did, a fellow Alawite officer and Assistant Secretary
General of the Party. Assad gave priority to the goal of
liberating the Israeli held territories and wanted to
strengthen Syria's position after its 1967 military setback
by trying to improve relations with other Arab countries and
to win support for the Ba'ath program front the urban middle
classes at home. His views were opposed as insufficiently
revolutionary by J'did, who wanted the main emphasis placed
on domestic economic development along Marxist lines, a
policy favored by the USSR.
The two factions clashed openly on several occasions
during the period from 1968 to 1970, but each time a
11
compromise was worked out that kept representatives of both
camps in the leadership, Assad's attempt to seize control of
the government in a coup in February, 1969 was thwarted by
Soviet threats to cut off all military and economic aid to
Syria if he succeeded. Syria's intervention in the fighting
that broke out in Jordan in September, 1970 led to the
ultimate clash between Assad and J'did. When Syrian troops
tried unsuccessfully to aid Palestinian commandos battling
the forces of Jordan's King Hussein, Assad blamed J'did's
faction and President Premier Nuredin el-Atassi for what he
considered a risky misadventure. They in turn criticized
Assad for not providing air support for the Syrian troops, a
move that in his view would have dangerously widened the
conflict. When J'did tried to oust Assad, the latter was
able to command the loyalty of the army and to take control
of the government on November 13, 1970 in a bloodless coup.
He then ordered J'did into exile in Egypt.
As Syria's new Premier and strongman, Assad appointed a
new leadership for the Ba'ath Party and proclaimed a
"corrective movement" to eliminate the mistakes of his
predecessors. Martial law was repealed, the news media were
given freer reign, and other civil rights measures were
enacted. Regulation of foreign trade was liberalized and
Syrians were allowed to travel abroad without restrictions.
To encourage the return of skilled Syrians living in other
countries, Assad lifted restrictions on the holding of funds
12
in foreign banks by Syrian nationals. He also granted
amnesty to a number of political exiles who had left the
country duilng the series of coups that had convulsed Syria
since 1946.
On the economic front, Assad launched a five-year
development plan, including the construction of a large dam
on the Euphrates that would greatly increase the number of
farms under irrigation. Although the state continued to own
the large industries and banks, Assad encouraged private
enterprise in tourism, construction, and transportation.
Wages and family allowances were raised, and the prices of
such essentials as tea, coffee, sugar and flour were
reduced.
Unlike his predecessor Salah J'did, Assad has neither
shared authority with his comrades in a collective leader-
ship nor held the reigns of power from a modest position,
such as Assistant Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party.
Orce he determined to assume control, Assad worked systemat-
ically to realize full authority. After a brief transi-
tional period of holding the dual positions of Prime
Minister and Defense Minister, Assad formed a new presiden-
tial system early in 1971. Under Syria's permanent Consti-
tution, promulgated on January 31, 1973, the president
(Assad) was bestowed with extensive political and military
powers as well as substantial legislative authority. For
example, being elected for i seven-year term (Article 85),
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the president establishes the general policy of the state and
supervises its application (Article 94). He nominates one or
more vice presidents, the presidert of the Council of
Ministers, the ministers and assistance ministers. Moreover,
he undertakes responsibility for receiving their resignation,
or for dismissing them (Article 85). "The President of the
Republic declares war or calls for general mobilization"
(Article 100) ; he is the "supreme leader of the army and
armed forces ...." (Article 103); he "appoints civil and
military functionaries and ends their services in conformity
with the law" (Article 106). "The President of the Republic
promulgates the laws passed by the Council of People. He has
the right to oppose the laws by a reasonable resolution..."
(Article 98). He is entitled to "d.ssolve the Council by a
justified resolution he promulgates" (Article 107); he
"exercises the legislative authority during periods of
prorogation in the intervals between... two councils..." and
"during sessions in cases of necessity pertinent to the
national interests of the country" (Article 111) and he "has
the right to refer important questions, related to the
interests of the country, to citizens. The results of the
referendum are obligatory..." (Article 113).
The constitution gives the president almost unlimited
control of the country. Assad exercises this control
through the formal institutions of the State: the
presidenc,, the cabinet, the government machincy, tk,.;
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armed command, as well as the Council of People. To these,
one should add Assad's leadership of the Ba'ath Party, which
is, according to the constitution (Article 7), "the leading
party of the society and state" - as Secretary General of
both its regional and national commands. He also dominates
the "National Progressive Front", the coalition of the Ba'ath
and three left-wing and national parties or groups. Not
content with exercising his authority through the official
government institutions and the party machinery, Assad exerts
his power simultaneously through other channels as well. One
of these is the team of advisors in the presidential office
who is separately assigned to political, military, security
and economical affairs, and who applies certain supervisory
functions over the government machinery. A more important
pivotal body is an unofficial group, called the Jama'a
(company), which is mainly composed of the founding members
of Assad's regime and his current core team.
The major tasks of the Jama'a are to assist Assad in
safeguarding the regime against its enemies, in exercising
effective control in the country and in tackling critical
issues in Syria's domestic and foreign policies from a level
above the regular government machinery. Although there have
been rivalries and rifts between certain members of the
Jama'a, notably between the president's younger brother,
Rif'at Assad and Mustafa Tlas, the Defense Minister, most
15
if not all members have been completely loyal to Hafez Assad.
Among those of special importance in the Jama'a are the
commanders of the elite army units assigned to protect the
nerve centers of the regime, such as the presidential palace,
radio and television stations, airports and the like. The
conspicuous units are "Defense Companies" and "the Special
Forces", which are stationed near Damascus and equipped with
their own helicopters, planes, artillery and other modern
material. One of these units is commanded by Assad's
brother, who was elected in 1975 to the Ba'ath National
Command. In 1984, Rif'at was appointed a vice president, and
one of three, in an attempt to contain his ambition to
succeed his then ailing brother. Other weighty members of
the Jama'a are officers in charge of the major combat
divisions of the Syrian army and the various military
intelligence services, notably Air Force Intelligence, which
has greatly helped Assad in both his ascendancy and rule.
What also helped Assad, "the Supreme Commander of the
Army", wield a power that is most crucial to the regime's
stability is that he personally appointed a large number of
officers as commanders, or to other key positions of the
select combat units. The criterion for their selection, as
for the choice of the top government ministers, is that they
are personal, Alawi-communal and Ba'ath-partisan friends,
relatives or comrades. Among these are a number of Sunni-
Muslim personalities, such as Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas
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and Chief-of-Staff Hiknat Shihabi, whose loyalty to Assad are
beyond doubt and at the same time they are not more than
figures. Within the officer corps, however, the number of
Alawis holding various command positions - the substructure
of Assad's regime - greatly exceeds the proportion of Alawis
(13 percent) in the total population. The famous 70th
Armored Brigade, assigned to protect the regime's centers,
was under the command of Izzat J'did, a close relative.
From the outset, Assad has systematically endeavored to
avoid an image of his regime as being based on confessional
military support, or a junta of Alawi army officers. He
adopted measures to emphasize the people's participation in
shaping his regime. In May, 1973 (and again in August,
1977), Syrian citizens elected their first National Council
(Parliament), which previously had been an appointed body.
Representatives of several parties as well as "independent"
delegates have successively been elected to the National
Council. With the Ba'ath Party, these older parties - the
Communist Party, the "Socialist Arab Union" and the "Arab
Socialists" - formed in 1972 a "National Progressive Front"
under the initiative and direction of Assad.
The outstanding moves made by Assad since his ascendancy
have been directed at appcasing or neutralizing the
conservative Sunni Muslim circles, particularly the
religious leadership. In 1971, Assad restored to the Syrian
constitution the previous formulation of the presidential
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oath, "I swear by Allah Akbar", which had been replaced by a
secular format ("I swear on my honor and my faith") in the
1969 constitution. In the Permanent Constitution of March,
1973, he reinstated the paragraph establishing the religion
of the president as Islam; this had been deleted previously
from both the 1969 constitution and the draft Permanent
Constitution. Assad has made other gestures to underzcore
his public image as a faithful Muslim, suh as publicly
participating in prayers and religious ceremonies at various
mosques, distributing honors among Muslim religious leaders
(ulama), raising them in rank and salary, and nominating the
promincnt Alim as Minister of War in the government.
Assad's own authenticity as a Muslim was verified by Sunni
Muslim ulama, including the Mufti of Damascus, Ahmad
Kaftaru; and he succeeded in having the leader of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon, the late Imam Musa al-Sadr, certify
that the Alawis are Shi'ite Muslims. Thus Assad has shown
his awareness of the importance of Islam as the majority
religion and as a value shared by the entire Syrian
population.
It appears that all these maneuvers and flexibility
failed to satisfy the Sunni Muslims in general and the
Muslim Brotherhood in particular whose strong opposition to
Assad's regime culminated in February 1982 when they
initiated an armed rebellion in the city of Hama and took
control of the city after killing tens of government and
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and military personnel. In reaction, elite units of the
Syrian army fiercely shelled the city, destroying large
parts of it and killing an estimated 30,000 inhabitants,
men, women and children. The opposition movement, guided
and led bv the Mus'lim Brotherhocd underground crganizatior,
represents not only the conservative and fundamentalist
elements, who have struggled since 1963 against the
allegedly secularist, anti-Islamic, sectarian Alawi regime.
This opposition has represented in the last two decades or
so other sections of the population, mostly city dwellers,
whose socio-economic interests and/or political-civil rights
and beliefs have been hurt or violated by the Ba'ath regime.
Among these are many members of the traditional urban middle
class or merchants and artisans, many of them conservative
Muslims, who resent both the socialist, secularist measures
of the regime as well as its disposition to develop the
rural areas, allegedly at the expense of the cities. The
latter grievance is also shared by not a few urban
intellectuals, professionals and other members of the
intelligentsia , who complain bitterly about the suppression
of their basic political and civil liberties.
But the Ba'ath derives its power and support from large
sectors of the Syrian population who have benefited from the
regime or that share the Ba'ath concepts. Besides the
Alawi, Druze and Isma'ili minorities, many thousands of
Sunni peasants and urban workers have significantly improved
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their socio-economic conditions under the Ba'ath regime. In
addition, there are thousands of members of the intelligent-
sia who support the regime out of interest or belief. For
the last two decades, many thousands of youngsters have been
educated and indoctrinated in Ba'athist ideology, and many
of them are ardent supporters of the regime. All these
groups and sectors may in the long run constitute the new
and cohesive political society and a solid basis for the
Ba'ath regime. In a future struggle between such socio-
political forces and the conservative urban Sunni Muslim
sections of the population, the former are likely to have
the upper hand.
Finally, here are some of Assad's personal qualities and
political skills that largely account for the preservation
of his position. His appearance, tall and grave, his
conduct, calm and cool, and his dignified bearing all
bespeak a strong personality, which is manifested, inter
alia, in his determination, consistency and stubbornness.
He possesses an air of authority and confidence, acquired
during his military career. These qualities make him a
natural leader, and with his traits of modesty and honesty,
also make him a popular idol with whom ordinary people
readily identify. In addition, Assad is a shrewd politi-
cian, with an instinctive cautiousness, patience and
realism - which possibly stem from his peasant minority
background. He is a systematic, though slow, thinker and
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has rare habit of listening to others and learning from his
own mistakes. 5He is a cautious and pragmatic leader who
nonetheless appreciates the uses and limits of brinkmanship.
Unfailingly courteous, the Syrian President inevitably
begins meetings with a disarming jest before buckling down
to what can become six hours of hard negotiating. "He gives
his thoughts away bit by bit, like peeling an onion," says a
Western diplomat. "He will just keep talking until you get
tired." He has a superb grasp of detail and rarely refers to
notes. On the other hand, he prefers to speak in
generalities that sometimes are so ambiguous that diplomats
leave his presence scratching their heads. His decision
making can be equally mysterious. After listening
expressionlessly to his small knot of Western-educated
advisors, Assad usually retires to read voraciously about
the question at hand, then flatly announces a decision,
often by telephoning an aid late at night. Neither a smoker
nor a drinker, Assad, the father of five children, lives
quietly with his wife Anisa in a heavily guarded palace in
Damascus. 6
In politics, Assad plays what has been called an "open
game", always preserving as many options as possible. If he
5This analysis is derived from two main sources:
a) Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, "Syria under Assad," pp
25-34. b) The New Yorker, "Letter from Syria," by Joseph
Kraft, June 17, 1974, pp 92-105.
6Time, "World", December 19, 1983, p. 32.
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uses violence to achieve his goals, whether overt force or
covert means, there is nothing impetuous about it. Calibra-
tion is the characteristic of Assad's famous ruthlessness.
Usually he gives his adversaries and his allies room to back
away from confrontation, and when he does make a move the
risk and the likely response appear calculated with extra-
ordinary care. "You must remember this about Hafez Assad,"
said a Christian Lebanese politician who has negotiated with
him often, and warily, "he never completely embraces his
allies and never definitely breaks with his enemies--- he is
"7
a master of suspense, a Hitchcock of policy.
Assad's word is a bond. For nearly two decades, Israeli
intelligence officers and academics have studied his words
for clues "and when he does, he means what he says."
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin calls him "the best
enemy Israel has." What he means is that while it's almost
impossible to reach an accord with him, Assad keeps his word
when an agreement is made - like one holding Israeli and
Syrian troops apart in the Golan Heights.
That Assad has lasted 20 years is no small feat in a land
of which a former Syrian president, quoted in the New
York Times Magazine (May 18, 1975), said of his countrymen,
7Foreign Affairs, "Assad and His Allies: Irreconcilable
Differences," by Christopher Dicky, Vol. 66, No. 1, Fall
1987, pp 59-62.
22
"Fifty percent of the Syrians consider themselves national
leaders, 25 percent think they are prophets, and ten percent
imagine they are gods." 8 These characteristics, together
with his deep and intimate knowledge of the Syrian political
scene and his keen interest in inter-Arab and global
politics, have made Assad a politician and a statesman of
national, regional and, to some extent, international
standing.
There is a consensus among the political observers that
the strength and success of Assad's regime derive from three
other important factors: The Alawi community, the Syrian
Army and the Ba'ath Party. In the few following pages,
these factors would be analyzed as a prior step to the
discussion of Assad's foreign policy.
8World Report, "Is the Protector of Lions Losing his
Touch?" by John S. Lang, November 10, 1986, pp 28-29.
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IV. THE ALAWI COMMUNITY: ITS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
The Alawis are known by another name - The Nusairis.
The Nusairis take their name from Abu Shu-aib Muhammad Ibn
Nusair an-Numairi (c.ca.270 Islamic Era, 883 Common Era),
who is reported to have attended the circles of the last
three Imams (Islamic spiritual and religious leaders) of the
prophet's line according to the Imami Shi'ah doctrine of the
succeision of Imams: Abu-'l-Hasan 'Ali al-Hadi ibn Muhammad
al-'Askari (214-54 A.H.,829-68 C.E.), Abu Muhammad al-Hasan
ibn 'Ali al-'Askari (230-60 A.H.,844-73 C.E.), and Muhammad
al-Mahdi ibn al-Hasan al-'Askari (b.255 A.H.,868 C.E.). The
teachings and declarations of ibn Nusair brought him into
conflict with the Imams who repudiated and cursed him and
warned their followers of the greater danger (Fitnah) of his
teachings. Ibn Nusair claimed for himself exclusive
authority to interpret the teachings of the Imams by virtue
of a special relationship to them. He proclaimed himself
the "Bab" (door, that is, the sole means of access to the
esoteric knowledge of the Imam in the Imam's absence) of the
Imams and their "Hujjah" (manifest proof, that is, the heir
to their knowledge and their sole representative), and Shi'i
and Sunni sources alike add that he rejected the Islamic
doctrine of the finality of prophecy and declared himself a
Prophet (Nabi) and Prophet-Messenger (rasul).
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Thus the Nusairis emerged as the followers of Ibn Nusair,
repudiated by the very Imams whom they claimed to be
following. "Nusairi" is their religious and historical
name, which they have carried for centuries. They have
sometimes been confused with partially similar groups in
Anatolia and Kurdistan, with whom they have held in common
the belief that 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the close companion,
first cousin, and son-in-law of the Prophet, was a divine
incarnation. This confusion is in part responsible for the
recent designation of the Nusairis as 'Alawis, because the
incarnationist groups in Anatolia have traditionally been
known as 'Alawi (Alevi, in Turkish spelling) and those in
Iran as 'Ali-Ilahis ("deifiers of 'Ali"). The name "'Alawi"
was never applied to the Nusairis until the orientalists
began using it as a designation for them in the 19th
century. They were not officially known as 'Alawis until
September, 1920, when the French occupational forces
instituted the policy of referring to them by that name.
In terms of overall beliefs, the Nusairis have much in
common with the Isma'Ilis, and they are sometimes regarded
as an offshoot of this group. Like the Isma'Ilis and related
groups, the Nusairis are extreme esoterics (batinis) who
contend that the Shari'ah (Islamic law) has both an esoteric,
allegorical (batini) meaning and an exoteric, literal
(Zahiri) meaning and that only the hidden meaning is
intended. The esoteric meaning, according to Nusairi belief,
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is known only to the Imams and was hidden even to the
Prophet himself. Only the Bab has access to this esoteric
meaning in the absence of the Imam, which gives the Bab a
rank second only to the Imams and in Nusairi belief superior
even to the Prophet. Because Ibn Nusair claimed to be a Bab
and a Prophetic Messenger as well, he used his esoteric
authority to abrogate prayer (Salah), Zakah (alms) al Sawm
(fasting), al-Hajj (pilgrimage), and other fundamental
religious obligations as being contrary to the esoteric
(batini) meaning of the Shari'ah and, according to Shi'i and
Sunni sources, permitted a number of things strictly
prohibited in Islamic law such as wine drinking. Nusairi
women are never allowed to learn the religious teachings for
fear that they would expose them to others, and women do not
take part in Nusairi religious practices because the Nusairi
teachings are highly secretive. The teachings are only
learned through a long process of induction and initiation,
which begins for suitable males at the age of 19. The
majority of the Nusairi community is never inducted into
knowledge of the full teachings, which privilege is reserved
to a select elite, the process of selection has clear
Isma'ili parallels and is also strikingly similar to masonic
rituals of induction and initiation.
The Nusairis believe in a holy trinity, the secret
formulaic (Kalimat as-sirr) which consists of the Arabic
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letters 'Ain-Mim-Sin ( , , ) which stand for the three
persons of the trinity. .i, Muhammad, and Salman
al-Farisi, the Persian compinion of the prophet. Each of
these three is said to have been an incarnation of God.
'Ali, however, constitutes the most important part of this
trinity. He is called al-ma'na (the esoteric meaning) and
the prophet Muhammad, who is called al-ism (the outward
esoteric meaning) is said to have been created from 'Ali's
light. Salman al-Farisi, who is called the Bab, is the sole
means of access to the esoteric meaning represented by 'Ali
and consequently is superior in that sense to Muhammad.
These conceptions are expressed in the Nusairi testimony of
faith: "I have borne witness that there is no God but He,
the most High, the object of worship [al-'Ali al-Ma'bud] and
that there is no concealing veil (hijab) except the lord
Muhammad, the object of praise, (as Sayyid Muhammad
al-Mahmud)), and there is no Bab except the lord Salman
al-Farisi." The Nusairis believe in the subseque.nt
incarnation of God in other persons after the passing of
'Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farisi. They differ among
themselves, however, on whether this incarnation was partial
or total, and on whom weze these divine incarnations. Thus
the Nusairis as a whole believe that each of the 12 Imams of
the Isianli line of succession was an incarnation of God, but
some exclude the prophet and Salman al-Farisi as
incarnations of God and restrict the phenomenon to 'Ali and
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the Imam, who descended from him, while others include Ibn
Nusair as d divine incarnation.
Nusairi r-.tual and belief involve the worship of sacred
sprinc,-, trees, and the like - practices believed to be
rooteK in Phoenician paganism. The worship of stars and
other celestial bcdies is also a central part of Nusairi
ritual. ui e of the fundamentals of Nusairi belief connected
to these practices is the rei ,arnation anO transmig-ation
of souls, belief that is also tied to their rejection of
the principal Islimic article cf faith, the physical re-
surrection of the dead and the Last Judgment. According to
Nusairi belief, all human beings originated aZ celestial
bodies but assumed their present form as a consequence of
9
the Fall, as they believe that sinning Alawis become Jews,
10
Muslims or Christians. The successive reincarnations and
transmigrations of souls will end in their restoration as
celestial Lodies. 'Ali is believed to be the "Prince of the
Stars" and, according to some Nusais, is embodied in the
Moon. But the incarnation of God is the most fundamental
Nusairi belief, and consequently, is referred to as the
"greatest of all divine secrets," In connection with this
belief, the Nusairis partake of bread and wine in a ritual
9Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, This analysis is quoted from
Chapter 1, "The Nusairi Sect," pp 42-48.
1 0Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, The Alawi
Community of Syria, April 1984, p. 135 by Mahmud A. aksh.
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strikingly like the Christian rite of the Last Supper. The
Nusairis deem the bread and wine to constitute the body and
blood of the incarnate God. They observe and celebrate the
Christmas according to the Greek Orthodox rites and
calendar. They also partake of wine on the occasion of the
Persian New Year festival and call the wine "'Abd-an-Nur"
(the servant of the light [God]), because God has manifested
his presence it it.
Religiously, the Nusairis are divided into three main
sects: Shamsis, Qamaris and Murshidiyyin. The Shamsis (a
derivative of Shams or sun, the astral symbol of Muhammad),
a section of detribalized Nusairis, form a minority in Syria
and are said to pay more reverence to the Prophet Muhammad
than to 'Ali, his cousin and son-in-law. The majority
section, the Qamaris (after Qamar or moon, the astral symbol
of 'Ali), allegedly regard 'Ali as the ma'na or "meaning" of
the divinity as we have mentioned before. The Murshidiyyin
split off from the Qamaris and are followers of Sulayman
al-Murshid, a humble shepherd. Al-Murshid claimed prophetic
powers in 1923 at the age of 17 and on that account and for
seditious proclivities, suffered death at the hand of
authorities some 23 years later. His sect attracted many
adherents and spread widely among the tribe of al-Khayyatin.
Tribally, the Nusairis are split into four main tribes:
al-Haddadin, al-Khayyatin, al-Kalbiyyah, and al-Matawirah.
Hafez al-Assad and his blood relations belong to the
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Numailatiyyah section of al-Matawira. Assad's sect, the
traditional Qamaris, is led by Sulayman al-Ahmad, who is
usually referred to as "the Bedouin of the Mountain" (Badawi
al-Jabal) and carries the official title of "Servant of the
Prophet's Household" (Khadim Ahl-il-Bayt). He has his
center at Qardahah, Assad's village, and belongs to Assad's
section, the Numailatiyyah, of al-Matawirah tribe.
1 1
What does their religion mean to the Nusairis? Since
many of its tenets are closely guarded and the Nusairis
refuse to discuss them with outsiders, and since only a few
initiates are privy to such knowledge, the doctrine and
theology of the religion remain a mystery for even the
ordinary Nusairi. As a result, the common folk have
developed strong beliefs in amulets, magic and Ziaras
(visitations to the grave sites of certain religious
Shaykhs). Also common is the belief in Khadr, a holy savior
who may reveal himself on occasion in corporeal form, but
in essence is divine. As to the educated, non-initiated
Nusairis who are now the mobilized stratum of the Nusairis
community, they maintain that their religion means little to
them because they lack any knowledge about it. 12
1 1The Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, "Some Observations
on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the
Causes for its Dominance," by Hanna Batatu, Summer 81, pp
331-335.
12Mahmud F. Faksh, p. 136.
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It should be mentioned parenthetically that the leaders
of the Nusairis deny any connection or affinity with astral-
gnosticism or other deviations from conventional Shi'ism.
In a formal proclamation issued in 1973, 80 religious
personages, representing the varicus parts of the Nusairi's
country, unqualifiedly affirmed that their book is the
Qur'aii, that they are Muslim and Shi'i, and, like the
majority of Shi'is, Ithna 'Ashariyyah or Twelvers, that is,
partisans of the 12 imams, and that whatever else is
attributed to them has no basis in truth and is a mere
invention by their enemies and the enemies of Islam. In
this connection, it is significant that when General Salah
J'did, Syria's 'Alawi strongman in the second half of the
1960s, voiced apprehensions at the rise of sectarian
feelings in the country and his Isma'ili Minister of
Information, Sami-j-Jundi, suggested, as an answer to the
problem and a check to the suspicion nursed by the other
communities, the publication of the secret books of the
'Alawi sect, J'did sharply rejoined: "Tf we did this, our
Shaykhs would crush us."
13
From an Islamic standpoint, then, the religious beliefs
and practices of the Nusairis ('Alawis) set them off as a
distinct religion, neither Islamic, nor Christian, nor
Jewish, and it has always been the consensus of the Muslim
1 3Hanna Batatu, p. 335.
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"ulama", both Sunni and Shi'i, that the Nusairis (Alawis)
are Kuffar (disbelievers, rejectors of faith) and idolators
(rushrikun). 14
14 Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, p. 48.
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V. THE ALAWI RISE TO POWER
The two major national organizations that were instrumen-
tal in the Alawi rise to power and eventual control of politi-
cal life in Syria were the Ba'ath Party and the military.
With respect to the former, many educated Alawis and members
of other religious minorities, such as the Druze and
Isma'ilis, found the Ba'ath most appealing, as they sought to
free themselves of minority status. The secular ideology of
the Ba'ath may explain why a higher proportion than their
representation in the population at large joined its ranks.
The notion of a secular state, socialist political system,
advocated by the Ba'ath, was extremely attractive to minori-
ties. Such a system would certainly weaken the traditional
Sunni-urban establishment's hegemony in Syrian political life
and, consequently, would eliminate the prevailing political
and socio-economic discrimination against heterodox Muslim
minorities. The Ba'athist secular national ideology regarded
them as full Arab Syrian nationals, irrespective of religion,
and admitted them to unfettered party membership. They were
allowed to be active in party politics and to compete for
power with other groups on an equal basis both regionally (in
the Latakian region) and nationally.
The Ba'ath Party, like most Syrian parties, reflected the
traditional paramountcy of regionalism in political life.
Consequently, the party's disproportionate expansion in
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the Latakia region gave the Alawis a strong base from which
to gain power in the region in the 1950s and in the nation
later.
When the Ba'ath Party came to power in a coup d'etat by a
group of Ba'athist army officers on March 9, 1963, the Alawis
were able, from their firm organizational regional base in
Latakia, to increase their strength in the party and to
position themselves in less than three years in high party
and government positions. They triumphantly controlled the
party and national politics between 1966 and 1970 under Alawi
General Salah J'did, and now do so under Alawi General Hafez-
Assad, who has been president since February 22, 1971. This
marked a radical change in the composition of the Syrian
political elite.
After 1963, the way was opening for persons from the rural
lower strata and minority groups to be at the forefront of
Syrian political life, which, in turn, would bring about
drastic socio-economic and political benefits for the rural
poor and members of religious minorities who had previously
been ignored. This can also be shown more accurately by
examining the composition of the Regional Commands of the
Ba'ath Party, which became the center of political power
after March, 1963. Table I reveals that Alawis, among
religious minorities, had the strongest representation since
1966, reaching its highest (23.4 percent) between 1966 and
1970 when Alawi General Salah J'did held the party reins.
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TABLE I
Sectarian Representation in the Syrian
Commands of the Ba'ath Party
(1963-1978)
Regional CcmTand No. 1-4 5-8 9-11 i-li
Period 9/63-2/66 3/66-11/70 11/70-11/78 9/63-11/78Religion % (No) % (No) % (No) % (No)Sunni 54.0 (27) 51.6 (33) 69.6 (39) 58.2 (99)
Alawi 14.0 ( 7) 23.4 (15) 21.4 (12) 20.0 (34)
Druze 20.0 (10) 9.4 ( 6) 3.6 (2) 10.0 (18)
IsIa' ii 10.0 (5) 9.4 ( 6) - - 6.5 (i)
Christian 2.0 (1) 6.3 (4) 5.4 (3) 4.7 ( 8)
Total 100.0 (50) 100.0 (64) 100.0 (56) 100.0 (70)
Source: Nikolaus Van Dan, The Struggle for Power in Syria, London, 1979,
Table 5.
During the J'did period, there was no representation at
all of people from Damascus, Aleppo and Hama; the predominant-
ly rural areas of Latakia, Hawran and Dayr al-Zur together
accounted for 65.6 percent of the entire roster of the
Regional Commands. he .nclusion of many Sunni members from
Damascus (25.0 percent) in 1970-78 only indicates the desire
of Alawi General Hafez Assad to win this important urban
segment to his side in order to lessen the Alawi regime's
isolation from the critical urban masses. It was a tactical
political move, designed to pacify the capital city, but not
to set in motion the trend toward enhanced Sunni-urban parti-
cipation. The same treatment was not extended to Aleppo, the
other Sunni-urban center, which was kept isolated and had no
representation at all during the same period.
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The other and more important national organization that
many educated, mobilized Alawis and other religious minori-
ties were attracted to and through which they came to power-
ful positions in national political life is the army. They
flocked to it in numbers far greater than their percentage of
the population. As they rose in rank, the Alawis in particu-
lar became a significant component of the Syrian officer
class. The Alawis, Druze and Isma'ilis who together repre-
sent about one-sixth of the population, are better represen-
ted in the armed forces, both among the officers and the
enlisted men, than is the Sunni majority.
There are a number of reasons for the non-representative-
ness of the Syrian army. First, the French had encouraged
minority recruitment as a means to counter the nationalist
tendencies of the Arab-Sunni majority and to secure the
allegiance of the minority communities. Second, minority
groups came mainly from economically less developed rural
areas and were, therefore, attracted by the economic
opportunities and social advancement of a career in the army.
Third, following independence, the Sunni townsmen, who had
led the Arab nationalist struggle against the French, in-
directly reinforced the trend toward overrepresentation of
minorities in the army; they avoided sending their sons to
military service by paying a redemption fee (badal 'askari) or
refused to let them join the army as a profession. They con-
sidered the military academy at Homs as "a place for the
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lazy", the rebellious, the academically backward, or the
socially undistinguished. It was certainly not a fit place
for the sons of Sunni-urban, middle- and upper-class families,
who could afford to provide university education or to subsi-
dize business ventures instead. The minority, rural poor saw
the military academy as a doorway to social advancement and
economic security. All this meant that the urban Sunnis no
longer held the upper hand. The situation within the army
was well described in a 1949 report: All units of any impor-
tance as well as the important parts ('anasir) were under
command of persons originating in [religious] minorities.
After the coup of March, 1963, minority officers,
especially Alawis and Druze, became more active as a group in
the ensuing power struggle among Ba'athist army officers.
They spearheaded a minoritarian-rural, radical-revolutionary
faction against the moderate lower-middle-class Sunni
Ba'athist officers. The end came in a bloody takeover in
1966 by the minoritarian-rural-radical faction, which
cemented its control. The event marked an important change
in Syrian post-independence history; control of the Syrian
army and Syrian political life had passed to the heterodox
Muslim minorities, led by the Alawis; the Sunni majority was
in a subordinate, inactive position. In 1966 and 1968, the
Alawi faction terminated the other two minoritarian-
sectarian factions (the Druze and the Isma'ilis), and became
the master of Syria. Since then, the Alawis discriminated
37
against the Sunnis in the armed forces, have given preference
to their co-religionists in appointments and promotions, and
have shown favoritism in the development of their home region
- all of which have bolstered the communal solidarity that
has helped to maintain their dominance.
The rise of poor people from the rural and religious
minority areas in Syria since early 1963, and the eventual
control by the Alawis of the reins of power starting in 1966
are manifest in the regional and sectarian backgrounds of
military members of the Syrian Regional Commands of the
Ba'ath Party, which are the leading indicators of power in
the army and in the party. Between 1963 and 1978, officers
from the predominantly Alawi region of Latakia had the
highest representation (49.0 percent) among all military
members; the traditionally Sunni regions of Damascus and
Aleppo had only 5.7 percent each. In terms of religious
minoritarian background, Table II shows that Alawi officer
representation increased from 30 percent in 1963-66 to 42.1
percent in 1966-70, and to 42.9 percent in 1970-78. During
the same periods, Druze officers declined from 25 percent to
none; the Isma'ilis went from 10 percent to 15.8 percent and
dropped to none in 1970-78. The Alawis were clearly the
preponderant minority force in the Ba'athist military
structure.
Although between 1970 and 1978 Sunni officer representa-
tion in the Ba'ath Regional Command (57.1 percent) outnumber
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TABLE II
Sectarian Background of the Military Members of the
Syrian Regional Commands of the Ba'ath Party
(1963-1978)
Regional Ccmmand No. 1-4 5-8 9-11 1-11
Period 9/63-2/66 3/66-11/70 11/70-11/78 9/63-11/78
19MelIon % (No) % (No) % (No) % (No)
Sunni 35.0 ( 7) 42.1 ( 8) 57.1 (8) 43.4 (23)
Alawi 30.0 ( 6) 42.1 ( 8) 42.9 (6) 37.7 (20)Druze 25.0 (5) . - . 9.4 (5)
Isna'ili 10.0 ( 2) 15.8 (3) - - 9.4 (5)
Christian - - - - - -
Total 100.0 (20) 100.0 (19) 100.0 (14) 100.0 (53)
Source: Nikolaus Van Dan, The Struggle for Pcwer in Syria, London, 1979,
Table 6.
that of the Alawi (42 percent), the figures do not tell the
story about actual power in the armed forces. First, Sunni
officers come from various regions, and have no common ties
and interests to support the sectarian loyalty that would
help knit together a regional-sectarian bloc, as is the case
with the officers belonging to territorial compact minorities.
Sunni officers neither represented nor led strong army fac-
tions to contest the supremacy of Alawi officers. They could
act only on an individual basis, not as a group. Second,
only Alawi officers were trusted" because of communal ties
with the important strategic, political and intelligence
positions in the armed forces. They also commanded key army
strike units and special forces stationed close to or around
the capital, Damascus, while many Sunni officers were
39
" WENiOHa
assigned to less important units in faraway regions. A few
Sunni officers are kept in high positions to satisfy the
different Sunni elements and to dispel the impression that
key military posts are held mainly by Alawis. Such officers
have no independent power nor a base of support from which to
muster strength of their own within the armed forces. They
remain as long as they act in line with Assad's policies.
Third, during this period, Assad cooperated with leading
Sunni Damascene Ba'athist officers in an effort to win
Damascus to his side. They were given high representation
(21.4 percent) in the military structure of the Regional
Commands of the Ba'ath, but the outlying traditional Sunni
towns of Aleppo and Hama had no representation at all. These
were the two main areas where major Sunni opposition to Alawi
hegemony was strong and violent.
The increasing Alawi domination of political life in
Syria since 1966 has had two major antithetical and polariz-
ing consequences. On the one hand, it has strengthened Alawi
cohesion and consciousness, with attendant discrimination
against Sunnis, especially urbanites. On the other hand, it
has engendered Sunni reaction and opposition, spearheaded by
the urban-centered movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-
Ikhawan al Muslimun).
1 5
1 5This section ('The Alawi Rise to Power" is quoted and
derived from Mahmud M. Faksh, pp 140-145.
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VI. THE SYRIAN IDEOLOGICAL PARTIES
Since her inception as a political entity, Syria has wit-
nessed the rise of three ideological parties - the Hizb
al-Ba'ath, tne Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri al-Ijtima'i (SSNP), and
the Syrian Communist Party which competed for the loyalties
of Syria's high school and college students particularly
after the independence.
In this paper, our concern would be of the first two par-
ties, because of the important roles that they have played in
the Syrian political life. These parties fcund fertile ground
for recruitment, notably in Latakia area. especially among
Christians and Alawis. One of the important reasons that
helped these parties flourish in the Latakia area is that
poverty minority status heightened most high school students'
resentment toward wealthy landowners and the existing order.
Small 'Alawi tobacco farmers were forced to sell their crops
to Sunni enterpreneurs on the coast, often for inadequate3
remuneration. The 'Alawis could not change this situation by
ousting a few people as in Hama; a basic social and political
revolution was required in their society.
1 6
Although both the SSNP and the Ba'ath recruited
ex-peasant, lower middle class groups in the Latakia area,
.
6Michael H. Van Dusen, "Political Integration and
Regionalism in1 Syria," the Middle East Journal, Volume XXVI,
Spring, 1972, p. 122.
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and although the Ba'ath outlived the SSNP, the latter was
initially far more successful in this region. The SSNP
started recruiting in the late 1930s and the party was imme-
diately popular among ooth Christian and 'Alawi groups. By
the mid 1940s, the SSNP was well entrenched, particularly in
th Christian Safita district where the party maintained some
of its own high schools.
1 7
The competition between the Ba'ath and the SSNP was great,
and high school students of all faiths were usually attracted
to one of the two parties or both. While the SSNP was
popular among both Christians and 'Alawis, the Ba'ath
appealed mostly to 'Alawis and to some Sunnis on the coast.
By the 1950s, the Ba'ath and the SSNP were sending equal
numbers of their members to the officer corps and universify,
a situation which, of co.rse, changed with the mid 1950
crackdown on the SSNP.
After Shishakli's eclipse, che army had regained its
influence on Syrian's government and had again become an
important factor in the country's politics. The -wo groups
which were competing most vigorously for the officers'
loyalties were the Ba'ath and SSNP. The ideological struggle
between these two parties was very strong. On April 22,
1955, Lieutenant Colonel Adnan Malki, the Chief of the Third
Bureau of the Syrian army staff, was assassinated by Yunis
17ibid , Michael Van Dusen.
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Abd-al-Rahim, a sergeant who happened to be a member of the
SSNP. What followed could be called a mass persecution of the
SSNP. Army officers with links to the party were purged, the
immunity to its deputy to parliament was lifted, and a trial
involving charges of treason and conspiracy was instituted.
The proceedings were definitely political despite the outward
forms of legality observed by the authorities. The legal
proceedings notwithstanding, it was not certain that Malki's
assassination was an act of premeditated conspiracy. Certain
evidence pointed to personal motives, and the connection of
the assassin with the SSNP might have been coincidental.
1 8
The result of this incident was that the Ba'ath Party with
their cooperation with Egyptian protege Abdul Hamid Saraj and
his Cabal succeeded to launch a purge movement against the
SSNP and its goal of creating a Syrian nation state comprised
of present Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus and
Alexandretta. In other words, the ideology of Arab national-
ism defeated the ideology of pan-Syrianism.
Since 1966, when the Alawis consolidated their supremacy
in Syria, all signs indicate that Syria is going in the
direction of pan-Syrianism. In the following few pages we
are going to demonstrate some main excerpts of the constitu-
tions, programs and teachings of the two aforementioned
parties. We start first by the SSNP.
1 8George Lenczowsi, "The Middle East in World Affairs,"
Fourth Edition, 1980, p. 338.
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VII. THE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONAL PARTY
Antun Sa'ada (1904-49), the founder of Syrian regional
nationalism, was the son of a physician of Greek Orthodox
faith who migrated to South America. Saadeh returned to
Lebanon in 1929, and for a time tutored German at the
American University of Beirut. He developed the idea that
the Syrian nation differed from the Arab nation and consisted
of a unique historical synthesis of Arabs, Phoenicians, and
other groups who lived in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and
part of Palestine and who therefore must be united under the
flag of Greater Syria. This nation would form a homogeneous
society in which traditional group loyalties, feudal land
relations, and capitalism would be abolished and religion
separated from the state. These ideas, which Saadeh regarded
as scientific national philosophy and made mandatory learning
for his disciples, were embodied in a program that formed the
ideological basis of the Syrian Social National Party and had
a lasting impact on the thinking of some Arab intellectuals.
The party began as a secret organization in 1932 and was dis-
covered by the authorities in November, 1935. Saadeh and his
lieutenants were arrested, charged with plotting against the
state, and sentenced to prison. The SSNP attracted both Mus-
lim and Christian Arab intellectuals, for its prime purpose
was independence and the assertion of national identity.
After 1945, the idea of a Greater Syria, which was the
44
backbone of Saadeh's nationalism, no longer appealed to the
Christians of Lebanon who feared that they would be lost in
the Muslim majority. Nor did the idea appeal to Muslim Arab
nationalists, who had begun to think in terms of a union of
the entire Arab-speaking world. It appeals to those groups
who are interested in maintaining Syria's national existence
and making it the center of a large Arab political entity.
It also appeals to extremist secularists, including some
Christian, 'Alawi and Druze Arabs, who feel that neither
Islam nor any other religion should be made the basis of
nationalism, since they consider national bonds, such as
19
language and history, stronger than religion.
It may rightly be said that Saadeh's condemnation of
feudalism and his call for economic progress and social jus-
tice formulated within the context of secular nationalism and
corporatism have been preserved and reshaped under the new
ideology of Arab socialism. There is a striking similar-
ity between the principles of the Syrian party and the writ-
ings of some contemporary socialists. Saadeh's missionary
appeal on behalf of independence left its imprint on all
subsequent Arab revolutionary movements. Many of Saadeh's
19 Kemal H. Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in the
Contemporary Middle East," The Principles of Syrian Nationalism
and its Party, Paraeger Publishers, U.S.A., 1982, pp 51-52.
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followers joined the Ba'ath. In recent years, the party was
20
legalized and moved to populism and revolutionism.
A. THE REFORM PRINCIPLES OF THE SSNP
The following principles embody the constitution of the
party.
1. The First Principle.
Separation between religion and state. Saadeh declared
that the religious institutions are great obstacles in the
way of national unity and national welfare too. The principle
of divine right is a dangerous one and has enslaved many
people to the point of exhaustion.
2 1
2. The Second Principle.
Prohibition of the clergy from interference in the
political and judicial matters of national concern. This
principle is implied by the previous one. It is stated here
explicitly to put an end to the indirect interference by
religious institutions in the course of temporal and political
affairs with the hope of directing matters in favor of their
interests. Saadeh said, "It is necessary, therefore, that the
Social Nationalist state have a unified judiciary and one
system of laws." For this unity makes the citizens feel and




2 1ibid., p. 53.
2 2 ibid., p. 55.
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3. The Third Principle.
Removal of the barriers among the different sects.
Saadeh said,
"Undoubtedly there are, among the different sects and
denominations of our nation, traditional barriers not
necessitated by religion. These discordant traditions
derive from the organizations of our religious and denomi-
national institutions and they have exercised a tremendous
influence in weakening the social and economic unity of the
people and delaying our national revival. As long as these
traditional barriers remain, our calls for freedom and for
independence will continue to be cries of pain and signs of
ineptitude. We must break down these barriers in order to
render social unity a deep-rooted fact, and to set up the
Social Nationalist order which will bestow health and power
upon the nation."23
4. The Fourth Principle.
The abolition of feudalism, the organization of
national economy on the basis of production, the security of
the rights of labor, and the protection of the interests of
the nation and of the state. Saadeh said,
"The Syrian Social Nationalist Party wants to realize a
strong national unity in which the Syrian nation may be
enabled to persist in the struggle for life and progress.
This national unity cannot be realized within a bad social
order. Therefore, the realization of social-legal justice
and economic-legal justice are two necessary prerequisites for
the success of the Syrian Nationalist Movement."24
5. The Fifth Principle.
Preparation of a strong army, which will have an
effective role in defending the country and in determining
national destiny. Saadeh said,
2 3 ibid., p. 55.
2 4ibid., p. 56.
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"The competition for the resources of life and suprem-
acy among nations is a question of struggle between nationalinterests. The vital interests of a nation cannot be pro-
tected in the struggle except by force in its two manifes-
tations, the material and the spiritual. Now, spiritual
power, no matter how perfect it may be, is always in need
of material power. In fact, material power is itself an
index and manifestation of an advanced spiritual power.
Hence, it follows that an army and the military virtues are
essential bases for the state. It is our own power that we
trust in attaining our rights and in defending our inter-
ests. We intend to persevere in the struggle for existence
and for supremacy in life, and life and supremacy shall be
our reward."25
6. The Aim and the Program of the Party.
The aim of the Syrian Social National Party is the
creation of a movement which will realize its principles and
revivify the nation, and the establishment of an organization
which will lead to the complete independence of the Syrian
nation, to the affirmation of its sovereignty, the setting up
of a new order capable of protecting its interests and raising
its standard of living, and the endeavor for the formation of
an Arab front.
2 6
it is plainly manifest from the wording of this
article that national revival is the center of the attention
for the SSNP. The rise of the Social Nationalist Movement
involves the realization of nationhood in Syria, the protec-
tion of the life and interests and means of progress of the
2 5ibid., p. 58.
2 6 ibid., p. 58.
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Syrian nation, and equipping it with the power of strong
union and true national cooperation.
2 7
Saadeh mentioned frequently that Syria is one of the
Arab nations and is qualified to play a leading role in the
Arab World. Concerning the Arab front, Saadeh said,
"We shall never relinquish our position in the Arab World
nor our mission to the Arab World. But we want, before
everything else, to be strong in ourselves in order to con-
vey our mission. Syria must be strong in its own national
revival before it can undertake the realization of its
greater task."28
After this short simple coverage of the SSNP, we move to
the following step of covering the Ba'ath Party.
2 7 ibid., p. 58.
2 8 ibid., p. 59.
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VIII. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BA'ATH PARTY
Michel 'Aflag and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, two French-edu-
cated Syrian high school teachers, founded the Arab Resurrec-
tion Party (henceforth referred to as the Ba'ath - meaning
resurrection party) in Damascus in 1940. As both a theory
and a political organization, the Ba'ath has played a crucial
part in the contemporary history of the Arab World, particu-
larly in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.
'Aflag was born in Damascus in 1912, to a Greek Orthodox
Christian family that dealt in grain. He studied in Paris,
where he became a communist, but after he returned to Syria
and became a secondary school teacher, he turned against
commuism.29
communism. 2 Sensitive and austere, 'Aflag is more a
talented intellectual than a political leader. A poor public
speaker, he is at his best amidst a small circle of followers
discussing ideology. There is much of the suspicious, nervous
artist in his conduct. Credulous and even vain, he is vulner-
able to praise and duplicity. When ill-advised, he makes
grave mistakes, for he has "the innocence of childhood and the
caution of old age". He is a personality of contradiction
complicated by a strange mixture of weakness and strength.
His stubbornness is normally unyielding except where one finds
access to his heart. Hateful when insulted, 'Aflag's demeanor
2 9 ibid., p. 138.
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gives an impression of laziness though he has a full life.
In a very real sense, "the party was an expression of his
humanity and reflected from its early days his talents and
his weaknesses. 30
'Aflag, as a philosopher of the Ba'ath party, sought to
formulate an Arab nationalist ideology which would resolve the
Arab problems. He defined the Arabs in terms of language,
history and personal self-identification with the Arab nation-
alist movement. Religion does not enter the definition. For
'Aflag every nation has an idea, an essence, which operates
throughout history. The Arab essence is spiritual and is
reflected in Islam, which is a manifestation of the Arab
idea. Islam is, in effect, contained within 
Arabism.3 1
The Ba'ath program implies a separation of religion and
the state, unlike so many constitutions of the Arab states
which declare Islam as the state religion. Nationalism is to
be the only tie in the unified Arab state, and religious and
other modes of exclusiveness are to be 
suppressed.3 2
3 0 International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3,
No. 1, The Rise of the Syrian Ba'ath, by Nabil M. Kaylani,
January 1972, p. 7.
3 1Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Student
Notes: The Ideology of the Ba'ath Party and Syrian Politics,
Marc J. Sievers, Spring/Summer, 1980, p. 188.
3 2The Middle East Journal, Vol. XXIII, The Ba'ath Ideology
and Practice, by Gordon H. Torrey, p. 449.
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'Aflag states that "The Arabs today do not want their
nationalism to be religious, because religion has another
aspect, a field which does not bind the nation but which, on
the contrary, divides a single people although there is no
fundamental difference between the religions." However,
since Islam is so much a part of Arab culture, he is in a
difficult position on this facet of Arab nationalism. 'Aflag's
answer is that Islam must now conform to Arabism rather than
shaping it as it did in the early days of Islam. Since the
Arab resurrection will only include those aspects of Arabism
that are compatible with the modern world and will adapt
others through changes, Islam itself must change to meet the
requirements of the new age. Arab nationalism is not to be
constrained by the narrow limits of Islam which is only an
aspect of the larger movement.
3 3
Islam, in a sense, ended as a moral and unifying influence
among the Arabs when it spreads beyond the pale and included
non-Arabs. 'Aflag recognizes Islam as an element in Arab
nationalism, but on condition that it must subordinate itself
to the secular nationalist movement. In other words, Arab
nationalism has replaced Islam as the driving force of the
Arab people. Absolute equality before the law for all
citizens is to be laid down as a fundamental constitutional
right; thus, all public offices are theoretically open to any
3 3 ibid., p. 450.
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citizen regardless of creed. Education is to be secular,
free and compulsory, with all private educational institu-
tions suppressed.
3 4
'Aflag states that, "the great service rendered by Islam
to Arabism in the past could not be repeated in the 20th
century since the problems challenging Syria were not essen-
tially religious but political and social." The measures in
the social and political fields were envisaged strictly in
secular terms and this in practice was a radical departure
from the spirit of Islam and its socio-economic concepts.
Thus, in the last few years - that is to say, since the
Ba'ath coming to power - 'Aflag and the Ba'ath in general
have often been described as godless and as enemies of
religion.
A. CONCEPTS IN THE PARTY CONSTITUTION
The dominance of the Arab nationalist ideal in Ba'athist
thinking is made readily apparent in the Ba'ath Constitution.
The Constitution is prefaced by the slogan: One Arab nation
with an immortal mission, the Arab Resurrection Socialist
Party, a popular national revolutionary movement striving for
Arab unity, freedom and socialism.
3 6
3 4 ibid., p. 450.
3 5Kernal H. Karpat, p. 140.
3 6Gordon H. Torrey, p. 447.
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According to Ba'athist doctrine, the Arabs are one nation
possessing an indivisible political, cultural and economic
unit which belongs to them alone. The Arab nation possesses
special characteristics, which although long suppressed, are
capable of being resurrected.
The Constitution states that the Arab nation's special
characteristics include "vitality and creative powers". These
characteristics make possible its revival and development and
are the mystique of Arab nationalists everywhere. Without
this hope of resurgence, Arab nationalism would not exist.
'Aflag's historical studies and his acquaintanceship with
19th century German philosophy are brought out in the pro-
gram's section on the "immortal mission" of the Arab nation.
This mission is to revive human values, encourage human devel-
opment and strive for peace and cooperation with other nations
toward the common goal of comfort and prosperity for all
peoples.
According to 'Aflag, Arab history is characterized by al-
ternating periods of decline and renewal. At this stage in
history, the mission of the Arabs is the realization of Arab
unity. 'Aflag maintained that the experience of struggling
for unity would bring about the structural transformation, or
Inqilab, in the spirit and thinking of the Arab people which
would revolutionize their society. This was to be achieved
3 7 ibid., p. 447.
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through relentless struggle against reactionary elements with
vested interests in the anachronisms of the status quo, and
other political groups who were considered to only feign
nationalism while being in reality opposed to the national
welfare. 'Aflag laid down three essential conditions for the
Inqilab: (1) Awareness vf the historical and contemporary
realities which called for drastic transformation; (2) a feel-
ing of responsibility rooted in a strong moral base; and (3) a
genuine belief in the feasibility, at the existing stage of
Arab history, of the proposed Inqilab. These conditicns were
to be fulfilled by al-Tali'a (the vanguard) who constituted
the membership of the Ba'ath. "The struggle which I designated
as the practical expression of the Inqilab," wrote 'Aflag,
"creates its own crusaders." The Inqilab becomes a living
thing in their souls, minds and manners or it Decomes life
itself. Once achieve,., the Inqilab would presumably usher in
the Ba'athist trinity: unity, freedom and socialism.
3 8
Of the three parts ef the trinity, the first is prirary.
Once Arab unity is attained, freedom and socialism will fol-
low. Whatever degree of freedom and socialism attained prior
to Arab unity must necessarily be iincomplete. Socialism is
necessary in order to liberate the energies of the Arab
masses, and so allow them to take part in the Arab
resurrection. Freedom is found in conformity with the
3 8Nabil M. Kaylani, p. 5.
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general will. The achie-vement of unity and socialism creates
39
freedom. An insight into 'Aflag's thinking on this is
provided in a passage of his Ma'rakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The
Struggle for One Destiny). 'Aflag wrote that the party was
named the
"Arab Resurrection Party not only because it was the
first party to believe ideologically and practically in Arab
unity and to place its organization on a universal Arab
foundation, but also because it believed that any viewpoint
or remedy of the vital difficulties of the Arabs, either in
par + or in toto, which does not emanate from the axiom 'The
Unity of the Arab People' is an erroneous outlook and an
injurious cure."
The difference of the Ba'ath from other Arab political par-
ties is in kind, not in its Arab nationalism or its socialism,
but in its universality. The various national parties in the
Arab states did not measure up to the challenge of Arab unity.
Neither did the Arab League. Arab unity is a basic, daily,
ordered and continuous struggle and not something to be at-
tained automatically or "some day" when politicaal conditions
are ripe. It is not a result of the struggle of the Arab
people for independence or socialsm but a goal to be simul-
taneously struggled for. However, unity comes first because
it is spiritual.
4 0
Central to 'Aflag's thinking is the quest for freedom,
conceived not merely as emancipation from political tyranny
and oepressive poverty, but the liberaticn of the Arab
3 9Marc J. Sievers, p. 188.
4 0Gordon H. Torrey, p. 448.
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people, unified in mind and spirit, joined together in social
brotherhood. Freedom should, therefore, emanate from the
very soul of the Arab and be cherished as an indivisible part
of his cultural heritage. Here again, the path to freedom is
that of struggle strewn with sacrifice. Since such a generic
conception of freedom could not be achieved or even promoted
without state action, especially in the education of the
masses, the political machinery of the state had to be freed
from the grip of the privileged classes, considered to be
custodians of the feudal past, and intrinsically opposed to
the idea of the Inqilab. For that purpose 'Aflag and his
supporters advocated the prompt implementation of a radical
program of socialism designed to eradicate the economic power,
and hence political domination, of the big landowners, busi-
ness and commercial magnates and give the people a stronger
sense of belonging to society through direct ownership of
land and plant.
4 1
Every action based on principle was to be geared, in the
final analysis, towards unification of the Arab World - the
paramount objective of the Ba'ath. Without unity, the Arabs
could not possibly recapture their former glory and become
once again creative agents in human civilization. Ba'athism,
however, disparages any unity that is achieved by military
force or through agreement among political leaders regardless
4 1Nabil Y. Kaylani, p. 6.
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of their intentions. True unity can only be the result of a
spiritual Inqilab in Arab society. Only then, would the Arab
people in separate political regions realize that they
constitute one nation.
4 2
'Aflag call,!d upon the Arabs to fight imperialism by every
means. He considered imperialism "a crime". He disparages
the various national movements which have risen out of colo-
nialism to combat the ills of Arab society. Among these ills
are feudalism, regionalism, sectarianism and intellectual
reaction. He charges that one quality unites all of these
movements - negativism. They are the sum which rises to the
surface in the feebleness of present Arab society. Civiliza-
tion must be built and human values cultivated. The Ba'ath
goal is not confined to driving the colonizers out and up-
rooting the internal exploiters, or even to achieving the
freedom and prosperity of the Arab people. They are but
means to assuring a universal role for the Arabs, together
with the peoples of Asia and Africa.43
'Aflag goes to great lengths to define his concept of
Arab nationalism and distinguish it from other views. He
Stigmatizes the version of Arab nationalism which is restric-
tive state nationalism and which divides the Arabs. Further-
more, he condemns what he terms "racial nationalism" - that
42ibid., p. 6.
4 3Gordon H. Torrey, p. 448.
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which claims the Arabs to be superior - a type of t1hinking
which he finds no different than Nazism with its overtones of
racial superiority and oppression of minorities. He stresses
the humanitarianism of Arabism. Likewise, he does not pro-
claim Arabism to be international, which is one of the great
differences between it and communism. Communism, according
to 'Aflag, is an attempt to bind everyone with synthetic
economic bonds. He feels that this would fail as did the
religious state, by its inherent contradictions. 'Aflag
praises Tito's Yugoslavia because it was the first "socialist"
country to cast aside communist internationalism in favor of
nationalism.
B. BA'ATH SOCIALISM
Article 4 of the 1947 Ba'ath Constitution states that
socialism is necessary for Arab nationalism, being the system
which would allow the Arabs to develop their inherent poten-
tialities. Socialism will enable the Arab nation to increase
its production and strengthen its bonds. Believing that
wealth in the Arab countries is unjustly distributed, the
program calls for its "fair distribution" among the citizens.
However, there is no call for a general nationalization of
capital. In line with generally accepted view among social-
ists, public utilities, major national resources, and large
44 ibid., p. 44(.
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scale industrial and transport services would be national-
ized. Fore-.gn-owned concessions and company rights would be
cancelled. Land reform is envisioned with the size of plots
limited to that which the owner can work without "exploita-
45
tion of the efforts of others".
A dissertation on these socialist principles is found in
FiSabil al-Ba'ath where 'Aflag declares that "socialism means
that all citizens should share in their country's resources
with the intention that they better their life and consequent-
ly the life of their nation, because man does not accept his
rendering of himself as an end in life." However, he states
that there are no separate doctrines of socialism and nation-
alism but that they are "fused into one entity". It is sig-
nificant that the Ba'ath has declared that although it
believes in socialism because it would realize social justice,
the party would embrace another social system if it found a
better one. 46
'Aflag claims his socialism does not have the materialis-
tic objective of "feeding the hungry and clothing the naked",
but the higher one of freeing man's talents and abilities.
This means a destruction of the influence of the traditional
aristocracy of wealth which has ruled the Arab countries for
generations, so that lower classes may break out of the
4 5 ibid., p. 450.
4 6 ibid., pp 450-451.
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economic grip which has held them in a depressed state and
which has blocked their political influence. Thus, he rejects
the communist definition of socialism in the works of Marx
and Lenin. The Ba'ath socialism is proclaimed to be a new
form of nationalism.
4 7
In its vision of Arab unity, Ba'athist socialism envisions
bringing together those Arab countries whose progress is ob-
structed by their lack of capital and natural resources with
their better endowed brethren who would share their wealth.4 8
The Ba'ath's attitude toward real estate holdings is
spelled out in the party's program. Ownership of buildings
is to be limited to what can be personally used. "Exploita-
tion by means of renting is forbidden." A reference in the
Constitution to the state guaranteeing a minimum ownership of
landed property for all citizens would seem to indicate that
private home ownership, as well as agricultural plots, is to
be encouraged.
4 9
Usury, so prevalent in most parts of the Arab World, is
to be abolished. However, interest on money at a reasonable
rate is to be allowed. A government bank for agricultural
and industrial projects is envisioned; it would issue a cur-
rency backed by "national production".
4 9
4 7ibid., p. 451.
4 8 ibid., p. 451.
4 9 ibid., p. 451.
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Trade, in all of its forms, is to be controlled by the
state. A reference to the maintenance of equilibrium between
exports and imports seems to hark back to economic nationalism
and autarchy, or merely shows a lack of economic sophistica-
tion. Following on the path of trade restrictions is the con-
cept of a directed economy for the Arab countries and their
industrialization. Another interesting aspect of the Ba'ath
economic policy is worker participation and profit sharing in
the management of factories, apparently along the lines now
practiced in Yugoslavia.
5 0
The internal disarray in the Arab World necessitates a
far-reaching social "revolution"; according to Ba'athist
teachings, the Arabs do not have time to wait for evolutionary
progress, especially since the more advanced countries will
continue their rate of progress and make catching up impos-
sible. 'Aflag lays great stress on a revolution of spirit,
especially in the moral and intellectual realms.
5 1
The sixth article of the program ends with ringing exhor-
tation "to raise in revolt against corruption in all spheres
of intellectual, social and political life". Thus, the
Ba'ath is not only pushing for a resurrection of Arabism, but
for revolution, not evolution, in the fullest sense of the
term, a forced reformation of the social and political
5 0 ibid., p. 451.
5 1 ibid., p. 451.
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structure of the Arab counties which ousts old ideas and a
decadent spirit. As 'Aflag states, "the gap and disfigurement
in the Arab nationalist structure can only be bridged by a
violent wrenching away from the present situation."
5 2
In 'Aflag's eyes the Arab nation's interior is "rotten",
filled with social injustice, exploitation, ignorance, weak-
ness in thought, and lacking in tolerance and love. Thus,
the Arab people must not only struggle against imperialism
and Zionism (another form of imperialism), but against
53
themselves.
Michel 'Aflag has taken great pains to differentiate his
movement from communism. Besides his thesis that Arab
socialism is an amalgam of nationalism and socialism, he
stresses other points of difference. Socialism under the
communist system - since it is a universal theory and strives
to complete world revolution - cannot carry out a sufficient
economic readjustment until it achieves worldwide revolution.
Thus economic conditions in the communist countries are in-
fluenced and restricted by this goal. This includes prepara-
tion for war and competition with other nations. 'Aflag has
declared that the communist states pursue a bloc policy and
"help imperialism".
5 4
5 2ibid., p. 452.
5 3 ibid., p. 452.
5 4 ibid., p. 452.
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Under the heading of "Theoretical Differences Between our
Socialism and that of the Communists, 'Aflag wrote:
"Socialism in the communist system is not limited only
to the organization of the economy; it must obey the ends
and aims of communist system. Communism, as a universal
doctrine, aims in effect at worldwide revolution and can
only henceforth be applied if this revolution is an entire
success. On the other hand, as long as the revolution is
not at an end, the economic system of a communist country
will remain subject to aims and directives of the policy of
the communist movement, including preparation for war and
competition with other countries."55
Arab Ba'ath socialism, on the contrary, limits itself to
organizing the economy so as to redistribute thL wealth of
the Arab World and to establish a basis for an economy
guaranteeing justice and equality among all citizens, and
also to promote a revolution in production and the means of
production. 56
Another difference with communism is its belief in
materialism and disregard for spiritual principles and the
small value placed in the individual. As 'Aflag says, "it
permits the slaughter of the individual for the sake of its
material existence," because in communist theory, society is
the root. This outlook leads to dictatorship and a mechani-
cal, materialistic society lost to the spirit. His socialism,
however, is based on the individual and allows his personal
freedom. Another point of difference is the right of
5 5Kemal H. Karpat, pp 144-145.
5 6 ibid., p. 145.
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ownership. According to 'Aflag, "communist socialism went to
the utmost limit and did away with the right of possession,
and thus destroyed personal and instinctive motives in the
individual." Ba'athism preserves this right, but it limits
it fairly narrowly. 5 7 Under the heading of "Theoretical
Differences Between our Socialism and that of the Communists,"
'Aflag wrote: "Communist philosophy is based on belief in
materialism. It explains historical and social evolution
solely and wholly by economic factors, which results in its
changing its philosophy and spiritual beliefs." The philos-
ophy of the Arab Ba'ath does not agree with this materialis-
tic conception. On the contrary, it considers that the
"spiritual" factor plays a very important part in the evolu-
tion of history and human progress. Consequently, it con-
siders that the spiritual influences that have appeared in
the Arab World, such as Islait, are in no way strange.
Being materialistic, communist philosophy accords only
little importance to the individual; it does not respect him
and it scorns his freedom. It is concerned only with the
mass. This conception leads to dictatorship and the creation
of a materialistic society completely lacking 4n spirit.
This philosophy similarly results in a lack of balance be-
tween the individual and society and between Arab societies
and others. Our socialism, on the contrary, is based on the
5 7Gordon H. Torrey, p. 452.
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individual and his personal freedom; it does not allow his
individual liberties to be scorned and considers all individ-
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uals as equal and a tyrannical dictatorship unnecessary.
'Aflag continued his criticism under the heading of "Practical
Differences Between our Socialism and that of Communism". He
wrote: "Communist socialism has gone too far in the direction
of nationalization; it has abolished property rights and conse-
quently has killed all individual initiative." Ba'ath social-
ism, on the contrary, believes that the main strength of a
nation resides in individual initiative which encourages ac-
tion; it is careful not to abolish private property, there
limiting itself to the creation of strong impediments to
abuse.
Communism does not recognize the right of succession. Our
socialism, on the contrary, recognizes it and believes that a
citizen cannot be deprived of it. Nevertheless, to prevent
the wrongful use of the national wealth and exploitation of
labor, we have imposed certain changes that make this right
in certain cases alzmost theoretical and that reduce it in
other cases to a simple moral 
right.5 9
'Aflag extended his criticism to National Socialism.
Under the heading of "Differences Between our Socialism and
National Socialism - Theoretical Differences," 'Aflag wrote:
5 8 Kemal H. Karpat, p. 145.
5 9 Ibid., pp 145-146.
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"The National Socialism of Germany and of Italy is
linked to Nazi and fascist philosophy, based on the idea of
racial superiority and on the difference between peoples,
i.e., on the superiority of one kind over another and their
right to dominate the world. These philosophies likewise
establish differences between nationals of the same nation,
which leads to the dictatorship of an individual or of a
class. True socialism cannot succeed in such a system."
"Ba'ath socialism is inspired by its own philosophy,
does not despise other nations, and does not aim at domina-
tion. It is an end in itself, to procure economic and
social benefits that are easily achieved. It does not
cloak political or denominational ambitions."60
Under "Practical Differences", with National Socialism,
'Aflat wrote:
"Subjected to Nazi and fascist regimes, National
Socialism in Germany and in Italy is closely linked to
their aims; expansion and colonialism. These aims can only
be achieved, therefore, by territorial expansion. Thus,
National Socialism is only a means to imperialism. Ba'ath
socialism, on the other hand, does not aim at expansion.
Its sole aim is to create a fair economic system in the
Arab World. It supports all that tends toward the libera-
tion of peoples still under colonial rule. It desires that
other peoples may practice socialism and follow an economic
policy that gives justice to all and a higher standard of
living for all peoples, at the same time conserving the
individuality of each."61
Closely intertwined with the Ba'ath's econnmic views and
its Arab nationalism are the party's domestic program and what
it terms its social policy. In line with the considerable
emphasis on the role of the individual, Ba'ath doctrine envi-
sions a democratic state of the parliamentary constitutional
type with the executive responsive to the legislative organ.
60ibid., p. 147.
61 ibid., p. 147.
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In contrast with what has been the practice in the Middle
East, parliament is to be elected directly and freely by the
people. The unified Arab state is to be decentralized and
judicial authority is to be independent of the other arms of
the government.
Absolute equality before the law is guaranteed to all
citizens, as is freedom of expression. However, these appear
to be abridged by the addition of the clause so often found
in Middle Eastern political documents - "within the limits
of the law". All religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and
regional "factions" are to be fought. Military service is to
be compulsory.
Under "Social Policy" the family and children are recog-
nized as a trust and are to be protected. Marriage is a
national duty to be encouraged and facilitated by the state.
This probably refers to breaking down some of the existing
barriers to marriage, especially the custom of bride price.
In consonance with socialist thinking, medical care is to
be provided free by the state. The full employment doctrine
is embraced in the section of the program devoted to the role
of labor. A minimum wage is alluded to, as are disability
benefits, paid vacations and old age pensions. Free trade
unions for workers and farmers are to be encouraged and
special labor tribunals are to adjudicate labor disputes.
In conformity with the Ba'ath's thesis of awakening the
Arab people, the Program includes a special article relating
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to the encouragement of Arab culture in all of its aspects.
Likewise, private organizations and political parties are to
be given opportunities to function. The Constitution also
reiterates a continued theme in Ba'athist rhetoric, namely
freedom of expression by the individual and the press. How-
ever, this may be circumscribed by the higher Arab national
interest.
Reflecting the backgrounds of the Ba'ath's founders,
special reference is made to the position of mental labor; it
is placed on a par with its physical counterpart and is to be
protected and encouraged, as is academic scholarship.
As in the case with socialist dogma everywhere, class
differences and their distinctions are to be abolished. This
applies, not only to economic classes, but to those paragons
of Arab civilization - the bedouin. In Ba'ath's eyes they
are an embarrassment which retards progress and they must be
eliminated by sedentarization. In order to bring the new
order to the Arab World, the Ba'ath envisions the creation of
a new generation by means of education.
The Program's pronouncement on foreign policy is a ringing
denunciation of imperialism and foreign influence in the Arab
countries. A sweeping renunciation of all treaties and agree-
ments concluded by the Arab states limiting Arab sovereignty
is to be made. Despite this tone of belligerency, the Arabs
are to cooperate with other nations in creating a harmonious,
free, secure and progressing world.
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The Ba'ath's continual emphasis on the role of the
individual, his freedom of expression and action and his
opportunity to develop himself continually, seems to conflict
with another basic Ba'athist concept - Lhe Arab nationalist
movement. In his writing 'Aflag warns of the dangers of
tyranny of the group over the individual; yet almost in che
same breath he speaks of the supremacy of the Arab national-
ist movement. Since B. atiist ideology obliges the Arab
citizen to recognize and participate in the mission of Arab
nationalism, no Arab can stand aside from this struggle.
Thus, it would seem that i,.Jividual freedom must be circum-
scribed for the benefit of the immortal mission, no matter
how much the rights of the individual are stressed in
Ba'athist ideology. Arab ;,ationalism must take precedence,
since it is history being carried out and, thus, it is
inevitable an. supreme. Here -'s a basic conflict between
'Aflag's 19th century national liberalism and the influence
of 20th century nationalist totalitarianism. 'Aflaq attempts
to reconcile this conflict by stressing t:l-t the individual
through education will be awakened to the necessity of
conforming to the nationalist movement. Until the people
reach this point, however, they must be led by the enlight-
ened men who have reached the higher state wiere their own
interests and those of Arab nationalism are one. Bitar and
'Aflag contended that the party could not be a Mass move-
ment, since it would be weakened by dilution. On the other
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hand, Bitar argued that it was necessary to broaden the mem-
bership in order to make the party politically stronger. In
the end, 'Aflag won.
Carrying further this concept of enlightenment, 'Aflag has
stated that even those who now oppose the Ba'ath's ideas pos-
sess a "hidden will" to Arab nationalism that has not yet been
revealed to them. Also, underlying 'Aflag's thinking seems to
be a suffering motif. He has stated that "the driving factor
in the Arab world is suffering", which he regards as a boon
which makes more certain the attainment of ideals. He empha-
sized the healing power of pain and suffering. 'Aflag stated
that the struggle for Arab unity would involve a painful pro-
cess of structural transformation, referred to in Ba'athist
writing as "Inqilab" but the result will be the resurrection
(ba'ath) of the Arabs. Only those who are in harmony with the
Arab spirit are capable of leading the people. Of course, it
is the Ba'athists who constitute this elite. Another radical
departure from current Arab nationalist thought has been
'Aflag's ideas on the subject of the "new Arabs". He called
on the Arabs to stop blaming imperialism for all of their
ills and to regard it as "a result of our own inaction in
directing a change in our rotten internal situation and not
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as & cause for this situation and its persistence"
6 2This emonstration is derived from Gordon H. Terry -
The Ba'ath Ideology and Practice, pp 450-454.
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C. PARTY STRUCTURE
The Ba'ath Party does not accept the legitimacy of exist-
ing Arab states but refers to each of the Arab nations as a
Region. Each Region is subdivided into district Branches and
each Branch into Units. The Units, in turn, are composed of
many Cells, which lie at the bottom of the organizational
structure. These Cells play an important role in maintaining
contact with various sections of society and are responsible
for recognizing and recruiting new members for the party.
Every Region has a Congress for advisory purposes, an Execu-
tive or Regional Command and a Secretary. At the very top of
the pyramid of organizational structure lies the General
Congress, the national leadership (of the "Arab nation"), and
the Secretary General. Local societal issues are resolved
within regional headquarters, while matters of party policy
are decided by the General Congress. Many of these organiza-
tional infrastructures remained, at least in theory, within
Aany Arab countries, since the Ba'athist never succeeded in
establishing themselves in the practical politics of those
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areas.
6 3 Islamic Revolution, Ba'athist Syria and Iraq: "A
Comparative Approach", by S. N. Mehdi, Dec. 1981, p. 7.
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IX. THE SYRIAN ARMY: HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION
Since 1945, the Syrian army has been invclved in three
major wars and innumerable minor skirmishes with Israel,
large-scale military interventions in Jordan and Lebanon,
military confrontations with its other two neighbors, Turkey
and Iraq, and a total of 21 coups against its own government.
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It has grown to a regular strength of 392,500 men (500,000
on mobilization), and absorbs almost one fifth of the entire
GNP. It disposes of the most modern weapons in such numbers
that it surpasses the British and French armies in total
weaponry, although those countries have seven times Syria's
population and about 50 times its GNP.
This army, which dominates every aspect of Syrian politi-
cal and economic life, had its origin in the "Troupes
Speciales du Levant" (originally called the Syrian Legion)
which the French created in their newly acquired Middle
Eastern possessions after World War I.
The local forces France then created for internal secu-
rity purposes, however, were built up with the potential
threat of Syrian-Arab nationalism very much in mind, and so
the pattern of recruitment avoided Sunni Muslim Arabs of
urban background as much as possible. The Sunni Muslim Arabs
6 4The Military Balance 1986-1987, The International
Institute for Strategic Studies [Syria], 23 Tavistock Street,
London WC2E7NQ, pp 108-109.
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of the cities and plains of Central Syria make up about 65%
of Syria's population, but there was also a 13% Christian
minority, a small Kurdish minority (albeit Sunni), and a
variety of heterodox Muslim or ethnic minorities - Circassian,
Druze, Isma'ili and Alawite - making up about 20% of the total
population. It was from these minorities, and particularly
from the Alawites, that the French recruited most of their
"Troupes Speciales", on the principle of divide and rule.
There was, indeed, little inclination on the part of Sunni
Arabs to join the army, not only because it was an instrument
of alien rule, but because aversion to military service was
deeply ingrained in the peasant population after centuries of
Ottoman conscription methods. Educated Syrian Arabs, enjoying
many more attractive alternatives for advancement in commerce,
government and the professions, had never shown an inclination
towards the profession of military officer. Thus, in 1938,
the Troupes Speciales, numbering some 10,000 men and 306
officers (of whom only 88 were French, mainly in the higher
ranks) contained a majority of Syrians who were of ru-al
background and minority origins. Those urban Sunnis who did
become officers were of the lower-middle classees, not from
the Syrian political and economic elite.
It was these troops who became the core of the new Syrian
army after independence. After a period of military occupa-
tion, French powers were effectively transferred to a Syrian
govern:,-,t in January, 1944, and full independence was
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achieved in April, 1946. The former Troupes Speciales became
the Syrian army, serving the first government to rule an
independent and united Syria since the fall of Ummayad Empire
in the eighth century. An air force was founded in 1948 and
a navy in 1950.
The new Syrian state almost at once became embroiled in
the 1948 Palestine War, in which its troops were severely
handled by the victorious Israelis. In immediate reaction to
this, there were three coups in 1949 led by former officers
of the Troupes Speciales of which the last, headed by Colonel
Adib Shishakli, succeeded in retaining power until 1954. The
successor government survived numerous further coup attempts
and took the country into a federal union with Egypt as the
United Arab Republic in 1958, but the extreme resentment of
Syrian army officers at being forced to play a subordinate
role to the more numerous and powerful Egyptians in the new
joint army was the main motive force behind yet another coup
in 1961 that took Syria out of the union. A further success-
ful coup followed in March, 1962, and a third in March, 1963.
The seemingly endless succession of coups and attempted
coups between 1949 nd 1963 arose from two principal facts.
First, the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The second reason for
the coups was the fact that this overwhelmingly dominant army
was internally divided into bitterly hostile factions in which
generational rivalry played a large part.
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Colonel Shishakli, like most Syrian senior officers of
the 1950s, was a graduate of the French Military Academy at
St. Cyr. Like his colleagues, he had developed strong links
with the conservative civilian elite, and the factions which
they formed were allied to parallel factions in that elite.
Below them in the military hierarchy, however, were younger
officers of a more radical disposition, who had attended the
military academy at Homs, had been exposed to the radical
Arab nationalist ideology expounded by al-Husri, Minister of
Education, just after independence, and had been deeply
influenced by the example and ideas of Egypt's President
Nasser. They generally came from the same ethnic and social
background as their predecessors in the Troupes Speciales -
from the minority groups, especially Alawites, and from the
peasantry and lower-middle classes - but the prevailing
intellectual environment and the monopolization of lucrative
alliances with the civilian elite by their superiors both drove
them in the same direction: anti-colonialism (and consequently,
anti-Western sentiments) and socialism.
The first time that radical nationals.3t officers achieved
power was in 1954. No sooner had they done so, than Syria
began to come under great pressure to adhere to the Western-
dominated Baghdad Pact which was then being constructed in the
region as part of the West's Cold War strategy against the
Soviet Union. These pressures soon extended to Turkish and
Iraqi troop movements along the Syrian border, but the new
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regime was strongly opposed to the Baghdad Pact, which it saw
as an instrument for renewed Western hegemony in the area and
a distraction from the more important problem of Israel. It
was at this point in 1955 that the Soviet Union first offered
diplomatic support to Syria, and also showed willingness to
provide the country with the modern arms which the West had
refused to sell it. The relationship which began with the
delivery of the Soviet and Czech arms and the arrival of
Warsaw Pact military advisers in that year was more cemented
firmly by Soviet promises of support for Syria during the
Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, a renewed
attempt by the Baghdad Pact to precipitate the fall of the
Syrian regime through the creation of threatening troop con-
centration along the Turkish border, and the Anglo-American
military interventions in Jordan and Lebanon in 1958.65
After the emergency of the radical neo-Ba'athist regime
in 1966, Soviet military assistance became far more lavish,
and it has been indispensable in making possible the expan-
sion of the Syrian army from the 60,0(0 men and 400 tanks of
1965 to the 500,000 men and 4100 tanks of today. The remark-
able stability of this relationship, in comparison to the
history of Soviet relations with other Arab countries, derives
largely from the fact that the Syrians have never allowed the
Soviet Union to gain a disproportionate influence in the
6 5George Lenczowski, pp 335-345, pp 369-373, pp 483-488.
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internal affairs of the country or army: they have never
permitted the Russians military base facilities, nor have
Soviet officers and NCOs ever been placed in positions of
command over Syrian troops. Consequently, there has not been
the kind of anti-Soviet backlash that occurred in Egypt.
The relatively greater stability of Syria's military
government since 1963, which at last permitted a rapid devel-
opment of the country's economy, was due to the final,
inevitable settlement of the generational feud within the
officer corps in favor of the younger group in the March,
1963 coup. In contrast to earlier left-wing and radical
nationalist regimes, the group who seized power in 1963 had a
political doctrine and a party framework which allowed them
to survive. The doctrine was that of the Ba'ath Party.
The coup of March, 1963 was a different kind from those
that had gone before; therefore, and following an attempted
countercoup in July of that year, the Ba'athist officers -uth-
lessly proceeded to eliminate all further centers of resist-
ance within the army, and began the process of economic,
political and sometimes physical liquidation of the tradi-
tional civilian elite. At the head of this government was
the army commander, Major General Amim al-Hafiz.
After a result of disagreements within the Ba'athist
party, a new coup in February, 1966 brought the so-called
neo-Ba'athist groups of Dr. Nureddin al-Atasi to power, and
gave increased influence to civilian elements within the
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party. The succeeding 4 years saw the most extreme and brutal
totalitarian regime imposed on Syria, with even the small
property-owning and merchant classes being effectively
destroyed or driven into exile. The army's officer corps
became almost totally politicized, within military competence
and attention to duty ceasing to figure at all in the selec-
tion of officers for promotion. This had much to do with the
Syrian army's disastrous defeat in the June, 1967 war with
Israel as a result of which the Golan Heights came under
Israeli occupation.
In 1970, Syria intervened in the Jordan Civil War on be-
half of the Palestinian guerillas. Numbers of military
officers were greatly opposed to this venture, and none more
than the Defense Minister, Lieutenant-General Hafez Assad, a
senior Ba'athist who also served as a commander of the air
force. The government overruled his protests and dispatched
a Syrian armored column into northern Jordan, but Assad, as
head of the air force, withheld air support; as a consequence,
the Syrian force was badly mauled by Jordanian tanks and air-
craft, and then forced to withdraw by a combination of
Israeli threats and Soviet and American pressure. In Novem-
ber, 1970, the more moderate military wing of the Ba'ath
party seized power under the leadership of Assad in the so-
called "correctionist movement". Assad was elected president
in 1971.
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President Assad's regime was initially extremely popular
in Syria;, however, because it ended the veritable reign of
terror of the previous four years. It continued the drive to
construct a strong socialist and centralized state controlled
by an army- dominated administration, but there was a great
easing of economic and political restrictions and a consequent
surge of economic growth. The economic liberalization
produced a 159% growth in the GNP between 1970 and 1975.
A. STRENGTH AND BUDGET
The strength of the Syrian armed forces in 1986 was
392,500 regulars and 272,500 reservists, out of a total popu-
lation of 11,250,000. The army was far the strongest service,
with 270,000 regular officers and men and 100,000 first-line
reservists for whom a full regular scale of equipment issue
was immediately available. The air force numbered 70,000,
all of whom were regulars. The navy is the smallest service
by far, with only 2500 regulars and 2500 reservists. The
Syrian armed forces incorporate a fourth branch, Air-Defense
Command, on the Soviet model, with a strength of 60,000 men,
but its personnel are drawn from the army and air force and
are included within those totals.
Also included within the army totals, but in practice
,
operating under a separate command, are some 15,000 Special
* *
Forces tioops, and between 5,000 and 10,000 "Detachments
for the Defense of the Regime" ("World Armies", 1983 estimates
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these "Forces" by 105,000), which serve as a Praetorian
Guard. Paramilitary forces included a Gendarmerie of 8,000
men, and a Desert Guard (Hajjana of some 1800 men who are
principally employed in controlling the bedouins of the
eastern desert.
Syrian defense expenditure in 1986 was $3,623,000,000 out
of a GNP of $54,000,000,000.66
B. COMMAND AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
All executive power is vested in the president who also
holds the office of Commander-in-Chief. All senior military
appointments, promotions and transfers are made by the presi-
dent or his immediate entourage, and similarly, all movements
of major military units within the country must be approved
by him. The president appoints his own cabinet, which is not
subject to approval by the elected People's Council.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is also the Army
Chief of Staff. The other three armed forces - air force,
air defense, and the small navy, have their own commanders
and staffs, subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces, or in the navy's case, subordinate to the local army
commander responsible for the coastal region.
6 6The numbers in this section are derived from: a) The
Military Balance, Syria, 1986-1987, pp 108-109. b) the Middle
East Military Balance, 1985, "Syria", Edited by Mark A. Heller,
The Jerusalem Post, West View Press, Jerusalem 41000, p. 249.
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There are at least five major internal security and
intelligence services in Syria, some of which fall under the
Interior Ministry, while others are answerable to the Chief
of Military Intelligence. The coordinating authority, the
National Security Council, is headed by a general, who is
thus in effect Head of the Secret Police.
Outside of the normal command structure of the army stand
the 105,000 strong "Special Forces" ("Military Balance", 1986
estimates these "Forces" by 20,000 to 25,000 only), and the
division-strength "Detachments for the Defense of the Regime",
commanded by the President's brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Rifat
Asad. Figure 1 gives us an idea of how the Power Groups in
the Syrian regime, are interlocked and mutually reinforcing
each other. The "Special Forces" and the "Detachments for
the Defense for the Regime" are recruited almost exclusively
from Alawite areas, and are equipped with heavy weapons and
tanks. The "Detachments" are permanently kept in Damascus
protecting the Presidential Palace; the "Special Forces",
equally fanatical in their loyalty to President Assad, have
been doing most of Syria's actual fighting in Lebanon since
1976. These two forces would constitute the principal
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I ROLE CO.12-ITME1NT, DEPLOYMENT AND RECENT OPERATIONS
The Syrian army's military role has always been cf para-
;;,punt imDortance in view of the Arab-Israeli conflict which
has been in existence almost from the date of its creation.
7t7 parllel Dslitical role has sometimes had deleterious
consequences for its crimary .ission; however, to some extent
thrs was true in the 1948 war, which was inept_' directe6 by
c _ficer corns in wnich advancement depended on Dclitical
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influence more than on professional ability, and it was
entirely true of the disastrous 1967 war.
Syria belongs to the Arab Defense Council, a subsidia'-
body of the Arab League created in 1959, and to the Unified
Arab Command, set up in 1964. But the defense agreements
which have been of any signnificance havt. all been
bilateral, e.g., the alliances with which Syria fought the
June, 1967 war were the bilateral defense agreements with
Egypt of November, 1966 and with Jordan in May, 1967, which
provided for the establishment of a Defense Council and
Joint Command.
The most important of Syria's external defense relation-
ships was not with an Arab country at all, but with the
Soviet Union. The apogee was in 1980 when both countries
concluded a friendship treaty.
The Syrian army went to war in October, 1973 enjoying
four great advantages over 1967: a vastly expanded and
improved armory of weapons, officers who could be relied on
to know their job and stay with the troops, the benefit of
years of wcrk by a greatly expanded Soviet advisory corps,
and the inestimable advantage of surprise. Despite thest
advantages, the 1973 war was certainly not a military
victory for the Syrians. They ended up losing 600 km2 of
territory in addition to the area they had lost in 1967. In
the political circumstances of 1973, however, almost any
military outcome short of the Israeli occupation of Damascus
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would have meant a political victory for Syria, simply by
demonstrating that they were still a military threat which
could not be ignored either by Israel or by the Great
Powers, and so it proved under the disengagement agreement
of May, 1974 the Israelis withdrew from the additional
Syrian territory they had captured.
Since 1974, apart from the brief deployment of two
divisions along the Iraqi border in August, 1975, all the
army's operational experience has been in Lebanon. The
deployment of the Syrian army, in consonance with the
country's main military preoccupation, is mainly in the
southwest, between Damascus and the Golan front, in the
Bekaa valley of Lebanon and eastwards from the southern end
of the front, in an attempt to protect against Israeli
flanking moves. Only light covering forces are maintained
along Syria's other frontiers. Most other Syrian troops are
located at bases, depots and training camps which are mainly
located in and near the larger cities, thus also serving in
the function of garrisons.
One third of all the motor vehicles in Syria carry the
army's green license plates, and lands, buildings and
services have been requisitioned on a very large scale. The
armed forces have the ability in practice to disregard the
directives of other ministries and to reallocate to them-
selves resources of material, foreign exchange and industrial
capacity which were originally planned for other purposes.
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There is also a very substantial sector of Syrian industry
which is controlled by the army. Over 200,000 civilians work
in army-run enterprises. Taking this together with the
effects of conscription and premilitary training in schools,
and the omnipresent military intelligence services, there can
be scarcely a family in Syria which does not have regular
contact with the army in one way or another.
The Syrian army was unwillingly drawn into new hostili-
ties by Israel's invasion of Southern Lebanon on June 6,
1982. It suffered heavy tank losses in its withdrawal to the
line of the Beirut-Damascus road, and subsequently, further
equipment losses, inicluding the loss of aircrafts, in
Israel's attacks on its position in the Bekaa valley, which
employed the most modern methods of electronic target
acquisition and weapon guidance and homing.
D. ORGANIZATION
1. Arms of Service.
The Syrian army is divided into the conventional
arms - infantry, artillery, engineers and services. Air-
Defense Command, although it combines army and air force
personnel under army command, does not have its own separate
branch structure.
2. Operational.
The general staff organization is patterned on that
of the French army, with four chiefs of bureaus charged with
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responsibility for personnel and administration, intelligence,
operations and training, and logistics. There is also a spe-
cial staff composed of the directors of the various technical
functions and services. The military chain of command extends
from General Headquarters in Damascus to the component field
commanders and chiefs of the combat arms. Air force head-
quarters is also in Damascus. The navy's headquarters is
near Latakia; its commander is subordinate to the local army
commander in the area, and a director of naval operations
exercises direct control ov: all units afloat.
The Syrian army is made up of four armored divisions,
each with two armored and one mechanized brigade, and two
mechanized civisions each having one armored and two mechan-
ized brigades. There are further two independent armored
brigades, four independent mechanized brigades and three
independent infantry brigades. The army also contains two
artillery brigades, five commando regiments, one paratroop
regiment, two surface-to-surface missile regiments, one with
scud missiles and one with Frog-7s, and 26 SA, batteries
with SA-21-31-5 l-6s. They received recently missiles SS-21.
The internal organization of all army combat units now
closely parallels the Soviet model.
The Air-Defense Command, under army control, is
organized into 50 fixed SAN batteries equipped with SA-23-3s,
25 mobile batteries SA-61-8s, anti-aircraft artillery
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batteries of a variety of calibers, plus interceptor aircraft
and air defense radars provided by the air force.
The air force's tactical organization consists of: 11
fighter-ground attack squadrons (three with MiG-17s, three
with SU-7s); three fighter squadrons with MiG-23s and MiG-27s;
12 interceptor squadrons with MiG-21 PF/MF (under the opera-
tional control of Air Defense Command); and transport, heli-
copter and training squadrons; a reconnaissance squadron of
MiG-25s. Major Syrian air bases are at Damascus, Hamah,
Dumayr, Palmyra, Sahles, Sahra, Aleppo, Blay, Sayqat, Rasafa,
Khalkhalah and Masiriyah.
The navy does not appear to have any permanent opera-
tional subdivisions; all units at sea are directly controlled
by the Director of Naval Operations. The major naval bases
are at Latakia and Baniyas.
E. EQUIPMENT AND ARMS INDUSTRY
The Syrian army's armored strength consists of 1000 T-62,
2200 T-541-55 and 790 T-72 medium tanks. The army has unknown
numbers of BRDM reconnaissance vehicles and BMP MICVs. The
mechanized infantry is borne in 1600 BTR-401-501-601-152 and
OT-64 APCs. Artillery strength consists of some 800 122 mm,
130 mm, 152 mm and 180 mm guns/howitzers, 2600 SU-100 and
some ISU-1221-152 SP guns. These are supplemented by 122 mm,
140 mm and 240 mm multiple rocket launchers, and 82 mm, 120
mm and 160 mm mortars. For long-range bombardment of targets
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within israel, the army has 30 FROG-7 and 36 scud surface-to-
surface missiles. The army has 1000 Milan missiles from
France. These missiles are supported by 57 mm, 85 mm and 100
mm towed, ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 self-propelled anti-aircraft
guns, and SA-71-9 surface-to-air missiles. There are further
SA-61-81-9 SAMs on order. The army has 40 Gazelle helicopters.
Area air defense, as opposed to mobile point-defense AA
weapons with the combat units, is the responsibility of Air-
Defense Command. This controls 150 batteries of SA-21-3 and
125 batteries of SA-6 missiles, AA guns, 12 squadrons of
interceptor aircraft and a comprehensive air-defense radar
network which, since 1973, has been extended to cover all the
country's industrial areas.
The great majority of Syrian weapons is derived from the
Soviet Union, and must almost certainly continue to be so,
both because of the logistical problems that would arise if
major items of military equipment from other countries had to
be fitted into the structure, and more importantly because the
Soviet Union is the only country willing to provide Syria with
arms in the quantities and of the level of sophistication the
country requires. Moreover, no other arms supplier has the
sheer reserve industrial capacity to provide Syria rapidly
with replacements for weapons losses of the scale that were
experienced in 1973. Thus, although Syria has deliberately
diversified its arms-purchasing policy since 1973 by acquiring
specific items of Western military equipment which were
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superior to their Soviet equivalents - Milan anti-tank guided
weapons, and Gazelle and Super Ferlon helicopters from France,
HOT ATGWs from the USA, AB-212 helicopters from Italy, all-
terrain trucks from Germany, and ordnance production equipment
from Austria, there is no alternative to the Soviet Union for
most of its equipment needs.
There have, of course, been difficulties with Soviet arms
supplies as well, on both political and financial groundR The
Soviet Union has used its virtual monopoly position from time to
time in an attempt to influence Syrian policy by slowing down the
delivery of weapons and spares - in early 1974, for example when
it was trying to persuade Syria to attend the Geneva Conference
on Middle East peace, and in 1976 during the Syrian military
operations against the Palestinians in Lebanon. It also insisted
on cash payment for its weapons nowadays, which posed a consider-
able problem fcr Syria in 1976-7 when the flow of financial
assistance for military purposes from the Arab oil states had
temporarily slowed down.
F. RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND RESERVES
Candidates who wish to become regular officers must be
between 18 and 23 years of age, and in possession of a satis-
factory school matriculation certificate. Selections for the
military academies are made from among those who pass the
entrance examination and are physically fit.
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Army officers undergo a two-year course of instruction at
the Military Academy at Homs, which was founded in 1933 by
the French. It is primarily a school for training infantry
officers; graduates selected for other arms or services go on
to additional specialized training at other army schools, or
are sent abroad for instruction at foreign schools and
academies. Since 1963, almost all foreign training has been
done in Soviet and Eastern European institutions. Upon com-
pletion of the two-year course at the Academy, graduates are
commissioned as second-lieutenants.
The Air Force Academy, founded in 1960, is at Nayrab air
base near Aleppo. It provides officer candidates with a two-
year course of instruction in theoretical, technical and
scientific subjects, and basic flight training. The Naval
Academy, founded in 1962, is at Latakia, and also provides a
two-year course of theoretical and practical instruction.
Most of the manpower of the armed forces is provided, at
least in the first instance, by conscription, which was intro-
duced by the Service of the Flag Law in 1953. All Syrian
males, with a few exceptions, are liable to perform 30 months
of military service (subject to extension at the discretion
of the army) commencing at age 19 years, and subsequently, to
serve in the active reserve for 18 years. Some individuals
with special qualifications of use to the State have to serve
only 18 months, and deferments are available for students
going onto university. The conscript classes, designated by
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their year of birth, ace called up in two annual increments
in March and September. Some conscripts, mostly college
graduates, are selected for training as reserve officers,
while most of those with school-leaving certificates become
reserve NCOs (though not with the same authority as profes-
sional NCOs) after basic training. The remainder of the
conscripts serve as privates.
Military training for many Syrian conscripts begin long
before induction, in the 'Futuwah' program for secondary
school pupils. Begun in 1956 with regular army instructors,
it is now run by full-time civilian instructors who are
usually reserve NCOs or officers. All male secondary school
and university students attend compulsory weekly sessions of
military training, and in the case of secondary school pupils,
compulsory annual summer training as well. The school-leaving
examination includes military sciences and practical miliLary
examinations upon which pass or failure are contingent.
Once in the army, conscripts undergo basic training and
then go on to their units where they receive further on-the-
job training, most of which is conducted by NCOs. The units
of the army operate the usual annual cycle of field training
exercises. Conscripts selected for reserve officer training
attend a concentrated nine month course at the Reserve
Officers' school in Aleppo, and are then assigned to a unit,
usually in the infantry, as an officer candidate. Those
whose performance has been satisfactory are granted
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commissions as reserve second-lieutenants one month before the
end of their required two-year tour of duty.
Medical officers are given direct commissions after short
periods of military training: six months at the Military Academy
for those going into the regular service and three months at the
Reserve Officer's Academy for those fulfilling their national
service obligations.
The professional NCO Corps is drawn from conscripts who
choose to enlist for an initial five-year period in the regular
army on completion of their obligatory service. Full status as a
professional rather than a conscript NCO is not granted, however,
until the end of the first term of voluntary enlistment. Those
volunteers who fail to make NCO may re-enlist up to a maximum
total time of 15 years in the service; professional NCOs are
retired at 45, or at their own request after 20 years of service.
11eie i-, wide var±ety of opportunities ror NCOs to receive
specialized technical instruction and advanced schooling, both
within their own branches and at advanced career technical
schools which all thrcr services maintain for stniur NCOs.
Engineers and other highly trained and technical personnel are
also recruited directly by the army as NCOs by the inducements of
high salaries and other privileges; this applies particularly to
those who work in the army's research centers and maintenance
workshops.
The general standard of individual training of the Syrian
army in the late 1970s was good, and it was by then largely
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independent of Soviet training assistance except for specific
highly advanced technical subjects. The estimated number of
Soviet advisors with the Syrian armed forces in 1978 was
1800, down from 3500 a few years earlier (some sources
estimate the number by 5000 now), and the majority of those
were assisting in the training of the air force and Air
Defense Command (where the Russians insist on placing one
adviser with each SAM unit). The professional NCOs continued
to be the backbone of the system, but officer recruitment,
though still drawing disproportionately heavily on the
minorities, was based on professional competence or promise
rather than on the purely political grounds of the 1960s.
In general, quarters, food and pay in the Syrian army
compare favorably with what the average serviceman could
expect to receive in the civilian economy. Officers and NCOs
have separate accommodation, including family housing for
married regulars on most posts. Medical care is of high
standard, leave is 30 days a year for regulars and 15 days a
year for conscripts, and there are a wide variety of supple-
ments to basic pay for dependents, duty in a combat zone,
subsistence and specialist qualificatio.s which in many cases
double the basic rate. Officers receive an allowance for
servants (I personally doubt this last sentence). Retirement
pay is adequate to live on, with NCOs qualifying for retire-
ment after 20 years and officers after 25 years.
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The reserves are almost all army, there being only 2500
naval reservists. The widely used figure of 100,000 army
reservists represents an estimate of how many reservists the
army could actually equip and fit into its formations upon
mobilization; the actual total of former conscripts with a
continuing reserve liability is many times that figure. In
practice, the army would only bring back those who had com-
pleted their service within the previous three-five years,
with the possible exception of reserve officers, as older men
would be unfamiliar with much of the army's equipment. The
mobilization organization for the reserves is maintained at a
high level of readiness, and although not so quick-moving as
that of the Israelis, could produce most of those reservists
who are actually required at three-four days'notice.
G. RANK, DRESS AND DISTINCTIONS
The military rank and grade structure is the same for all
services and conforms to normal practices. In general, lieu-
tenants command platoons and captains are in charge of com-
panies; squad leaders are usually sergeants with corporals as
assistants.
Officer's rank is shown on shoulder boards, NCOs rank by
chevrons of silver thread worn Point upward on the uppcr
sleeve; the background color of the shoulder board or chevron
indicates the branch of service.
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Fariq (Lieutenant-general) - Crossed swords and two eagles.
Liwa (Major-general) - Crossed swords and one eagle.
Zaim (Brigadier-general) - Eagle and three stars.
'Aqid (Colonel) - Eagle and two stars.
Muqaddam (Lieutenant-colonel) - Eagle and one star.
Rais Awwal (Major) - Eagle.
Rais (Captain) - Three stars.
Mulazim Awwal (First-lieutenant) - Two stars.
Mulazim (Second-lieutenant) - One star.
Wakil Awwal (Chief warrant officer) - Three chevrons over two
stars.
Wakil (Warrant officer) - Three chevrons over one star.
Raqib Awwal (First sergeant) - Three chevrons.
Raqib (Sergeant) - Two chevrons.
'Arif (Corporal) - Two inverted chevrons (point down).
Jundi Awwal (Private first class) - One inverted chevron.
Jundi (Private)
Different sources give slightly different explanations of
the ranks in the Syrian army. I added here a table of the
Syrian military ranks and insignia and United States equiva-
lents from another source. Please see Figure 2 for more
information and clarification.
Army combat clothing is of Soviet pattern. Officers'
service uniform is wool coat and trousers of British design,
with a visored cap; enlisted men wear battledress with a
garrison cap. The red and white chequered Arab headdress (the
Kaffiyah) is sometimes worn by soldiers guarding important
national buildings. The dress uniform, worn by officers only,
is of dark blue with a gold-decorated upstanding collar,
black shoes and gold-trimmed belt. Air force personnel wear
the same uniforms as the army, a:;d naval uniforms are similar
to those of the British or American navies.
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Decorations carry considerable prestige, and are distri-
buted sparingly. In order of precedence, the decorations for
valor or outstanding performance in war service are: the
Medal of Military Honor (four classes), the Medal of Merit
(five classes), the Loyalty Medal (five classes) and the War
Medal (four classes). They may be awarded to either military
or civilian personnel. Any participant in hostile action
against Israel is awarded the Palestine Medal, and those who
receive wounds in combat receive the War Wounded Medal.6 7
There is a gleneral consensus among the political observers
that Syria under the leadership of President Hafez al-Assad
is working seriously towards achieving a grandiose dream of
restoring its powerful, always proud empire - Greater Syria.
The Greater Syria State which the Syrians dream of is the
state which was planned and advocated by Antun Sa'adeh and
his followers 
- the Syrian Social National Party, SSNP.
According to Sa'adeh, this state includes present Syria,
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Alexandretta and Cyprus. To
achieve this great dream, the Syrian policy makers adopted
different pragmatic policies vis-a-vis the aforementioned
countries in addition to the two great superpowers and Iran.
Given the ambiguity of the Syrian policy makers and the
6 7This section - The Syrian army - is quoted from Gwynne
Dyer, "Syria", in World Armies, edited by John Keegan, Gale
Research Company, Booktower, Detroit, Michigan 48226, 1983, pp
561-571.
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impenetrability of their decision-making black box, the
analyses of the Syrian foreign policy would be based on
sources of Middle Eastern famous analysts and the modest
experience of the writer.
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X. SYRIA AND ISRAEL
A. 1948-1967: THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE WARS
Like the rest of the Arab World, Syria has never accepted
the existence of Israel and has consistently labored to
destroy it. Syrians generally regarded the area of Pales-
tine as "Southern Syria" and often referred to it in this way.
In reaction to the U.N. resolution of 1947, to partition
Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, Syria joined
the other Arab states in condemning the U.N. resolution and
in preparations to nullify it by military force.
The State of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948. Dur-
ing that night, the army of the newly created state of Syria
was one of the seven Arab armies that invaded the new state
of Israel. In fact, when the war ended in January, 1949,
Egypt, Lebanon and to an extent Jordan, lost that war while
the Syrian army still held a small but strategically signifi-
cant series of salients on the Israeli side of the inter-
national border. As a result, while Egypt and Lebanon,
anxious to retrieve their lost territories, had a powerful
incentive to enter the Rhodes Armistice negotiations, Syria
was reluctant to do so.
On August 23, 1949, Syria and Israel reached an agreement
by the help of U.N. mediator Ralph Bunch. According to the
agreement, Syrian iorces would be evacuated but the areas
held by them at the cessation of hostilities would remain
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demilitarized. Since the sovereign rights over these areas
(see map on page 102) were not determined and since neither
side would give up hope ultimately to establish full sover-
eignty in the demilitarized zones (DMZs), the latter became a
festering wound, a constant source of contention, during the
following years. Israel hoped to contain the growing friction
by gradually moving towards a de Facto partition of the DMZs.
Syria would have the southern DMZ and Israel the other two
zones. Syria, however, was unwilling to endorse such a
solution.
During the short rule of General Husni Zaim, Syria pro-
posed peace talks with the new Jewish State in 1949 following
the armistice negotiations. Syria offered attractive conces-
sions to Israel. Syria offered to relinquish all the DMZs in
exchange for holding peace talks with Israel. The Israelis,
encouraged and supported by the West, rejected the Syrian
proposal which was a great opportunity of many missed oppor-
tunities that would have improved the climate not only of
Syrian-Israel relations but of U.S.-Syrian relations too.
6 8
From 1949-1953, Israelis attempted to persuade the Syrians
to accept the idea of de Facto partition. Their efforts were,
however, to no avail. Hence, Israel decided to act unilater-
ally. Paramilitary kibbutzim were established in several
6 8Talcott W. Seely, "U.S.-Arab Relations: The Syrian













parts of the DMZ and Israeli earth-moving equipment moved to
the Hula Lake and swamp area, in order to reclaim it. At
first Syria reactedcalmly and merely complained to the Mixed
Armistice Commission (MAC). But as of February, 1951, Syria
decided to resort to force in order to thwart the Israeli
activities. The upshot was escalation sometimes leading to
pitched battle involving large ground forces and even air
power.
During 1951-5, however, the focus gradually shifted to the
Sea of Galilee, where Syria demanded fishing rights. Israel
rejected the Syrian demand. Syria reacted by force and sought
to prevent Israeli vessels from moving in the northeast
corner of the lake. Again, the result was escalation which
climaxed on December 11, 1955 in an Israeli raid on Syrian
forces in which 50 Syrian soldiers lost their lives. During
the period of 1955-60, small scale incidents continued and
intensified. In 1960, Israel started to cultivate parts of
the southern DMZ. Syria, as usual, tried to thwart Israel
militarily but the Israelis reacted by the Tawfig raid of
February, 1960 and Nuqeib raid of mid-March, 1962. Meanwhile,
the pending completion of the Israeli National Carrier irri-
gation project, which was resumed after the collapse of the
Johnston plan, had prompted the Arab League to take further
action. In August, 1961, the Arab Defense Council approved
an Arab League plan for diverting the sources of the Jordan
River in order to thwart Israel's National Carrier project.
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The Axab defense ministers agreed to establish a joint Arab
Command for the purpose of military operations to support the
diversion scheme. The fact that these military designs led
to naught was mainly due to Nasser's procrastination as he
did not want to be dragged into a premature war with Israel.
In a summit conference in Cairo on January 13-16, 1964, Nasser
agreed, however, to the diversion plan and Syria started the
diversion work as it was planned.
As soon as the Syrian diversion work began, Israel was
faced by a grave threat to the Jewish State's very life line.
The choice was, therefore, between massive punishment with a
view to dissuading Syria in one major blow or, alternatively,
limited and specific operations which would simply stop the
Syrians from carrying on their project. Israel, under the
leadership of Levi Eshkol, opted for the limited disruptive
alternative.
In February, 1966, power in Syria was seized by the most
military wing of the Ba'ath Party under the leadership of
Salah J'did and Hafez Assad. The new Syrian leadership took
a decision to embark upon a strategy which would mirror image
Israel's own strategy. Instead of merely reacting to Israeli
action or attempting to stop one or another Israeli project,
Syria would, henceforth, initiate military action on a large
scale, including an extensive use of air power. The purpose
of such a strategy would be either to score a victory against
Israel or to accelerate the deterioration in Israeii-Arab
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relations and ultimately bring about a large-scale war in
which the rest of the Arab World would have to participate.
By August 15, 1966, the new strategy was carried into effect.
The Syrian air force launched two air strikes on Israeli
boats in the Sea of Galilee. The incident ended with one
Syrian Mig 17 shot down by Israeli ground fire and one Mig
shot down by an Israeli Mirage. Nevertheless, an official
communique on Radio Damascus stated the same day that Syria
would not confine herself to defensive action, but would
attack defined targets and bases of aggression within the
occupied area (alias Israel).
On April 7, 1967, the Syrians engaged in a great air
battle against Israel in which Syria lost 6 Migs. Having
already employed the most formidable weapons in her arsenal,
Syria could only engage the Israeli air force on a larger
scale, launch a combined operation which was bound to lead to
an even more formidable Israeli response, or call on Egypt to
make a move which would pose a restraining threat vis-a-vis
Israel. Syria selected the second choice. Nasser was in no
position to deny Syria a helping hand without a serious loss
to his waning prestige. If Nasser were to turn down the
Syrian request for help, Syria would have an excellent excuse
for de-escalation on the Israel front on the grounds that
Syria alone was not a match for Israel. If Nasser were to
rise to the challenge, Syria's plight vis-a-vis Israel would
be ameliorated too. Thus, calling on Nasser for help must
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have appeared to the Syrians as a "heads I win, tails I
win" solution.
B. THE SIX DAY WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
In the event Nasser overplayed his hand, the upshot was
that Israeli attention switched entirely to the Egyptian
front. At this juncture, the Israeli predisposition was to
avoid a two- not to speak of a three-front war. Hence,
Israel pre-empted against Egypt on June 5, 1967 without any
intention to take on either Jordan or Syria. The latter,
however, was impaled on the horns of a difficult dilemma.
Having dragged Egypt into war, should Syria come to Egypt's
rescue? The Syrians were informed by the Soviets on the
first day of the war of the full scope of Egypt's disastrous
defeat. Hence, while joining the conflict made no sense,
Syria could not afford the risk of being blamed by Egypt,
Jordan and the others for causing the war, but shrinking from
actively participating in it. The Syrians decided to put in
merely a token military effort.
Haunted by the possibility of a confrontation with the
Soviets, Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, during the
Six Day War, offered precisely this argument in order to
convince his colleagues that Syria should not be attacked.
Dut Dayan was overruled by a powerful combination of forces
which were determined not to let this golden opportunity to
get even with Syria slip by. Israel attacked Syria and
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succeeded in the conquest of the strategic area of the Golan
Heights in the last two days of the Six Day War.
Within the Israeli perception, a conventional deterrence
based on a combination of proven military prowess with what
was termed 'defensible borders' the occupation of the Golan
was an inestimable gain. The other side of the same coin was,
however, that Syrian dependence on the Soviets (a critical
dimension of escalation in itself), and Syrian commitment to
another war which would retrieve the lost territories would
grow too. Syria cooperated with Egypt and launched the 1973
war. This war was completely different from the last two.
If in 1948, Syria's participation in the war was limited and
if in 1967 Syria could drag Egypt into war but then refrain
from actually applying any serious pressure on Israel, in
1973, Syria could not help but do her very utmost to assist
Egypt in the war. For if Egypt were to attempt the crossing
of the canal without Syria when Syrian sovereign territory
was held by the common enemy, the Syrian regime would at once
miss an opportunity to retrieve Syrian lands and help along a
holy Arab cause more generally and Syrian inaction in 1973
war would be virtually inexcusable.
According to political and military analyses, the 1973 war
was not an act of escalation by Syria but rather an outgrowth
of the Israeli decision to occupy the Golan during 1967 war.
At the same timr, the actual fighting in the 1973 war entailed
a number of escalatory elements. For one thing, Syria launched
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SCUD missiles into Israel's rear - a critical element of
escalation in both vertical (weapons systems) and horizontal
(geographic) terms as well as in terms of a new emphasis on
counter-city targeting. In order to deter Syria and others
from further resort to such a practice, Israel responded by
deep-penetration bombing of Syrian targets which escalated
the conflict in these same terms. The sheer size of the
military effort on both sides in qualitative and quantitative
terms had brought the confrontation to a new level of mutual
peril. The superpower involvement politically and in the form
of unprecedentedly large airlifts was also a critical element
of escalation. In short, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur
War, the calculus of both Israel and Syria had been altered
beyond recognition.
The 1973 War ended with a virtual Egyptian betrayal from
the Syrian point of view. For whereas Syria was pushing for
a new offensive against an exhausted Israel, Egypt was, in
fact, seeking a way out of the conflict altogether. Syria
was, therefore, put in a position in which she had to take
into account the possibility of facing a grimly-determined
Israe±, whose arsenal was rapidly expanding to a colossal
size, without Egypt, and quite possibly without Jordan.
Against this background, the Syrian decision to follow
Egypt in accepting a ceasefire, signing a disengagement
agreement and proceeding to accept an intermim agreement was
double-edged. On the one hand, it gave Syria a respite in
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which to reorganize for a solitary confrontation with Israel.
On the other hand, it could serve as a basis from a gradual
search for a rapprochement sometime in the future. Unfortu-
nately, no signs of rapprochement loomed in the horizon; on
the contrary, the escalation was stimulated once again as a
result of the deterioration in Lebanon and the Israeli-deter-
mined policy to annex East Jerusalem and the Golan heights
and increasing the Jewish settlements in the occupied terri-
tories.
C. THE EFFECTS OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT
One of the most important instruments of Israel's deter-
rence strategy all along was the enunciation of Casibelli.
Among these, the preservation of the status quo in Lebanon,
Jordan and, indeed, Syria itself always loome(7 very large.
If either Iraq or Syria attempted a direct or evei an
indirect take-over of Jordan, Israel threatened to intervene.
If either Iraq or Jordan (and both had such designs in the
early part of the 1950s) were to attempt a direct or even
indirect take-over of Syria, Israel, again, threatened to
intervene. Finally, if Syria - or any other power for that
matter - were to attempt a direct or indirect take-over of
Lebanon, Israel, once again, would intervene.
Paradoxically, this Isracii -c' . oincided with a maxim
or the Arab League that as long as an all-Arab union remained
a distant dream, the territorial integrity of member states
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have to be strictly observed. When this maxim was not ob-
served - as in the course of the upheavals in Lebanon and in
Jordan during the summer of 1958 and the autumn of 1970,
respectively, Israel - in tacit agreement with the U.S. and
Britain in 1958 and the U.S. in 1970 - signalled clearly 
that
she would intervene and the status quo was preserved.
The 1975-6 Civil War in Lebanon, however, caused an
Israeli reassessment. In the autumn 1975, the Phalanges
attempted to expand the domain under their control. The PLO
which had hitherto abstained from direct involvement in the
conflict was faced by a distinct possibility of a Christian
victory, which would be followed sooner or later by a
Christian onslaught against the PLO. The latter's decision
to throw its weight behind the beleaguered Lebanese "left"
immediately tipped the balance against the Christians. Thus,
by December, 1975-Jan- ry, 1976, it already appeared that the
PLO and the left might ultimately emerge as Lebanon's rulers.
At this point, both Syria and Israel were faced by a diffi-
cult choice. A PLO-Lebanese left victory could result in the
appearance of an assertive Lebanon which might seek alliances
with Iraq, Egypt, Lybia or all together, in order to offset
the weight of both Syria and Israel and thus preserve
Lebanon's own independence. Syria could not tolerate such an
outcome lest it might spill over into Syria's own internal
political scene and reduce her inter-Arab stature. Israel
could not tolerate it for fear of an intensified instability
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along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Both countries, there-
fore, moved in a manner which would check the advance of the
PLO-Lebanese left coalition. Syria at first attempted
mediation between the camps in Lebanon. Having failed, she
gradually interfred by force - at first through proxies such
as Saika, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) Yarmuk Brigade
and Gibril's Popular Front/General Command 
- and subsequently
through means of direct intervention of the Syrian army on the
side of the beleaguered Phalanges. Israel paralleled Syria's
action by building up supportive elements in Southern Lebanon.
Paradoxically, the caution of both IErael and Syria vis-
a-vis the Lebanon war was largely due to their fear of colli-
sion between themselves. Both countries supported the same
party in the Lebanese imbroglio, namely the Phalanges. But
the incompatibility of their other interests was such that
the risk of collision between them seemed very great.
At this junction the U.S. offered the good offices of L.
Dean Brown as a means of helping along the stabilization of
Lebanon through a mutually agreed Israeli-Syrian interven-
tion. Syria concurred with the Israeli request that her
forces would not move roughly south of the Zahrani River and
west of the Bekaa valley and that she would not deploy SAM
missiles on Lebanon's territory. Israel, in turn, refrained
from direct intervention. The PLO-Lebanese coalition was
ruthlessly restrained and the Phalanges were saved.
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Apart from the fact that Israel compromised her long-held
objection to direct Syrian interference in Lebanon, these new
arrangements contained the seeds of a future confrontation,
which would not only shatter the precarious and limited
Syrian-Israeli accord but would also lead to yet another step
up the ladder of escalation between the two countries. One
of the results of the tacit 1976 accord was the creation of a
vacuum in Southern Lebanon between the Israeli border and
the "red" line beyond which the Syrians agreed not to move.
Within a short while, this virtual no-man's land was filled
by the PLO which sought refuge there from the tightening
Syrian embrace in the rest of Lebanon. As the PLO for its own
reasons could not afford to hold such an autonomous domain
right on Israel's border without using it as a launching pad
for further attacks against Israel, both Syria and Israel
were soon confronted by a new set of problems. From the
Israeli point of view, the problem boiled down to the follow-
ing: how to restrain the PLO without provoking the Syrians
into a new confrontation at a time in which the Arafat trail
- the most critical lifeline of the PLO - ran through Syrian
lines. From the Syrian point of view, the problem was the
obverse: how to pay its dues to the sacrosanct goal of the
Palestinians which Syria had so vociferously espoused all
along without inviting Israeli counteraction against Syrian
forces in Lebanon which could easily escalate "horizontally"
to the Golan.
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Israel could not curb the activities of the PLO in Lebanon
without effectively isolating the PLO from Syria. The latter
could perhaps observe the ground rules with Israel but seemed
reluctant actively to operate against the PLO. Hence, a new
twist to the Israeli-Syrian escalation process became virtually
inevitable as a direct result of the intensification of hostili-
ties between the PLO and Israel between 1976 and 1982. In July
1977 Syria abandoned the Phalanges and resumed her support of the
PLO. In March, 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani against
the PLO. Thereafter, the PLO was forced to abandon guerilla
operations and rely instead on long-range artillery and multiple
rocket launchers which could cause damage inside Israel while
flying over the heads of the UNIFIL and Haddad forces which were
supposed to maintain a buffer between Israel and the PLO. By
July, 1981, this exchange reached a deadly climax in a three-week
war of attrition. The damage to the Israeli population in the
area was so extensive that Begin's government c ccepted a cease-
fire with the PLO. But, simultaneously, Begin, Minister of
Defense Sharon and a number of other members of the cabinet also
decided to launch a major operation against the PLO which would
drive the latter out of Lebanon altogether. Operation SHELEG
(Hebrew acronym for Peace for the Galilee) in July, 1982, was the
result.
Theoretically, operation SHELEG did not have to lead to fresh
hostilities between Israel and Syria. After all, the declared
purpose was to deal with the PLO and not with Syria.
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In practice, however, a new confrontation with Syria was in
Israeli perception - inescapable. For one thing, Syria was -
with some justice - perceived as the main force behind the
stepping up of the PLO's campaign against Israel. Second,
faced by the provocation of the Phalanges and by Israel
decision to back the latter, Syria abrogated her commitment
under the tacit agreement which L. Dean Brown negotiated in
1976 not to deploy SAMs inside Lebanon. The upshot was that
the freedom to fly over Lebanese territory which the IAF had
enjoyed was gradually diminished. Soon, Israel could argue,
the Syrians would gain complete control over the air space of
Northern Lebanon and Israel's ability to deal with PLO bases
there and to protect the Phalanges would have been completely
eroded. All this took place against the background of the
most acrimonious election campaign in Israeli history. And
in the head of the campaign, Begin was several times carried
away emotionally to such an extent that he issued bellicose
statements against Syria. In turn, he would have to make good
his word or lose credibility both with his domestic constitu-
ency and, worse still, with Syria.
As soon as the invasion of Lebanon was underway, Begin
called upon President Assad "who has always kept his agree-
ments" not to fight. On the whole, the Syrians complied.
But apart from the fact that they did allow the PLO to fire a
few artillery rounds from behind their lines, the Syrians
also poured massive reinforcements into the Bekaa valley.
114
Using this as a pretext, the IDF attacked them on the fourth
day of the war. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was ordered to
knock out the Syrian SAMs in the northern sector of the Bekaa
valley. The IDF ground forces simultaneously moved into the
Shouf and drove the Syrian forces in the southern sector of
the Bekaa valley to the northern shores of the Qar'awn Lake.
Finally, the IDF successfully drove a wedge between the Syrian
forces on the high ground around the Beirut-Damascus road and
the Syrian contingent in Beirut.
Syria suffered a defeat - especially in the air war. As a
result of this war, her capital became exposed to Israeli
artillery. The upshot was, inevitably, a frantic Syrian drive
to rearm. The Soviets responded by supplying Syria with
SAM-5 missiles, SS-21 missiles, MiG 29, large quantities of
T-72 tanks, helicopters and other items. The Soviets also
had to commit their personnel or, which probably seemed worse,
let the Syrians handle the SAM5 system.
6 9
Since the 1973 war when Syrian armored units came close to
breaking through on the Golan Heights, President Assad has
been a stubborn thorn in the Israeli side. 70 At the present
time, Syria is considered the main strategic threat to Israel
6 9 This section is quoted from Avner Yaniv, "Syria and
Israel: the Politics of Escalation" in Syria under Assad,
edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, St. Martin's Press, New
York 1986, pp 157-175.
7 0 The Financial Times Limited, "Syrian Thorn in Israel's
Side," President Assad, by Roger Mathews, January 4, 1986, p. 6.
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in the Middle East. Following the visit by Egypt's President
Anwar al-Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977, Syria adopted a policy
of "strategic balance" which has increased from six to nine
divisions and sophisticated Soviet and Western weapons have
been acquired. Syria regards its military performance
against Israel during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 as
encouraging. Assad has promised the Syrian people that the
Golan Heights would one day be the "heart of Syria" and not
its fConcluded Middle East expert William Quandt
of the Prookings Institution: "Both Israel and Syria have
got it in their minds that they will fight another major war,
and both are very seriously planning for that day." 7 3
A process of escalation which began 40 years earlier with
small and strictly localized skirmishes involving far more
diplomacy than actual fire and not involving the superpowers
had thus expanded dramatically. Geographically, it could
lead to war on a long front from Central Lebanon all the way
to Southern Golan. Functionally, it could lead to conven-
tional violence. Indeed, handled with less than utmost care,
71IDF Journal vol. 3, issue 1, Fall 1985, pp 73-76,
Language: English, Section Headings: Syria: The Strategic
Threat.
7 2The Washington Post, "Syrian-Israeli Chill Envelops
Saturday, Final Edition, First Section; A13.
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this confrontation could even involve both the U.S. and the
USSR, complete with their awesome nuclear arsenals.
7 3Time, Section: World; Middle East, "Stirring Up Rumors of
War, Jerusalem and Damascus Square Off," by William E. Smith,
U.S. Edietion, May 26, 1986, p. 30.
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XI. SYRIA AND LEBANON
It was mentioned earlier in this paper that present
Lebanon was part of a powerful, always proud empire - Greater
Syria. At the end of World War I, the land of Greater Syria
came under the mandate of Britain and France. France's share
of Greater Syria was present Syria, Lebanon and Alexandretta.
To weaken the Arab nationalist movement, the French carved
contemporary Lebanon from Syria after World War I directly
and gave Alexandretta to Turkey a few years later.
The Syrians have never absolved the French for taking
territory from them. After World War II, France reluctantly
departed, and Syria and Lebanon became independent republics.
Underlying the Syrian state's attitude to Lebanon was the
view that the whole of Lebanon and, even more so, the terri-
tories added to it by the French in 1920 were part of Syria.
The explicit Syrian demands to reintegrate Lebanon or parts
of it faded during the years because Syria's domestic weak-
ness, instability and lack of external resources had prevented
its leaders from translating their interests and ambitions
into actual influence. But an implicit claim was maintained
through the Syrian refusal to establish normal diplomatic
relations with Lebanon.
7 4
7 4 Itamar Rabinovich, The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in
Le1,anon as a Mirror, an Issue and an Instrument, in Syria under
Assid, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, St. Martin's Press,
N.Y., 1986, p. 180.
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Relations between Syria and Lebanon, since independence
in 1946, have been characterized by continuing tension over
(1) economic matters, (2) asylum granted to political
refugees, (3) differing positions on relations with the U.S.
and the West, and (4) the conflict with Israel, including the
role of the Palestinians in this conflict.
Lebanese and Syrian economies are basically competitive
and not complementary, and the two countries have radically
different approaches to economic policies. Syria has adopted
"economic nationalism", or socialism, as the basis for its
economy and Lebanon's policy is based on laissez faire, or
free trade. During the Mandate period, the two countries had
a unified policy, including a common currency and customs
administration. The matter of customs fees produced friction
since they were split proportionately, by size, with 44%
going to Lebanon and 56% to Syria, while Lebanon produced the
greater amount of trade revenue. This unified policy was
dissolved in 1950, which precipitated tension requiring Arab
league mediation. After two years of negotiations, an
economic agreement was signed between the two countries in
1952. The agreement has, on occasion, been used as a weapon
against Lebanon by Syria, which does this by raising the
duties on goods being shipped from Lebanon through Syria to
Iraq, Jordan and the Persian Gulf. The Syrians have also
used border closings as a means of exerting economic pressure
on Lebanon.
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Disagreements have been frequent over asylum granted by
Lebanon to Syrian political refugees. In 1952, when Akram
Haurani, Salah al-Din Bitar, and Michel 'Aflag fled to Lebanon
and mounted an attack on the Shishakli regime, Syria closed
the border for 24 hours in protest. In 1956, during the Suez
crisis, the discovery of a Lebanon-based plot against the
Syrian government by Syrian Intelligence led to a deteriora-
tion in relations between the two countries. In 1961, the
Foreign Ministers of Syria and Lebanon reached an agreement
on mutual cooperation in solving the problem of political
subversion after discussions o i the infiltration of UAR
agents into Syria from Lebanon. In 1968, Syria found it
necessary to impose higher duties as well as a tax on trucks
engaged in the transit trade, as a retaliatory measure
designed to force the Lebanese to suppress subversion and
sabotage again at Syria that originated in Lebanon.
On the other hand, Syria has also served as a base for
attempted political disruption in Lebanon. The most notable
case was the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war of
1958. At that time Lebanon was forced to complain to both the
Arab League and the United Nations Security Council about
Syrian actions. During the middle of May 1958, rioting broke
out in protest against the possible revision of the Lebanese
Constitution that would permit Lebanese President Chamoun to
take office for a second six-year term, thus extending the
tenure of a pro-Western government in Lebanon. Radio Cairo
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and Ra-io Damascus urged the Lebanese to sustain the revolt
and urged President Chamoun to resign. Actual aid to anti-
government forces in Lebanon came from the Syrian sector of
the UAR. The whole problem of Syrian intervention was, how-
ever, muted following the Iraqi coup d'etat on July 14 and
the subsequent dispatch of United States troops to Lebanon by
President Eisenhower at Lebanon's request.
The ties between Lebanon, the U.S. and the West in general
have also formed the focal point of dissension between Syria
and Lebanon. Generally speaking, Lebanon's position was a
reflection of its commercial interests and the need to pre-
serve them by ties to the West. Its large Christian popula-
tion also exerted its influence. This pro-Western stance has
been anathema to the anti-imperialist, Muslim and strongly
nationalistic Syrian leadership. The fact that Lebanon
accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 and that it asked
for aid from the United States in 1958 made it vulnerable to
Syrian accusations that Lebanon was consorting with the
enemy. Furthermore, Lebanon's refusal to act as a "confron-
tation" state during the 1950s and 1960s had an impact on the
relationship during that period. Lebanon's territory was
seen by Syrian military planners both as their soft belly
vis-a-vis Israel and as a potential staging ground within an
offensive scheme. Furthermore, Lebanese repression of
Palestinian guerillas using Southern Lebanon as a staging
ground for attacks on Israel led to Syrian support for the
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Palestinians in their struggle against the Lebanese govern-
ment as well as to infiltration of Sa'iqa (Syrian based
Palestinian Commandos) into Lebanon early in 1969. The
tension over Lebanese actions against the Palestinians grew;
in October, 1969, two large groups of armed Syrians attacked
Lebanese border posts and the Syrian government again closed
the border as a reaction against the attacks of the Lebanese
army on Palestinian guerillas in Lebanon. During 1970, there
was a considerable lessening of tension. Relations between
Lebanon and Syria continued to be good until May 1973 when
fighting erupted between the Palestine Liberation Army and
the Lebanese Army. Syria responded by closing the border.
The border closing was not attended by any drastic deteriora-
tion of relations and the Foreign Minister of Syria asserted
that Syria had no desire to bring down the Lebanese regime,
but that it only wished to help end the fighting. The Syrian
government had, in fact, inter,7nef wit!-, fhon Dnestinians at
one point for the release of Lebanese customs officials held
by the guerillas. On June 3, 1974, the Syrian Foreign
Minister noted that Syrian Lebanese relations were solidly
based. By the end of 1974, Syria had not only offered to
support Lebanon against attacks by Israel, which were
launched in retaliation for Palestinian activities but it
also promised to supply Lebanon with military aid. It is
against this background of often fluctuating relations
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between Syria and Lebanon that the current struggle in
Lebanon must be viewed.
75
A. THE CIVIL WAR, 1975-1976
President Assad of Syria has, since the beginning of 1975,
begun to revive the concept of "Greater Syria". In 1975,
Lebanon's process of decline led to the outbreak of civil war.
For six months, Syria was able to play another dual role -
part-time supporter of its friends and clients in the opposi-
tion and part-time mediator and peace maker. That strategy
collapsed at the end of 1975, and Assad was forced to choose
a more decisive line.
The crisis of December, 1975 - January, 1976 revealed a
complexity of considerations hitherto unfamiliar in Syrian
foreign policy. In Lebanon itself, the situation threatened
to get out of hand and Assad realized that he could not
afford to accept the victory of either party to the civil
war. Although the Maronites could not hope to re-establish
their supremacy in the whole of Lebanon, some of them seemed
determined to fall back upon the nation of a "smaller
Christian Lebanon". This notion - a "Maronite Zion" - was
anathema to Assad as well as to all Arab nationalists. The
alternative, a victory of the leftist-Muslim Palestinian
7 5This section quoted from Elizabeth L. Conroy, "Syria and
Lebanon: The Background," in The Syrian Arab Republic, edited
by Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, New York, 1976, pp 80-83.
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alliance, was equally repelling. It could result in an
Israeli or other external intervention. In any case, Assad
did not want to be sandwiched between a radical Iraq and
radical Lebanon. "Decision military action in this sense in
a country like Lebanon," Assad argued, "is impossible because
the issue does not depend solely on might .... there are other
factors and conditions which must be available but are not
present. By crushing the dominant Maronite political estab-
lishment, as Kamal Jumblatt and Yassir Arafat wanted to do,"
Assad continued, "a host of negative consequences would be
created - international and Israeli intervention, partition
and further division of Arab ranks - an ugly picture detri-
mental to Arab interests and objectives."
Assad, however, failed to mention another dimension that
had been added to his calculations. For Syria seeking a
regional and an international role, the crisis in Lebanon
presented an opportunity as well as a challenge. By demon-
strating that it and it alone could solve the crisis in
Lebanon, Syria would prove to the U.S. that in that part of
the Middle East one had to deal directly with Syria. The
humiliating experience of 1973-74, when Syria was perceived
and treated as Egypt's subordinate partner, would be written
off. Syria would became an autonomous regional power, on a
par with Egypt and Iraq, and able to deal confidently with
both superpowers. The American factor, which had become
paramount in his thinking, and the fear of Israeli
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intervention confirmed his conviction that Syria's interven-
tion should aim at consolidation and moderate reforms rather
than radical transformation. In February, 1976, the Syrian
leadership together with President Faranjiyyah prepared the
"Reforms Document". This document resulted in an acro-
batic renversement des alliances. Syria was now opposed by
its former allies, who resented the limited change envisaged
by Damascus and refused to accept Syrian domination. It was
supported by the conservative, predominantly Maronite Lebanese
Front, whose leaders saw the Syrians as (at least temporary)
saviors.
There seemed to be an inescapable logic to the new turn of
events. Most of the organizations and individuals constitut-
ing the National Front were willing to take up arms in order
to obstruct Syria's new policy. The same considerations that
had motivated Assad's intervention and initial direction now
forced him to use his army against the Front. His interests
in Lebanon itself and his regional ambitions had become far
too important for Assad to tolerate defeat. It was also a
classic case of interventionism - once the initial investment
had been made, additional investments had to be made in order
to justify its cost. In any event, the Syrian army in
Lebanon found itself in the improbable position of fighting
alongside conservative militias against the PLO and the Druze
militia of Kamal Jumblatt.
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In September, 1976, the Syrian army came close to crushing
its rivals, but Saudi Arabia's intercession prevented a mili-
tary decision. The Riyadh Conference in October, 1976 formal-
ized the ambiguity with which the fighting ended. The Arab
consensus recognized Syria's hegemony in Lebanon, which condi-
tion it legitimized by accepting Syria's military presence in
the guise of an Arab Deterrent Force and agreeing to subsidize
it. Syria, however, was forced to accept the continued pres-
ence and role in Lebanon of the PLO and some of its other
rivals.
The mixed results of the Riyadh Conference were illustra-
tive of Syria's regional and international standing in late
1976 and 1977. Syria achieved an unprecedented degree of
prestige and influence that was, to a considerable extent, a
consequence of its achievements in Lebanon. In 1977, Assad
met with Soviet and American leaders on his own terms, and
played a cardinal role in obstructing U.S. President Carter's
efforts to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict through an
international conference. Assad's new relationship with the
Maronite militias of the Lebanese Front was perplexing. The
militias were the most powerful local force, but cooperation
with them was difficult and ideologically awkward. Assad
realized that Lebanon could not be annexed or even taken over
in a brief span of time. Syrian supremacy had to be
consolidated and formalized over time.
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B. PERIOD OF 1977-1982
After the crushing of the National Front, Syria frced an
increasing challenge in Lebanon posed by Israel and the
Lebanese Frcnt. Israel's Menachem Begin, during his first
two years in office, continued the Lebanese policy of his
predecessor, Yitzhak Rabin. In the sunuLer of 1979, however,
Begin authorized greater support of and commitment to Bashir
Jumayyil and his militias. One common goal of the Israeli-
Maronite alliance was to challenge and weaken Syrian suprem-
acy in Lebanon, which had been accepted, with reservations,
as an unavoidable evil in 1976.
There was little that Assad could do against this chal-
lenge until the end of 1980. By that time, he had defeated
his domestic rivals, signed a treaty of friendship and
cooperation with the Soviet Union and completed an important
part of his military build-up plan. He had not closed the
"strategic gap" with Israel that had been opened by Egypt's
departure from the Arab consensus in 1977, but he felt that
Syria had the military capability to challenge Israel even if
the challenge were likely to trigger an Israeli military
reaction.
The series of challenges and counter-challenges posed,
respectively, by Israel and the Lebanese (Front) forces and
by Syria finally led to a showdown at Zahle: the so-called
"missile crisis" of the spring and early summer of 1981.
Syria did not seek a showdown and was probably not interested
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in a military clash with Israel, but the prospect of Lebanese
forces' take-over of Zahle was simply unacceptable to Syria.
Zahle is situated in the Bekaa Valley, the part of Lebanon
considered most vital to Syria's national security. A
Lebanese forces' outpost in Zahle and a possible link up with
Israel were perceived as a grave threat to Syria's position
in Lebanon and, indeed, to Syria proper. The "missile
crisis" of 1981 was an important link in the chain of events
that led to the June, 1982 war. In several respects it can
also be seen as a dress rehearsal for that war. This war was
imposed on the Syrians who were defeated badly in Lebanon.
After a few weeks, the Palestinian forces were defeated and
evacuated from Beirut and South Lebanon.
C. THE PERIOD OF 1982 - PRESENT
The complications of the Israeli operation enabled Syria
to save some of its positions in Lebanon towards the end of
June. When the PLO had left Beirut and Bashir Jumayyil had
been elected President of Lebanon, the future of Syria's
influence seemed bleak. During this period, two characteris-
tics of Assad's political style became fully evident - his
perseverance and his ruthlessness. The assassination of
Bashir Jumayyil was but one of the measures initiated by
Syria during the late summer and autumn of 1982 in order to
salvage its position in Lebanon.
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For some time, Syria's efforts were solely concerned with
that salvaging operation. Syria's position in Lebanon had to
be restored and Syria's enemies and competitors (the U.S.,
Israel and the Lebanese forces) removed or subdued. With the
passage of time and as the success of Syria's efforts in
Lebanon became more apparent, additional and more ambitious
goals were added. Lebanon became the focal point of regional
politics, and since Syria could rely on several advantages in
Lebanon, it could realistically aspire to regain the regional
and international prominence it had briefly enjoyed in
1976-77.
Syria, indeed, regained its regional and international
prominence, restored its supremacy in Lebanon and proved that
it had a staying power more than all other states involved in
Lebanon. By this supremacy, Syria subdued Arafat's followers
and Muslim fanatics in the City of Tripoli in North Lebanon.
It obstructed the implementation of the Reagan plan of Septem-
ber, 1982. By so doing, Syria not only thwarted an objection-
able development but also demonstrated, once again, that the
U.S. could not afford to ignore, let alone snub, Damascus.
It was, in addition, an excellent way of offering a service
to the Soviet Union that was fully congruent with Syria's own
interests. The Soviet Union, by rehabilitating Syria's
ground-to-air missile system at the end of 1982, had played a
crucial role in rebuilding Syria's position in Lebanon. Syria
destroyed the May 17, 1983 agreement between Israel and
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Lebanon which was engineered and orchestrated by the United
States because Syria viewed the May 17 agreement as a leaf
from the tree planted at Camp David.
7 6
The Syrian presence in Lebanon is indispensable for the
survival of any Lebanese polity. On different occasions the
Lebanese political leaders resorted to Damascus for help. On
February 25, 1980, the situation deteriorated badly in
Lebanon. The Lebanese leaders including Premier Selim Hoss
rushed to Damascus to plead for a delay in the Syrian with-
drawal. Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing states offered
to raise the stipend of $50 million per month that they were
paying Syria for its forces in Lebanon.7 7 On September 20,
1985, Premier Rashid Karami appealed for Syrian military
military intervention to end Lebanon's civil war. 78 On June
17, 1985, the News Week Magazine mentioned that President Amin
Gemayel appealed for Syrian military intervention. He visited
Damascus and asked President Assad to send extra troops to help
the Lebanese Army disarm warring militias and maintain order.79
7 6 This section is quoted from Itamar Rabinovich - Syria
under Assad, pp 181-187.
7 7Time, February 25, 1980, p. 30.
7 8The Associated Press, Section: International News,
September 21, 1985.
7 9Rod Nordland, 'The Syrians are Coming', News Week, June
17, 1985, p. 59.
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D. THE SYRIAN OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON
I would like to mention here the opinion of a great
Lebanese Socialite - Karim Pakradouni - concerning the Syrian
objectives in Lebanon. Karim Pakradouni, a lawyer and member
of the Phalangist's politburo, pro-Syrian, was senior advisor
and confident to both Lebanese ex-President Sarkis and the
late President-elect Bachir Gemayel. Pakradouni summarized
to us the Syrian demands in Lebanon as follows: a) Syria
expects the Lebanese army to be its ally not its enemy.
Therefore, the Syrians want to ensure their control over the
Lebanese army. They insist on having a major role in the
appointment of the Lebanese Army Commander, the Director of
Military Investigations, and the General Director for National
Security. b) Syria wants to control the Lebanese foreign
po.!icy. c) Syria would not accept any Arab or foreign inter-
vention in Lebanon, whether this intervention is intended to
solve Lebanese-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian, or Lebanese-
Syrian conflicts. d) Syria has ensured the failure of several
U.S.-sponsored mediation efforts the goals of which were to
solve Lebanese-Syrian disputes. e) Every act done without
the participation of Damascus will be rejected, no matter
what positive results it may bring about. Every act in which
Damascus participates shall be accepted, no matter how
dangerous the results may be. f) Syria has thus succeeded in
demonstrating to the World that the road to Lebanon runs
through Damascus; conversely, it has made the Palestinians
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and Lebanese realize that the road to the outside World leads
through Damascus.
8 0
8 0 Karim Pakradouni, "Assad's Syria and the Politics of
Change," Middle East Insight, pp 4-6. (I could not find the
publishing date of this article, but from the context, I guess
it was published after 1983.)
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XII. SYRIA AND JORDAN
Till the end of the Ottoman period, the territories that
later comprised Syria and Jordan shared much in common, from
geography to economics and linguistics. The historical and
administrative concept of Syria, furthermore, usually included
most of Transjordan.
The establishment of Transjordan as a political entity
separated from Syria stemmed from considerations that were
irrelevant both to historical developments and the desires of
the indigenous inhabitants. That separation, together with
the differences between the two forms of foreign rule that
both countries experienced, somewhat blurred the common
denominators, sharpened existing differences and created new
ones.
With independence, and the passage of time, the respective
regimes of the two countries have taken utterly different
directions. Syria, an authoritarian republic, built up an
impressive military force with the ambition, as well as the
potential capability, of becoming a leading Middle Eastern
power. The pattern of its global and regional alliances has
shown a tendency to prefer the Soviet bloc and the radical
Arab regimes. Jordan, a traditional yet fairly enlightened
monarchy, also developed an efficient professional army but
one designaLed (in the last 30 odd years, at least) to
preserve the regime and defend the country rather than to
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back an aggressive regional and foreign policy. In contrast
to Syria, Jordan has persisted in its preference for a pro-
Western orientation and aliqnment with moderate Middle
Eastern states.
Syria has championed the cause of the Palestinians, while
often ruthlessly suppressing the PLO. For Jordan, the atti-
tude towards the Palestinian was not only a question of
expediency - as it was for Syria - but also a matter of
survival. Jordan, too, sometimes followed a repressive
policy towards the PLO, but constantly adhered to a policy
that considered the Palestinians and thc Transjordanians as
two segments of the same people and country.
These differences between Syria and Jordan, which have
become increasingly more pronounced, have given rise to fre-
quent fluctuation in their mutual relations. On several
occasions, the two states attempted to merge into one
political entity. On the other hand, diplomatic relations
between them have been severed at least as frequently, and in
four instances, the two countries seemed headed towards
large-scale armed conflict. Such extreme ups and downs are
uncommon even within the inter-Arab system, which have in
general been characterized by rapid shifts from violent
animosity to declarations of eternal friendship. Tracing the
precise causes of these fluctuations cannot possibly be done
within the confines of a brief section of this paper;
however, an overview of the history of Syrian-Jordanian
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bilateral relations as well as a brief analysis of some of
the most conspicuous determinants of Jordanian policy is
feasible.
A. JORDAN'S POLICY UNDER ABDALLAH
Jordanian interest in Syria dates from the beginning of
Hashemite rule in Amman. Abdallah ibn Hussein, founder of the
Emirate of Transjordan, and its ruler for 30 years, arrived in
that area in 1921. He had come from the Hijaz with the
declared intention of advancing into Syria; at the time, he
contemplated taking revenge upon the French for their usurpa-
tion of the throne of Damascus from his brother Faysal.
Eventually, h,. settled for much less: Colonial Secretary
Winston Churchill's offer of the remote desert emirate pro-
vided Abdallah with a good enough excuse to change hiq mind.
Nevertheless, during the 1910s and 1930s, Abdallah's name was
mentioned more than once as a candidate for the kingship of
Syria.
After the outbreak of World War II, Abdallah initiated and
publicized the "Greater Syria" scheme that called for the
unification of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine under
his throne. Henceforth, that scheme became the cornerstone of
all his diplomatic efforts. In spite of strong opposition on
the part of almost all the parties concerned, he adhered to
his territorial goals until his assassination in July, 1951.
His only achievement in this respect - the annexation of Arab
Palestine in 1948 - was described as the fulfillment of the
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first stage of the Greater Syria scheme. In 1946, when both
Syria and Transjordan (henceforth Jordan) gained their inde-
pendeiice, Abdallh's tactics became nothing short of interven-
tion in Syria's domestic affairs. Syria reciprocated by
filing a complaint to the Arab League, launching a propaganda
campaign and granting political asylum to opposition activists
from Amman. Abdallah retaliated by closing his consulate in
Damascus.
The three coups d'etat that took place in Syria in 1949
and the subsequent changes in its political orientation affec-
ted ties with Jordan. There was tension and hostility between
the two nations under Za'im, rapid improvement in relations
after Hinnawi took over and occasional ups and downs under
Shishakli. Sometimes relations between the two nations were
influenced by developments not directly associated with bi-
lateral issues. In early 1950, for example, tension between
the two countries mounted because of rumors (not unfounded)
about Israeli-Jordanian peace negotiations and their reaching
of an agreement.
The assassination of King Abdallah in July, 1951 not only
marked the end of a chapter in Jordan's history, but also
heralded a new era in its relations with Syria. Up to that
point, Abdallah had dominated the scene, his policy towards
Syria having been mainly based on his personal and dynastic
considerations. Though he was not the first Arab statesman
to push for union with Syria, he was the only one to insist
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that Jordan, under his leadership, be the core of that
unified entity. Thus, it would not be unreasonable to assume
that Abdallah aspired to a greater Jordan rather than to a
Greater Syria.
B. THE IMPACT OF HUSSEIN
Hussein's ascendancy to the throne channelled relations
between the two countries into an "ordinary" bilateral pat-
tern. The conduct of the young monarch within the inter-Arab
system indicated the return of Jordan to its true political
size: Hussein neither introduced grandiose unity schemes nor
contemplated shaping other Arab regimes in his own image. As
a result, Syria gradually became the dominant factor in their
bilateral relations.
Hussein's first years on the throne were years of grace.
They were characterized by gradually improved ties with Syria,
leading, in 1955, to the resumption of full diplomatic rela-
tions. From 1955-57, correctly referred to as "Hussein's
Arab-nationalist era", Jordan was closer than ever to its
militant Arab neighbors. Its non-admittance to the Baghdad
Pact, together with the dismissal of John B. Glubb and the
rest of the British officers from its army accelerated
cordial relations with Syria.
The period that followed showed a deterioration in these
friendly relations that was even more rapid. The turning
point came in April, 1957, when a coup d'etat by some
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Jordanian army officers was nipped in the bud and Jordan's
provocative national-socialist prire minister was dismissed.
Although Syria was not behind the plot, it was sympathetic to
the conspirators and granted political asylum to the scores
of army officers and civilian politicians who escaped f-om
Jordan. In the second half of 1957, their common border was
closed, diplomatic relations were broken off and propaganda
warfare was commenced.
The tension between the two countries stepped up early in
1958, when Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Repub-
lic (URA), and gave way to violence. Armed groups, trained in
Syria for subversive activities, infiltrated into Jordan.
Relations undoubtedly reached their lowest ebb in November,
1958, when Syrian Migs intercepted Hussein's private jet
(flown by the king himself) enroute to Europe and forced him
to return to Amman.
Jordan's rejection of the idea of a Palestinian entity
(promoted by Egypt and Iraq in 1959) only made matters worse.
Terrorist attacks from Syria against Jordanian targets con-
tinued, reaching a peak in August, 1960 with the assassination
of the prime minister, Haza 'al-Majali. The murderers escaped
to Syria and Jordan attributed the crime to the UAR intelli-
gence services.
Despite the merger of Egypt and Syria and notwithstanding
their common foreign policy, a distinct pattern of Jordanian-
Syrian relations between 1958 and 1961 can still be traced.
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During this period, Jordan disregarded Syrian violence, to
which it had been subjected before and after the foundation of
the UAR, and took pains to demonstrate hostility vis-a-vis
Egypt in order to cultivate Syrian goodwill. Insinuating
that Egypt was working against both Syria and Jordanian
interests and diverting the relations between the two from
their "natural" course, Jordanian broadcasts urged the
Syrians to liberate themselves from the Egyptian yoke.
Upon the dissolution of the UAR in 1961, Jordan was the
first country to recognize Syria and to offer its support
against political attacks by Egypt and other Arab states for
breaking an "historical" union and becoming an isolationist.
These improved relations lasted for a brief interlude as the
Ba'athist revolution in 1963 widened the ideological gap
between the two countries.
A slight improvement in Syrian-Jordanian bilateral rela-
tions in 1964-65 was soon checked by the establishment of the
PLO - with the blessing of the inte--Arab system - and the
revival of Palestinian nationalism. Syria developed the idea
of a "popular war of liberation" (against Israel) and made
Fatah its protege. Jordan, less than happy about the concept
of a Palestinian renaissance, was forced to choose between
acquiescence or confrontation within the inter-Arab system.
The split between Jordan and the PLO in 1966 placed further
strain on already tense Syrian-Jordanian relations. By the
end of May, 1967, the two countries were on the brink of open
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conflict, and it may be plausibly assumed that the outbreak
of the Six Day War prevented escalation into all-out
hostilities.
After a year in isolation, Jordan was provided by the
1967 war and its outcome with renewed legitimacy among the
Arab states, Syria included. Conflicts over the Palestinian
issue, however, were to crop up again. Syria unequivocally
supported the Palestinian organizations whenever they were
involved in battles with Jordanian authorities. In September,
1970, Syria went so far as to send an armored division into
Jordanian territory to reinforce the Palestinians during the
Black September showdown with Hussein's army. When Jordan
once again operated against the Palestinians in July, 1971,
Syria severed diplomatic relations and closed the border.
The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War found both countries
in the midst of a gradual and cautious rapprochment. In 1975
and 1976, the two countries were on the verge of a union. A
common supreme leadership was established, and practical
measures for merging several systems (civil as well as mili-
tary) were taken. Both parties benefited. Jordan became the
only Arab state to back the Syrian intervention in Lebanon,
while Syria recognized Jordan's special status regarding the
Palestine question. President Assad publicly supported
Hussein's federation scheme as a solution to that problem.
In 1977, the Jordanian-Syrian relations deteriorated and
the gap widened by Syria's not unfounded suspicions that
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members of the Muslim Brotherhood, its most dangerous inter-
nal opposition, had escaped to Jordan. In reaction to Syria's
mounting hostility, Jordan was quick to improve relations with
Iraq, Syria's ideological and political arch-enemy. On
several occasions, the Syrians produced Moslem Brotherhood
suspects who said on Damascus radio and television that they
were trained at camps in Jordan with help from Jordanian
intelligence officers. When President Assad met King Hussein
at the funeral of President Tito in Yugoslavia in 1980 and
confronted him with the charges, the Jordanian ruler denied
them categorically. 81
The unavoidable outcome was a new crisis; in December,
1980, Jordan and Syria came very close to violent confronta-
tion as massive military concentrations were deployed along
the common border. It took several weeks of Saudi mediation
to defuse the tension, which only mounted again in early
1981, following the kidnapping of the Jordanian military
attache in Beirut and the uncovering of a plot to assassinate
the prime minister. Jordan accused Rif'at Assad, brother of
the Syrian president, of initiating and organizing the murder
attempt; Syria retaliated by sending a few Palestinian groups
to operate against Israel through Jordanian territory, there-
by embarrassing Hussein.
8 1The New York Times, "Jordanian Prime Minister to
Syria," by Ihsan A. Hijazi, Section A, p. 3, column 4.
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The war in Lebanon in 1982 only increased the tension;
the unclear future of the PLO, after having lost its terri-
torial base in Beirut, sharply exposed the divergence of
opinions between Jordan and Syria regarding that organization
and the Palestine question in general. Syria was apprehensive
lest Arafat's weakened position produce a rapprochment between
him and Hussein and Jordan be granted the desirable mandate
to negotiate a political settlement. Such possibilities
placed Syria's vital interests and ideological tenets in
jeopardy. The first round of Hussein-Arafat talks in March-
April, 1983 were followed by extreme Syrian pressure on both
sides in order to thwart the dialogue. Syria encouraged the
split within the PLO and the challenge to Arafat's leadership.
In fact, respective reactior7 to the internal struggles of the
PLO somewhat reflected Syrian-Jordanian relations in general.
Syria made considerable efforts to replace or at least con-
strain Arafat, and thereby guarantee an obedient, pro-Syrian
organization; Jordan remained ostensibly passive, expecting
Arafat to make the next move; in fact, most of the events that
either fostered advancement or caused regression in their bi-
lateral relations originated from Syria. In 1983, a Syrian
proposal for military coordination with Jordan to counter an
Israeli attack on Syria through Jordan had been rejected.8 2
8 2Middle East International, Issue 202, p.6, "Jordan: Be
Prepared," by Abu Nab Ibrahim, June 10, 183.
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In 1985, Hussein sent his Prime Minister Zaid Rifai to Syria
for reconciliation talks with Syrian President Hafez Assad,
who had long accused Jordan of harboring Moslem Brotherhood
opponents of his rule. Hussein emphatically insisted that he
had learned only recently that Jordan had been used as a base
by subversives operating against Syria. This "minority," he
said, had "deceived" him and the vast majority of Jordan-
ians. 83 According to some diplomats in the Syrian and
Jordanian capitals, Jordan took this step of reconciliation
because it had been forced to accept the Syrian position that
the only way to negotiate with Israel is as an Arab bloc,
operating from a united stand backed by a strong military
force. 84
C. THE DETERMINANTS OF JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS
Broadly speaking, Jordanian-Syrian relations were deter-
mined by seven factors: 1) the dynastic ambitions of the
Hashemites, 2) the Greater Syria scheme, 3) domestic social
processes and historical processes, 4) the changing military
balance, 5) economic dependence, 6) inter-Arab pressures and
7) ideological and structural differences.
8 3The Washington Post, "Hussein Curbs Fundamentalists," by
Samira Kawar, Sectin A21, December 27, 1985.
8 4The Washington Post, "Rapprochement Seen Dooming Peace
Move," by Loren Jenkins, First Section, AIO, December 24,
1985.
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1. The Dynastic Ambitions of the Hashemites.
As was mentioned early in this section, King Abdallah
ascribed the utmost importance to Syria in both dynastic and
pan-Arab terms, considering that country a family realm, as
his brother Faysal was its first ruler after the disintegra-
tion of the Ottoman empire.
2. The Greater Syria Scheme.
Aside from his dynastic aspirations, Abdallah con-
sidered Syria the historical and territorial center of the
Arab nation. He saw the re-establishment of the historical
bilad-al-sham (Syria's ancient Arabic name) as the most
important territorial objective of the Arab revolt in World
War I. He referred to Greater Syria (Surriya al-Kubra) not
only as an historical entity, but also as a natural (Surriya-
al-tab'iyya) and geographical (Surriya al-Jughrafiyya) entity.
Abdallah, moreover, developed a series of arguments to sub-
stantiate his claim to rule over Greater Syria.
King Hussein has also made extensive use of the
Hashemite heritage and the memory of the Arab revolt. His
deep emotional commitment to the legacy of Abdallah is
evident. Nevertheless, he has made no efforts to fulfill his
grandfather's ambitions or to utilize his ideas politically
or ideologically.
Upon the accession to power of Hafez al-Assad, the
tables turned. Assad exploited the concept of Greater Syria
for his own ends, to justify his intervention in Lebanon (and
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later, the refusal to withdraw) and to threaten recalcitrant
Arab colleagues. Yassir Arafat's somewhat critical reference
in 1974 to Syria patronization of the PLO was immediately
followed by Assad's statement that Palestine had no indepen-
dent standing and was actually Southern Syria. The rapproche-
ment that brought Jordan and Syria to the brink of uinion in
1975-76 was considered by foreign observers as a Syrian
attempt at Syrian-Jordan "integration". The Greater Syria
objective was not ignored by King Hussein, who eventually
rejected all proposed measures that would have made the
"integration" irreversible. The idea of Greater Syria, so
aggressively promoted by King Abdallah, now made contemporary
Jordan a potential victim of Syrian ambitions of geographical
expansion. Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan once complained that
"the Syrians say there are no Palestinians, Jordanians,
Lebanese - that they are all Southern Syrians".
3. Domestic Social Processes.
The territory composing the Emirate of Transjordan in
the 1920s (and later, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) had
never been an integrated administrative or political unit
before Abdallah assumed the throne. Throughout history,
considerable portions of that area had been administered from
Damascus for rather long periods, beginning with the rule of
the Umayad dynasty (seventh-eighth centuries A.D.). Under
the Ottoman empire, Northern and Central Transjordan were
part of the vilayet of Sham (the provinces of Syria). When
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Abdallah established himself in Transjordan, his administra-
tion was largely based on Syrian personnel. Moreover, all his
prime ministers until 1931 were Syrians. Consequently, many
inhabitants of the northern part of Transjordan, especially
the Ajlun area, remained Damascus-oriented for years after
the establishment of a central administration in Amman. Most
of the officers that were involved in plots to topple the
Jordanian regime, such as Abdallah al-Tall, Mahmud al-Rusan
and Sadiq al-Shara came from Ajlun, and Ali Hiyari and Ali
Abu Nuwar came from Balqaa. Many conspirators and opposition
leaders escaped to Syria, which granted them political asylum.
Some of the Bedouin tribes in the north are pro-Syria. They
threaten to cross the border and join their brothers in Syria
in order to extract various concessions or benefits from the
authorities.
4. The Changing Military Balance.
The unitary territorial ambitions of the Hashemites
(and of Abdallah, in particular) during the late 1940s and
early 1950s constituted a viable threat for Syria because of
its military strength vis-a-vis Jordan (and Iraq). Jordan's
British-equipped, trained and commanded Arab Legion, a profes-
sional standing army, was considered by many as the best Arab
force. The Legion outnumbered the young, ill-trained "Troupes
speciales du Levant" of the mandatory period that had been
trained and commanded by the French. Inferior to the Legion
units in its scope, quality and military experience, the
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Syrian Army in 1948 also had rather meager achievement in
comparison. The military gap was gradually narrowed during
the 1950s, and the balance began changing in favor of Syria.
Syria constantly increased its military edge over Jordan.
The fear of Syrian military power and apprehension that
it might use it have become, since the late 1960s, a dominant
factor influencing Jordan's attitude towards its neighbor.
5. Jordan's Dependence on Syria.
Because of political and geographical constraints and
particularly the absence of an outlet to the Mediterranean,
most of Jordan's links to Europe have passed through Syrian
territory or air space, consequently making Jordan consider-
ably economically dependent on Syria. This dependence has
been augmented in recent years, since most of Jordan's
revenue comes from hundreds of small factories engaged in
production for the Syrian market and for the Gulf. The need
to utilize Syrian air space to Europe has also had political
repercussions, as in the case of the Syrian interception of
King Hussein's plane in November, 1958.
This dependence has both affected bilateral relations,
reinforcirg Syrian dominance, and has been influenced by them.
Whenever a deterioration in relations led to conflict, Syria
did not hesitate to take advantage of Jordanian dependency by
closing the border, an action that proved to be an effective
weapon more than once.
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The political implications of this dependence some-
times exceeded certain limits for Jordan. It forced Jordan
to solicit Israel's good will, which was not only humiliating
but also hazardous, owing to the Arab reaction that such a
move could evoke. In 1958, British troops were hastened to
Amman to protect Hussein and his regime. Because of Syria's
hostile attitude, the only possible flight course from British
bases in Europe and Cyprus was via Israel's air space. The
Israelis consented and Hussein was forced to acquiesce.
Several months later, he found himself in a similar situation
when the Americans obtained permission to fly oil to him from
the Gulf through Israel's air space.
6. The Inter-Arab System.
The fear of the Hashemites and of Abdallah's initia-
tives had originally pushed Syria into a bloc with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia with the founding of the Arab League. In spite
of the political and ideological regroupings of the 1950s and
the changing alliances and coalitions, Syria and Jordan
remained in different camps.
Syria has generally enjoyed a more senior status in
the Arab World than has Jordan because of the former's size,
location and political importance. Concomitant with growing
prominence of the inter-Arab system - mainly during the 1960s
and 1970s - Syria's influence increased and Jordan became
obliged, even more than before, to take Syria's views into
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account. This development fostered gradual Syrian dominance
in their bilateral relations.
7. Different Ideologies, Different Levels of Stability.
The frequent fluctuations in Syrian-Jordanian rela-
tions should also be attributed to the different nature of
the respective regimes and, in particular, to the differences
in their internal strength. Whereas Jordan has been ruled
for more than 30 years by the same monarch, and for 30 years
before that by his predecessor, rule in Syria has frequently
been challenged, usually by force. In 1949 alone, Syria
norer~cd three take-overs, each ushering in a new regime
that possessed different views, inter alia, towards Jordan,
Internal instability was one of the hallmarks of Syrian
regimes during the 1950s and 1960s, and bilateral relations
with Jordan often reflected political agitation in Damascus.
Although it is true that Syria has now been ruled by the same
man for the past 18 years and that his regime has been amaz-
ingly stable and durable, basic ideological disagreements that
existed before Assad came to power continue among Syria's
different political-religious groupings and must also be taken
into consideration.
Jordan, a monarchy that has been consistently pro-
Western, possesses both a form of government and a political
orientation that are not too popular in the contemporary
Middle East. Syria, on the other hand, is a republic, having
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ideologically associated with progressive Arab nationalism.
As a result of this basic ideological gap between the coun-
tries, cordial relations arising from pragmatic considerations
(such as rapprochements of 1956, 1961, 1975-76 and 1986)
usually did not last. Political realism may sometimes override
ideological differences, but the sort of cooperation that can
then be obtained is vulnerable and exposed to agitation.
Ideological differences provide an explanation, too,
for the relatively frequent Syrian-sponsored attempts to
topple the Jordanian regime. From the Syrian point of view,
abolition of the Jordanian monarchy might also narrow the
ideological gap and pave the way for closer links. It might
eventually lead to Syrian hegemony.
8 5
This type of fluctuation in Syrian-Jordanian relations
will continue till a just and comprehensive settlement in the
Middle East be achieved.
85 This section (Syria and Jordan) is quoted from Joseph
Nevo, "Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion," in
Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, St.
Martin Press, New York, 1986, pp 140-152.
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XIII. SYRIA AND THE PLO
Syria's policy towards the PLO, especially with regard to
Fatah, the organization's mainstay since 1968, has fluctuated
with bewildering intensity from support and collaboration to
suppression and persecution. Having virtually baptized al-
Fatah as a guerilla organization in 1964, thereafter champion-
ing its cause, training its personnel and providing its equip-
ment, the Syrians proceeded to turn against it within less
than half a decade. in 1966, Syria arrested the entire Fatah
leadership for about 40 days. In 1970, Syria again changed
course, embraced the PLO and even went as far as invading
Jordan with a view to rescuing Fatah from the fury of
Hussein's troops. Fully supportive of the PLO/Fatah for the
next half-decade, Syria once again turned against it in the
course of the 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon. Less than two
years later, a Syrian-PLO rapproachment took place, coopera-
tion between the two entities developed and lasted until the
autumn of 1982. Following the PLO's massive defeat at the
hands of the Israelis, Syria turned against it yet again,
instigated a violent rebellion within its ranks and then
proceeded to conduct a war of nerves against the Palestinian
organization.
How can one account for these radical fluctuations in the
Syrian attitude to Fatah? Were Syria's actions a reflection
of whimsical changes in the preferences of individual Syrian
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leaders? Or were they inspired by ideological considera-
tions? Was its conduct motivated by a cynical pursuit of
self interest? Or was it, perhaps, a combination of all
these factors? Given the impenetrability of the Syrian
"black box" where policies are determined, options canvassed
and critical decisions formulated, a definitive answer to such
questions seems impossible. Nevertheless, an overview of
Syrian policy towards the PLO in general and Fatah in particu-
lar since the early 1960s does offer a number of plausible
clues.
In the first place, Syria's support of the PLO hinges on
the latter's conforming to Syria's ideological objectives. A
PLO that drifts too far afield from the prevailing ideological
orthodoxy in Damascus is likely to be subject to extreme
pressures. An ideologically quiescent PLO, on the other hand,
is likely to enjoy Syria's unswerving support.
Second, and perhaps of greater importance during the reign
of Hafez al-Assad than previously, Syria's attitude towards
the PLO/Fatah is determined by the degree to which that organ-
ization has been inclined to subordinate its own practical and
immediate priorities to Syria. If the Syrian national interest
dictates militancy (for instance, against Israel), the PLO
should toe the line.
Indeed, from the PLO's point of view, it all boils down to
one and the same thing: if the organization wishes to survive,
it cannot afford to defy Syria abrasively. Yet, if its own
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policies are restricted to the narrow confines of the Syrian
national interest, the PLO's ability to advance its own goals
is severely, perhaps fatally, limited. This predicament has
not always been painful in the same degree; but after two
decades of PLO-Syrian relations, it seems to have become a
conspicuous and even an enduring pattern.
A. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1964-1975
Syria's relations with the PLO, more precisely, with
organization's backbone, Fatah, were born of the challenge to
Nasserism. As early as 1958, Syria had pressed Nasser to
resume fedayeen action against Israel. Unwilling to face a
war with Israel, the Egyptian president refused. Late in
1964, the Syrian regime was ready to translate this challenge
to Nasser from diplomacy into military action against the
Jewish state. The logic of this departure was simple enough.
Both domestically and in the wider Arab context, thr Syrian
regime could not criticize Nasser incessantly while declining
to take any risks itself. If, on the other hand, Syria were
to initiate small-scale hostilities with Israel and face
Israeli retributions, it could always employ this sacrifice
as a means of further challenging Nasser's lead in the Arab
World.
The chief architect of this policy was the head cf Syria's
military intelligence, Colonel Ahmad Suwydani. By 1964,
Suwydani succeeded in obtaining the blessings of his superiors
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as well as the consent of Yasir Arafat and the nascent Fatah
organization. Arafat was fully aware, of course, of the fact
that the Syrians meant to use Fatah for their own ends. But
since he and his colleagues share, for their own reasons,
Syria's criticism of Nasser, they were quite prepared to
collaborate with Suwydani's design. On January 1, 1965, Syria
permitted the Assifa (Fatah's operational arm) to undertake
its first raid against Israel. The troubled partnership
between Syria and Fatah was thus baptized in military action.
With Syrian and Lebanese help, Fatah's military raids
against Israel drew a great deal of attention in the Arab
World and presented a severe challenge to the Egyptian-
sponsored PLO under Ahmad Shukairi. This latter organization
was seemingly far larger and better endowed than Fatah. In
practice, however, it was strictly prohibited by Egypt from
engaging in military activities. Nasser's response to the
Arafat-Syrian challenge was double-edged. He pressed most
Arab governments to deny Fatah any help, especially through
publicity, finance and permission to operate against Israel.
Solidly backed by Syria and, owing to this, beyond Nasser's
reach, Fatah could ignore Nasser and carry on its operations.
Nevertheless, Nasser's campaign against Fatah had one impor-
tant effect: Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon would not permit the
organization to operate from their territories. Fatah,
therefore, became entirely dependent on Syria's goodwill.
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During the latter part of 1965, the Syrians were divided
on whether or not to permit Fatah members to cross into
Israel from Syrian territory, and the organization suffered a
certain loss of freedom. Following the Jdid coup February
23, 1966, it seemed for a moment that this militant Syrian
regime would at last allow Fatah all the freedom to operate
which the organization demanded. In fact, the opposite took
place. Within two months of the coup, it became clear that
the new regime was, if anything, even less inclined than the
previous regime to allow Fatah real freedom of action. Fric-
tion between Syria and Fatah could be discerned on two criti-
cal issues. The first was ideological: the J'did regime
sought to impose its militant brand of Ba'athism on Arafat's
pragmatically oriented organization. The second bone of con-
tention was practical, namely, the degree to which Fatah raid-
ing parties should be subject to Syrian army control. Faced
with stiff Fatah resistance, the J'did regime attempted to
oust Arafat and replace him with its own man, Captain Yousef
Ourabi. Failing this, the Syrian authorities in May, 1966,
suddenly jailed the entire Fatah leadership.
Arafat and his associates were released after 40 days.
What apparently saved the Fatah leadership from long imprison-
ment was a shift in Egyptian policy. Nasser decided about
this time to authorize Shukairi's PLO to adopt the Fatah
method of armed struggle, provided that operations would be
carried out from Lebanese and Jordanian territories. Thus
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Syria's claim of being the only Arab government to allow the
Palestinians to pursue the armed struggle was suddenly chal-
lenged. In response the Syrians freed Arafat and his col-
leagues and stepped up support for their cause. Syria,
however, also set up a rival Palestinian organization - the
Palestinine Liberation Front, under the command of Ahmad
Gibril, a Palestinian officer in the Syrian army. This rival
to Fatah capitalized on the Palestinian cause without claim-
ing as much autonomy as Arafat's Fatah. Indirectly, the move
to set up the PLF also reflected rivalries among the ruling
Ba'ath elite. Whereas, Suwydani and, increasingly, Hafez-
Assad sponsored the Fatah, their rival, Colonel Abdal-Karim
Jundi, acted as patron to the PLF.
The intensification of the activities of Fatah, of the
PLF and of the PLO against the background of fierce rivalry
between Nasser, Jedid and King Hussein of Jordan ultimately
hastened the escalation in the conflict with Israel which led
to the 1967 war. Following this catastrophe, Syria and the
PLO did not change course but, if anything, increased the
emphasis on revolutionary warfare. A popular liberation
struggle based on the population of the West Bank and Gaza
could, therefore, be presented as the only viable alterna-
tive. This was Fatah's view. It also served well the Syrian
challenge to Nasser's declining leadership.
As part of Fatah's effort to establish bases of operation
in the Israeli occupied West Bank, Syria provided the
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organization with three to four training centers in the
vicinity of Damascus. All bases were supervised by the
Operations Division of the Syrian General Staff. In
addition, the Syrians set up a command post in Dera (on the
Jordanian border), whose task was to guide Fatah squads
enroute to the West Bank through Jordan.
The transfer of the center of Fatah activity to the West
Bank and, subsequently, to Jordan gave the organization an
unprecedented degree of freedom from Syrian control. After
the 1967 war, moreover, Egypt rejected Shukairi and endorsed
Arafat's leadership, not only of Fatah, but also (as of
August, 1968) of the entire PLO. Syria attempted to buttress
its flogging influence on the Palestinian movement by further
consolidating its own Palestinian organizations. Thus,
during the spring of 1968, Syria unified three separate
Palestinian Ba'athist organizations - the Popular Palestine
Liberation Front, the Pioneers of the Popular Liberation War
and the Upper Galilee Liberation Organization - into one
entity under the title al-Saika. Within a short time, the
Saika organization took Fatah's place as Syria's main
Palestinian client. Formally, it became a constituent organ-
ization within the new PLO under Yassir Arafat's chairmanship.
In practice, Saika remained largely subordinate to the Syrian
Ba'ath Party.
These important changes in Syria's relations with Fatah
did not, however, result in a new crisis. For his part,
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Arafat was careful to avoid friction with the Syrians while
seeking to reduce their influence over the PLO. The Syrians
reciprocated Arafat's prudent policy. Consequently, rela-
tions between Syria and the PLO remained close enough to
withstand their first major test, the 1970 civil war in
Jordan.
Syria's decision to invade Jordan in order to rescue the
PLO from the wrath of Hussein's troops in 1970 was apparently
taken by J'did. Once the invasion was under way, the Syrian
air force, which was under Assad's command, declined to give
the invading armored column critically needed air cover.
Strategically, Assad was, of course, right, since Syrian air
force participation in the fighting would have tilted the
balance against Hussein. In that event, Israel and the
United States, both of whom were determined to save the
Hashemite king, would have intervened. Thus by denying air
support to the armored column, Assad saved Syria a possible
debacle of major proportions.
The invasion failed. J'did blamed Assad for the failure
and tried to remove Assad from office. Assad had no alter-
native but to resist the move, which he did with a coup
d'etat on November 13, 1970.
During the next five years, Syrian policy towards the PLO
seemingly did not change. The PLO was permitted to recoup
from its disaster in Jordan by operating from Lebanon, largely
with Syrian blessing. In the final analysis, however, the
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deterioration of Lebanon as a consequence of PLO actions and
Israeli reprisals was bound to expose Syrian-PLO relations to
new, and far greater, tests.
B. CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, 1975-1976
The civil war in Lebanon impaled both Syria and the PLO
on the horns of excruciating dilemmas. From the Syrian point
of view, it was essential to restore stability in Lebanon
under conditions that would ensure the Ba'athist regime's
ability to steer, shape and direct the course of Lebanese
politics. Domestically, the Assad regime could be severely
shaken by a failure to contain the crisis in Lebanon. Syria
could not tolerate an assertive, independent Lebanon that was
capable of playing balance-of-power politics in the arena of
inter-Arab relations in a manner which would be detrimental
to the Syrian regional position. On the other hand, Syria
did not want to countenance the complete disintegration of
Lebanon and its partition into separate entities, each of
whom would turn either to Israel and/or to Syria itself for
protection. Nor did Syria wish to become so deeply involved
in the Lebanese imbroglio that it would have to maintain a
large garrison in Lebanon on a permanent basis. Such an
outcome would sap Syria's military strength and demoralize
its troops, and it might even send ethnic/religious shock
waves through the Syrian body politic. Syria's ultimate aim
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in the civil war, therefore, was a restoration of the status
quo - ante bellum.
The PLO's dilemma was quite different. The organization's
position in Lebanon had been fairly convenient. The City of
Beirut, with its vast infrastructure, extensive media and
attractive comforts, offered an ideal locus for the PLO's head-
quarters; Lebanon's hilly and populated south gave the PLO an
ideal terrain for operations against Israel. Last, but cer-
tainly far from least, the weakness of the Lebanese polity
enabled the PLO to possess a freedom of action the likes of
which it had never enjoyed anywhere in the Arab World. If,
however, Lebanon were to come under the determination of the
Phalangists, who had extensive links with Israel, the PLO's
freedom would be severely curtailed.
In order to prevent a Phalangist victory, a PLO alignment
with the Lebanese left was essential, and, indeed, some of the
more radical elements in the PLO were eager to embrace such
an alliance. Somewhat superficially, they assumed that it
could overcome the Phalangists, effect a complete reshuffle
of Lebanon's domestic constitution and, thereafter, turn
Lebanon into a radical state, free of the ambiguities towards
the Palestinian cause with which traditional Lebanon had been
saddled. The Fatah leadership, though, seems to have been
far less eaqer to take part in such a radical experiment.
But at the time it feared that a victory for Lebanon's anti-
status quo might face the PLO with greater difficulties than
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the prevailing order had ever posed. Fatah's leaders were
fully aware of Syria's opposition to a major change in
Lebanon's internal complexion.
Both the Syrians and the leadership of Fatah entertained a
hidden temptation to exploit the deterioration to their advan-
tage. Both preferred the pre-civil war status quo. But the
course of the civil war in Lebanon was from the outset beyond
the control of either the Syrians or Fatah. The sources of
the conflict were ingrained in the complexity of the Lebanese
system per se. The forces which launched the civil war and
kept it going during the first ten months were mainly
Lebanese. At first, both Syria and the PLO were coenfined to
the role of keen, but essentially passive, spectators. When
this changed, it was not due to either a Palestinian or a
Syrian initiative. Rather, a new twist in the war - specif-
ically, the growing prospect of a Christian victory - prompted
the PLO to intervene. Once it did, so the Syrian calculus
was altered, and Syria, too, was impelled to become directly
involved.
The PLO's intervention was inspired by a desire to prevent
the elimination of a favorable status quo - so was Syria's
intervention. But by so doing, Syria and Fatah suddenly found
themselves in conflict. According to Fatah, Syria made exten-
sive use of the PLO's own cause while actually suppressing
Fatah, the PLO's most important constituent organization.
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Syria's conflict with the PLO in the Lebanese civil war
had its origins in an act of cooperation between them. From
January 4-18, 1976, Christian forces succeeded in laying
siege on a number of Palestinian and Muslim areas in and
around Beirut. The PLO and the (leftist) Lebanese National
Movement retaliated by attacking the Christian cities of
Damour and Jiyeh. In turn, the Lebanese air force was
ordered to strike the leftist. The Palestinians and their
Lebanese allies turned to Syria for help. Concerned with
avoiding Israeli intervention, but determined to halt the
deterioration, Syria deployed in the Bekaa Valley the Yarmuk
Brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army, formally a consti-
tuent part of the PLO but in practice a Syrian army unit.
Syria then proceeded to mediate among Lebanon's warring
parties with a view to restoring order on the basis of a num-
ber of moderate changes in the Lebanese National Pact. The
Muslims, and especially Kamal Jumblatt's Druzes, were not
satisfied with Syria's proposals and sought to force Syria to
press for more extensive changes. To achieve their aims, they
renewed hostilities and even attacked the presidential palace
in Baabdeh, the residence of Sulayman Faranjiyyah, the Syrian
supported president of Lebanon.
This challenge to Syria faced the PLO with a difficult
choice. Should it join the National Movement and risk a
breach with Syria or should it side with Syria and risk its
alliance with Lebanon's National Movement? Sensing the PLO's
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dilemma, Assad summoned Yassir Arafat to Damascus on April
15, 1976 in an attempt to prevail upon him to side with Syria.
An agreement was reached, but it proved to be short lived.
On May 8, 1976, Syria succeeded in ensuring the election of
Ilyas Sarkis to the presidency of Lebanon. The move was
openly defied by the National Movement. Under pressure from
the PFLP and the PDFLP, and probably assuming that even a
'friendly' Syria would undercut his organization's indepen-
dence and freedom of action in Lebanon, Arafat drifted towards
an alliance with Jumblatt, the leader of the National
Movement.
Arafat's move was a virtual act of rebellion and exposed
Assad to a great deal of criticism at home. Deciding to in-
crease Syria's involvement in Lebanon, Assad first ordered
Zuheir Mohsen's al-Saika, ostensibly a part of the PLO, to
join PLA units in a campaign against the Lebanese National
Movement, Fatah, the PFLP and the PDFLP. When this action
failed to quell the resistance, Assad, with tacit Israeli and
American acquiescence, finally ordered (on June 1, 1976)
regular Syrian army units to intervene in the fighting. The
die was cast; Syria was determined to force the PLO and its
Lebanese allies to accept a Pax Syriana in Lebanon.
The Syrian offensive proved surprisingly sluggish. Never-
theless, by September 30, 1976, the PLO seemed to the Syrians
to have been sufficiently bruised to be amenable to fruitful
negotiations. Assad ordered a halt to the Syrian attacks and
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attempted once again to talk the PLO into a more acquiescent
position. Arafat and his colleagues were, however, slow in
responding to the Syrian call for a cease-fire. Syria, there-
fore, launched another offensive on October 12. It was so
devastating that this time the PLO had no alternative but to
yield. On October 16, 1976, President Assad of Syria and
Sadat of Egypt (the latter in fact representing Fatah) met in
Riyaadh. A formula for a settlement in Lebanon was worked
out and subsequently confirmed in an Arab summit in Cairo on
October 25. It basically conferred on the Syrian force in
Lebanon a peace-keeping mission. The PLO's (and the Lebanese)
challenge to Syria thus came to a brutal end.
C. RECONCILIATION, WAR AND A RENEWED RIFT, 1977
Following the Riyadh and Cairo conferences, Syria and the
PLO gradually moved towards rapprochement. The reasons for
seeking accommodation were: in the fiist place, Syria had
not abandoned its self-ordained role as guardian of the
Palestinian revolution. If anything, the open conflict with
the PLO had damaged Syria's position in this regard, and
Syria felt impelled to redress its tarnished image.
Second, both Syria and the PLO had to seek ways and means
of offsetting the potential effects of the visibly growing
cooperation between Israel and the Phalangists.
Third, and perhaps most important, Sadat's peace initia-
tive of November, 1977 inevitably drew the PLO and Syria
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together again. For both, that initiative was a momentous
challenge, militarily, ideologically, and politically. It
implied that Israel would be far more capable of affecting
the situation vis-a-vis Syria in the Golan Heights and vis-a-
vis the PLO in Lebanon. The implication was that militarily,
too, Syria and the PLO should again close ranks.
After Sadat's peace initiative, the PLO and Syria moved
fast towards a degree of cooperation that superseded anything
achieved in this respect previously. This trend was rein-
forced under the impact of the Israeli invasion of South
Lebanon in March, 1978 (Operation Litani). Following that
Israeli operation, the PLO hastened to overhaul its entire
deployment in the south of Lebanon. It was in urgent need of
training facilities, of far heavier equipment and of Soviet
assistance. Syria was both able and willing to satisfy all
three needs; indeed, like the PLO, the Syrians increasingly
anticipated a far greater Israeli military incursion in the
(then) foreseeable future. Thus they had an added incentive
for helping the PLO in its own attempts to prepare for the
apparently inevitable showdown.
The renewed alliance had clear limits, of which both par-
ties were fully aware. For one thing, the PLO had been
engaged since 1974 in internal debate concerning its funda-
mental disposition. Arafat and some of his associates in
Fatah apparently favored a gradual, and cautious, opening to
the West, which while avoiding a clear-cut recognition of
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which while avoiding a clear-cut recognition of Israel, would
nevertheless qualify the PLO as a legitimate participant in
an American-Sponsored peace process. Syria was not at all
enamored of this idea. Syria was not ready for a grand com-
promise with Israel. Hence, Arafat's viewed campaign was
essentially unacceptable to the Syrians, because if Arafat
accepted the notion of a mini-state in the West Bank, the
Syrian dream of the Greater Syria ideal would 1,e dealt a
severe, indeed fatal, blow.
It was, therefore, essential from the Syrian point of view
to make sure that Arafat's campaign inside the PLO for a
reorientation of the organization's posture would fail. rro
achieve this goal, Syria relied on its supporters inside the
PLO framework to slow down the shift in the organization's
position. Assad's policy proved fairly successful. President
Carter's attempts to bring the PLO to accept indirectly the
essence of UN Resolution 242 were aborted. Sadat's subsequent
attempt to martial support on the West Bank for the autonomy
scheme born at Camp David was foiled.
The second major limit to the Syrian-PLO rapprochement
from 1977-82 was far more strategic than political or ideo-
logical. During Operation Litani (March, 1978), Syrian forces
in Lebanon had remained totally inactive. Israel and Syria
were determined to avoid war with each other. Syria's inac-
tion in support of the PLO was conspicuous. The PLO, there-
fore, had to assume that Syrian devotion to the Palestinian
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cause notwithstanding, the Ba'athist republic would not risk
its national interest for the sake of the PLO. And when
Israel invaded Lebanon on June 5, 1982, this PLO perception
of the Syrian position was doubly reinforced. Syrian forces
left the PLO to their own devices. Even when they came under
heavy Israeli attack, the Syrian contingents in Beirut and in
the Bekaa Valley reacted rather passively.
In the wake of the Israeli invasion, some 50 percent of
the PLO's troops departed from Beirut late in August, 1982 to
Tunisia, Algeria and the PDRY. The rest retreated to the
Syrian-held areas of east and north Lebanon and attempted to
re-establish themselves there as an autonomous force. The
obvious consequence of this latter act was a head-on collision
with Syria. The Syrians instigated the so-called Abu Mussa
rebellion, a challenge to Arafat's leadership led by Syrian
loyalists in the PLO. The Abu Mussa following was, of course,
negligible. But it posed a major threat to Fatah because
wherevcr it could not force itself on the latter, it could
still count on solid backing by al-Saika, by PLA units and
above all, by regular Syrian forces. By 1983, Fatah was cor-
nered in Tripoli, from which it was eventually evacuated by
sea. Thus, the combined effect of the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon and Syria's later actions against Fatah ejected the
1 f-) 7
PLO from its last remaining foothold in the vicinity of
Israel.
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In the wake of that disastrous evacuation, the PLO'b
fighters started to infiltrate back into the Palestinian
refugee camps in Beirut. Syria's response to this infiltra-
tion was the encouragement of Amal Shiite militiamen to
attack the aforementioned camps in what was then called the
"War of the Camps". When Amal militiamen failed in their
siege of the Camps, the Syrians asked the Druze, the pro-
Iranian Shi'ite groups, the Syrian National Socialist Party
(SNSP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) to attack the
Camps, on the grounds that Arafat had sent his armed
supporters back there.
All these groups refused, and the anti-Arafat Palestinian
organizations in Lebanon and Syria openly denounced the
attacks. These Palestinian groups have, as a result, been
virtually disarmed for their disobedience; the Druze and pro-
Iranian Shiites were given a stern warning; the SNSP has been
smashed from the inside; and the LCP has been forced to
dissolve its military wing.
8 7
8 6 This section (Syria and the PLO) is quoted from Moshe
Maoz and Avner Yaniv, "On Short Leash: Syria and the PLO,"
in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv,
St. Martin Press, New York, 1986, pp 191-203.
8 7The Middle East, Section: Monitor, Assad's Secret War,
edited by Judith Perera, August, 1985, p. 18.
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At considerable cost of lives, Arafat regained a foothold
in Lebanon during the first months of 1987 through the bloody
war of the Camps and skillful diplomacy.
8 8
After more than two decades of turbulent relations, Syria
and the PLO seem to be facing a critical moment of truth. If
Arafat yields and accepts the limits imposed by the Syrian
position, the entire edifice he has labored to build will
crumble into little more than a Syrian front. If, on the
other hand, he maintains the challenge to Syria's hegemony on
the Palestine issue, in itself one aspect of Syria's struggle
for regional preponderance, he and his followers may face a
mortal risk.
8 8 The Middle East, Section: Monitor, Syria Loses its
Grip in Lebanon, edited by Judieth Perera, March, 1987,
p. 22.
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XIV. SYRIA AND IRAQ
Relations between Iraq and Syria are among the most per-
plexing in the Middle East. Both countries came into exist-
ence as a result of the same circumstances; and although Iraq
became a British Mandate and Syria a French Mandate, at least
insofar as the capitals Baghdad or Damascus are involved,
their individual distinctiveness was for decades more a matter
of differences between their respective patrons than of real
distinction between societies. Hence, once the British and
the French each departed from the scene, it could have been
expected that Iraq and Syria would rapidly draw together
again and ultimately become what they had previously been,
namely, two provinces of the same political entity. This,
however, never occurred. In fact, with the passage of time,
their differentiation both from each other and from the rest
of their regional environment rapidly sharpened, often
resulting in dissension that bordered on hostility.
In theory, the ascendancy in the 1960s of Ba'athist
regimes in both Baghdad and Damascus should have arrested any
process of progressive estrangement. In practice, the ideo-
logical similarity not only failed to generate rapprochement,
but indeed added yet another source of friction.
Syrian-Iraqi relations were not always characterized by
dissection and friction. If anything, the hallmark of these
relations was a sharp fluctuation between cooperation dnd
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conflict. Between July, 1968, when the Ba'athist regime
gained ascendancy in Baghdad, and the early 1970s, relations
between Ba'athist Baghdad and Ba'athist Damascus oscillated,
sometimes from month to month, between bitter hostility and
close cooperation on the political and military levels. On
the economic level, on the other hand, cooperation continued
throughout this period. The political-military fluctuations
resulted from a deep conflict between both countries'
Ba'athist ideological commitment to Arab unity and to the
liberation of Palestine, which called for close military
cooperation, and the hostility and mistrust that often develop
between competing offshoots of the same movement. Since 1973,
and more in evidence since 1975, the rift between these neigh-
boring Ba'athist regimes progressively widened, until it
became almost unbridgeable. Anwar Sadat's peace initiative
brought the two rivals together for a brief period; but their
uncompromising rivalry soon threw them apart again. The rift
was so intense that even their economic relations increasingly
deteriorated, although it involved a substantial loss for
both sides.
What were the most prominent causes and the most signifi-
cant consequences of the fluctuating relationship? Briefly,
the answer seems to be as follows: There were many reasons
for the growing estrangement of the two countries. One
factor was the development of conflicting interests regard-
ing major economic issues like oil and water. Another was
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Iraq's growing involvement in its dispute with Iran over the
Shatt al-Arab and other border areas, which necessitated a
growing military concentration in the east and a consequent
withdrawing of Iraqi troops from Jordan and Syria, in other
words, a certain detachment from Syrian-Iraqi cooperation
over the Palestinian issue. The emergency of a new young
Ba'ath leadership, led by Sadam Hussein in Iraq, widened the
gap between the two countries. Remaining faithful, at least
in the long run, to the Ba'athist pledge to Arab unity, the
new leaders believed that the rule of their own branch of the
party in Baghdad should take priority. Intimate relations
with Damascus were regarded as too risky because of the danger
that they would lead to a pro-Syrian change of regime. Rap-
prochement and eventually unity with Syria would have to wait
until the Assad administration was replaced by a true
Ba'athist regime; that is, one which was a mirror image of
the ruling Ba'ath in Baghdad.
A. THE BA'ATH PARTY PRIOR TO 1968
The "Arab Ba'ath Party" was officially born in Syria on
April 7, 1947, the day its first congress was convened. The
most prominent among the founders of the new party, which
adopted a "constitution" at this gathering, were Michel Aflag,
a Syrian born Greek Orthodox, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a
Syrian Sunni. A few years later, the fledgling Ba'ath party
united with a party led by the Hama-born Akram Haurani, and
172
from then on, it was called "the Arab Ba'ath Socialist
Party". Its three most important ideals were, in order of
importance, total Arab unity, liberation and socialism. By
the early 1950s, the party had branches in Lebanon, Jordan
and Iraq. In 1958, it was one of the major moving forces
behind the Syrian-Egyptian unity that culminated in the UAR.
Disillusionment, however, soon set in. Gamal Abd al-Nasser
ignored the party and tried to push Ba'athist leaders to the
fringe of political life in the united state. Thus the party
did not actively oppose Syria's secession from the two-state
union in September, 1961. Thereafter, a split developed in-
side the party when a young generation, consisting mostly of
army officers, challenged the old guard. In February, 1963,
the Ba'ath Party came to power in Baghdad, and in March that
year, it took over in Damascus.
In both countries, the rift between the two factions
became more and more evident. In Iraq, a left wing, led by
the regime's strong man Ali al-Sadi, competed with a right
wing, led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. In November 1963, the
Iraqi Ba'ath were ousted from power by General Abd al-Salam
Arif, who had served until then as the country's figurehead
president.
The Ba'athist split in Syria involved leftist army offi-
cers and civilian intellectuals, on one side, and Aflag's and
Bitar's veterans, on the other side. The rift widened between
1963 and 1966. During this period, Bakr's right wing, now
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out of power in Iraq, aligned itself with the ruling Aflag
group in Syria. At the same time, there was growing estrange-
ment between Bakr and the Syrian "left" led by two colonels,
Salah Jedid and Hafez al-Assad. On February 23, 1966, the
Syrian leftist officers ousted Aflag's faction from power.
The Aflag-led Ba'ath Party thus found itself out of power in
both Syria and Iraq and from time to time, even suffered
persecution at the hands of the respective regimes in each
country.
In July, 1968, Bakr's faction of the Ba'ath took over in
Iraq. Ideologically, it was committed to the paramountcy of
the civilian party mainly as a reaction to what was seen as
the evils of military rule in Ba'athist Syria, from which the
Iraqis wanted to disassociate themselves. Iraq and Syria now
found themselves ruled by two mutually antagonistic elites,
each claiming to be the sole representative of the true
ba'ath Party.
B. OIL ROYALTIES AND PIPELINE POLICY
The upheavals described above, which resulted in the rise
of Assad in Syria and Bakr in Iraq, inevitably led to a great
deal of friction between the two Ba'athist regimes. The
Iraqis rebuked the February, 1966 coup in Syria and offered
assistance to leaders and supporters of the Aflag faction in
Syria and subsequently (during 1968-70) seemed more supportive
of Assad than of his Alawi rival, Salah Jedid. The Syrians,
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for their part responded fiercely, denouncing Iraq's position
on a variety of issues.
Nonetheless, from 1968-70, the two - 4imes also acknow-
ledged their great amount of interdependence and their criti-
cism of each other, notwithstanding, collaborated in a number
of important areas. Cooperation was particularly marked in
three spheres of activity: the transport of Iraqi oil exports
through Syria toMediterranean ports, the commitment to the
radicalization and unification of the Arab World and the war
against Israel. The consequence was a marked ambivalence in
their relations with signs of cooperation and of conflict
alternating in rapid succession.
With the passage of time, however, the elements of con-
flict gradually assumed greater importance. The first funda-
mental issue to deepen the friction centered on the sensitive
issue of oil. On June 1, 1972, Iraq nationalized the property
of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, which in the main, had pre-
viously belonged to British, Dutch, French and American
companies.
As a result of its act of nationalization, Iraq ran into
economic difficulties stemming from an inability to market all
its oil. Syria, meanwhile, who had also nationalized IPC
property on its own soil, then dealt a severe blow by demand-
ing that Iraq pay nearly double the fee for the transit of oil
through Syrian territory. Discussions on the matter lasted
until January, 1973, when an agreement was reached that met
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almost all of the Syrian demands. Iraq, with no other outlet
for its Kirkuk oil and faced with a Syrian threat to shutdown
the pipeline, had little choice but to yield to Syrian
pressure.
Iraqi frustation over this agreement made Iraq alter its
attitude towards cooperation with Syria. The first sign of
this change was the agreement between Iraq and Turkey on May
1, 1973 for the construction of a 40-inch pipeline, having an
initial capacity of 25 million tons a year, from Kirkuk to
Dortyol. A leader in Al-Thawra, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party daily,
praised the "farsightedness" of the Iraqi leadership for its
"innovative methods" that were designed to safeguard a number
of alternative outlets to get the nationalized Iraqi oil to
World markets. In more specific terms, the newspaper publi-
cized the fact that, in addition to the proposed Iraqi-Turkish
pipeline, Iraq had also started building a "strategic pipe-
line" from Haditha to the Gulf as well as a deep-water harbor
there that would serve as a major oil terminal. This meant
that Iraq was planning sufficient pipeline capacity to export
all its oil production without any dependence on Syria. It
was hardly surprising that Syria reacted with ferocious
accusation that Iraq was betraying the Arab cause by relying
on a non-Arab neighbor.
Iraqi resolve was not shaken. On December 27, 1975, the
strategic line was opened. It could deliver 48 million tons
yearly from Kirkuk through Haditha to the Gulf. In April,
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1976, Iraq stopped the flow of oil through Syria altogether
and diverted oil from Kirkuk, throu-" the strategic line to
the Gulf. In January, 1977, the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline was
officially opened in the district of Tamim in an impressive
ceremony.
Iraq's new strategy created an unprecedented situation.
The country was now more and more dependent on close coopera-
tion with Turkey, as well as with Iran, with whom Iraq had
signed an agreement in March, 1975 that ended the dispute over
the Shatt al-Arab. Both countries were non-Arab, both were
close allies of the United States and both had overt diploma-
tic relations with Israel.
From January, 1977, relations betwen Iraq and Syria
reached a nadir. Syria closed its borders to Iraq stopping
through-transit commerce, in retaliation for Iraq's suspend-
ing the flow of its oil through the Syrian pipeline, which
action caused the two trajectories, that of political and
that of economic relations, to converge. The transfer of
goods and oil through Syria was resumed during the short
thaw, from October, 1978 to July, 1979, that followed the
Camp David accord. Thereafter, the pumping of oil was stopped
and reneweC a few times. However, on April 10, 1982, Syria
shut down the pipeline as part of the Irano-Syrian agreement
that, among others, compensated Syria for its oil-transit
revenue losses. This time, Iraq was in the midst of a bitter
war with Iran, and Iraqi outlets on the Gulf were inoperative.
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The new situation dictated to Iraq, as it had in 1973,
the choice of new long-term allies. This time, in addition
to Turkey, there were Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through whose
territories Iraq planned pipelines for its oil. This time,
however, there may also be a hidden ally, whose cooperation
will have to be secured in order for Iraqi oil to reach World
markets: the State of Israel.
C. THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel.
Apparently, in response to a Syrian request, Iraq started
preparations on October 7 to send an expeditionary force. On
October 8, Iraqi units started moving on trucks, tank
carriers, trains and planes. Iraq sent, according to its own
reports, two (of its three) armored divisions and various
infantry units amounting to the size of a division - a formid-
able force, considering the short time that was available.
(Iraq had been kept completely in the dark in regard to
Egyptian-Syrian preparations.) Despite shortcomings in mili-
tary coordination with Syria and in general performance, the
"Saladin" expeditionary force caught the advancing Israeli
armor at a critical moment and forced it to arrest its advance
- an act that gives some credibility to the Iraqi claim that
they were the ones who saved Damascus. Iraq, though, paid a
heavy price for helping out a brotherly country with whom
relations were going from bad to worse.
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The Iraqi action in the October, 1973 war seemed to have
pointed in the direction of renewed military, and even poli-
tical cooperation with Syria on the Palestinian issue. Poli-
tical practice immediately following the cease-fire, however,
proved that this was not the case, as Iraq was adamant in
wanting to avoid not only a long-term involvement on the
Golan but also close cooperation with Syria. Alternatively,
it may be assumed that were Syria ready to pay the very high
price Iraq demanded for such cooperation, the latter would
have accepted rapprochement. The price was so high, though,
that this was hardly a practical prospect: it was the
continuation of the war.
When Syria signed th cease-fire agreement on October 24,
1973, Iraq saw this as a defeatist approach that lost the
Golan for the Arabs and, more importantly, caused them to
miss an historic opportunity to infect heavy losses on Israel.
Worse still, when it signed the agreement, Syria also accepted
UN Security Council Resolution 338, which, in turn, included
Resolution 242. Iraq viewed Syria's actions as complete
acceptance of a resolution against which it had fought since
the Ba'ath came to power in July, 1968. For Iraq, acceptance
of the resolution meant the embryo of a recognition of Israel
- and the Iraqi army was immediately called back home.
Between the end of 1973 and the Camp David meeting of
1978, the Iraqi condition for cooperation with Syria was that
Syria should withdraw its acceptance of UN Resolutions 338
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and 242. Even though Iraqi did not call for the resumption
of an all-out war, its demand that Syria annul a very
important international obligation was unacceptable to Syria
and, as such, barred the way to any meaningful cooperation.
D. THE ERA OF TOTAL ALIENATION, 1975-1978
Between the October war and the Camp David accord, which
pushed Iraq and Syria into each other's arms, four major events
affected their bilateral relations. The first of these was a
confrontation between March and August, 1975 over the allocation
of the Euphrates River waters. The second was the disengage-
ment agreement between Egypt and Israel, which forced Iraq,
for the first time since the war, to rethink its relations
with Syria. The third event was Syrian involvement in
Lebanon. The fourth was Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, which
again compelled Iraq to review attitudes towards Syria.
In the spring of 1975, after two years of drought in a
row, and the blockage of water by Syria and Turkey, the level
of Euphrates water in Southern Iraq decreased sharply. As a
result, Iraqi peasants in the lower Euphrates basin suffered
greatly, and many crops were lost. This resulted in an
unprecedented Iraqi-Syrian confrontation that turned already
sour relations into those of coherent hostility.
The escalation of the Syrian-Iraqi rivalry following the
Euphrates crisis was reflected in Iraq's attitude towards
Damascus in the wake of the second disengagement agreement
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between Egypt did Israel in September, 1975. A communique
issued by the pan-Arab Leadership of the Ba'ath Party criti-
cized Sadat in no uncertain terms. The Egyptian leader,
however, was given credit for his frankness, having often
admitted being in favor of a peaceful settlement with Israel.
Syria's Assad, on the other hand, was accorded no such
redeeming feature. As the Leadership saw it, he was follow-
ing Sadat's footsteps, albeit at some distance; whatever
Sadat did today, Assad would do within a few months. Assad
and the Arab reactionaries, it was charged, were using Sadat
as a 'minesweeper': once he had cleared the road for them,
they would move along it unharmed.
The pan-Arab Leadership communique heralded a period of
constant crisis between Syria and Iraq, on both the political
and, for the first time since 1968, the economic level. In
1976, Iraq tried to align itself with Egypt (and a few other
Arab countries) against Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Iraq
was disappointed at the Cairo sumit of October 25, 1976, at
which Egypt and Saudi Arabia came to an agreement with Syria
over Lebanon, according to which the Syrian army could remain
there as the bulk of an Arab security or deterrent force.
After Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in November,
1977, the Iraqi media once again turned on Syria, even more
viciously than they did against Sadat. At the summit meeting
of radical states and organizations (Syria, Iraq, Algeria,
South Yemen and the PLO) in Tripoli (Libya) on December 2,
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1977, Iraq made it clear that only a change in Syria's com-
mitment to the Resolutions 242 and 338 could lead to any Iraqi
cooperation with the Syrians. In addition, Iraq demanded that
Syria allow the PLO complete freedom of action through the
Syrian border into Israel, that the Syrians withdraw from
Lebanon, and that Damascus make a clear-cut commitment to the
total liberation of Palestine, not just (allegedly) to the
Golan alone. Assad flatly refused the Iraqi demands, and Iraq
withdrew from the summit, remaining completely aloof from any
joint action by the radical Arab states against Sadat's Egypt
because of their refusal to boycott Syria.
E. TO UNITY-STEPS AND BACK, 1978
The shift from bitter confrontation to close cooperation
was abrupt. Immediately following the Camp David conference,
the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) sent out a com-
munique in the old style, that by implication, denouncing
Syria more than it did Egypt. Yet, in October, 1978, the RCC
issued a new statement, which appeared in the Iraqi dailies,
that opened the gate to Arab cooperation against Sadat without
posing any conditions for Iraqi-Syrian cooperation. What had
made Baghdad change its mind? The two documents that heralded
the change of policy, the communique of the RCC and, a day
later, that of the pan-Arab Leadership, explained that Iraq
was worried about the defeatist atmosphere in the Arab World
and had decided to make an effort to halt the spreading sense
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of desolation. Iraqi sources implied that Baghdad now ex-
pected to assume the leadership of the Arab World. This
meant that Damascus was expected to recognize Baghdad
seniority.
As it then appeared to the eye, Iraq's hopes were not
frustrated. Following an exchange of messages on October 25
and 26, 1978, it was President Assad, accompanied by a most
senior delegation, who came to Baghdad to discuss unity and
in November, Baghdad became the scene of an Arab summit meet-
ing that created a united Arab front against Sadat's Egypt.
In terms of Iraqi-Syrian relations, the unity talks pro-
duced a Covenant of Joint Pan-Arab Action, which stressed
"determination to endeavor seriously... to achieve the strong-
est form of unitary relations." A supreme political committee
under Assad and Eakr was established, along with a host of
subcommittees to "undertake the supervision of all bilateral
relations... and achieve the cooperation and integrity...
towards unionist objectives."
The two countries seemed, however, to be approaching the
issue of unity with the greatest of care. The most impressive
step was in the area of economic relations, which were re-
turned to normal: the borders were reopened, transportation
ties were resumed, aiJ oil starttj flowing once again from the
Kirkuk fields to Banias. On the cultural level, some work was
done to unify the curricula of schools and universities.
There was, cn the political level, an attempt to unify foreign
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ministries and to coordinate economic planning. Most of
these activities, however, remained in an embryonic phase;
the two sides seemed to be in no hurry to complete them.
There is some evidence that Bakr may have been more in-
clined toward some kind of federation with Syria than was
Sadam Hussein. If so, it was eventually Hussein's views
which prevailed, and six months later, in mid-July, 1979,
Sadam Hussein replaced Bakr as President, Chairman of the RCC
and Secretary General of the Regional Leadership of the party
in Iraq (RL).
On July 30, 1979, Iraqi media announced the exposure of a
could-be coup d'etat against Hussein that had been planned in
connection with a "foreign country whose name the Leadership
sees that pan-Arab interests require not to mention now".
Upon subsequent hints that it was the Damascus regime which
had tried to topple the new government in Baghdad, senior
Syrian officials went to Baghdad to deny any connection
between Syria and the Iraqi plotters, and to try to convince
Iraq to refrain from a breach. This effort failed and unity
was over.
What made the unity attempt collapse- Iraqi sources give
a variety of reasons, some of which are credible: disagree-
ments over the attitude towards the Khomeni regime in Tehran,
over the exact fourf if thp future union, and over military
cooperation. Most important, however, was the implied admis-
sion that appeared in the Resolutions of f-'- NinLh Rwiia. 1
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Congress of the party that, if Iraq and Syria united, the
Iraqi leadership expected to be recognized as the senior
partner in any fully fledged union. Since Syria turned down
this offer, Iraq's enthusiasm for the proposed partnership
was greatly reduced. The hint was yet another demonstration
of the new line that not only placed local interests very
high on the regime's scale of priorities, a policy that was
practiced by many Arab governments, but also openly admitted
and sought to legitimize it as part of a new emphasis on the
Iraqi entity. The Iraqi leadership considered the well being
of Ba'athist rule in Baghdad more important than union with
Syria.
On August 18, 1980, the heads of Arab diplomatic missions
in Baghdad were summoned to witness the removal of "large
amounts of explosives, arms and poisonous materials from
Syrian Embassy premises". Syria was accused of planning "to
carry out massacres, acts of sabotage and killings", and the
staff of the Syrian Embassy was told to evacuate the country
within 48 hours. Syria, for its part, denied the charges,
claiming that the supposed evidence had been planted by Iraqi
agents. In retaliation, Damascus expelled the Iraqi ambassa-
dor and his 19-man staff.
Relations never recovered, and, in fact, deteriorated
steadily. April, 1982 saw the nadir. On April 8, Syria
closed its border with Iraq allegedly to prevent the infil-
tration of cLitcui and weapcns f'Acoix iraq in support of the
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Muslim Brotherhood's underground and other Iraqi-sponsored
movements inside Syria. Finally, on April 18, Syria broke
off diplomatic relations with Iraq, and Walid Hamadun, a
deputy premier, promised to help the Iraqi people in toppling
the regime in Baghdad. Syria an Iraq had now completed a
20-year process of progessive estrangement.
The complementary elements of this disassociation were
not missing. Since the Baghdad summit of November, 1978,
Iraqi-Jordanian relations had been improving steadily. A few
weeks after the onset of the war with Iran, Iraq renewed ties
with Egypt. These were, to begin with, military relations;
the worse off Iraq became militarily, the closer these rela-
tions became. Thus, for example, in mid-1982, it was reported
that Egypt was selling Iraq large quantities of arms and
ammunitions (on the other front, Syria is considered a
reliable source of arms, ammunitions and missiles to the
Iranians), that Egyptians living in Iraq were free to join
the Iraqi army and that Egyptian ex-servicemen could enlist
on a private basis. In late 1982, there were reports that
the Egyptian labor force in Iraq amounted to more than one
million. Such reports indicate close ties and also inter-
dependence.
This Egyptian connection represented, as it did with
Jordan aiid Saudi Arabia, the near-completion of the process
of Iraq's estrangement from Syria. This, in its own turn,
was part of a wider change in national priorities, introduced
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by Sadam Hussein and his associates gradually since the mid-
1970s. It involved, anmong other aspects, a reduced commitment
to immediate and, even more so, amalgamative Arab unity; a new
balance in relations with East and West; and, at least on the
face of it, a somewhat less hostile attitude towards peaceful
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
In 1986, King Hussein of Jordan tried to mediate between
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Syria and Iraq but his attempt failed. In April 26, 1987,
King Hussein and Sauda Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah secured
a summit meeting between Hafez Assad of Syria and Sadam
Hussein of Iraq at a desert air base in northeast Jordan.
Although the Iraqi and Syrian leaders signed a preliminary
accord to crack down on dissident groups in their countries
that they have in the past supported, they failed to achieve
a rapprochement. Apparently, the obstacles before them
remained formidable. 90
As for the future of Iraqi-Syrian relations, there is
reason to believe that under their present leaderships, the
two countries will continue to bear the hallmark of mistrust.
This does not necessarily mean, however, complete paralysis.
8 9 The Middle East, Section: Monitor, Iraq and Syria; a
Thaw?, edited by Judith Perera, July, 1986, p. 7.
9 0Associated Press, Section: International News, Syria
and Iraq, edited by Ed Blanche, Nicosia, Cyprus (AP) June 15,
1987.
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Iraq is extremely anxious to return to the pattern of
bilateral relations that prevailed between the two between
1973 and 1976, that is, to political hostility accompanied,
notwithstanding, by almost undisturbed economic cooperation,
at least insofar as Iraqi oil exports were concerned. Syria,
for its part, insists on a thorough rapprochement and even
demands to establish federal unity, possibly with Assad at
its head. In view of its obvious inferiority under the pres-
ent war circumstances, Iraq cannot accept such a proposition,
which seems to the Baghdad-based Ba'ath to be a prescription
for Syrian infiltration and domination. Until either side
changes its position, rapprochement is not feasible.
Because of the fact that, in Baghdad, federation is seen
as tantamount to annihilation, any change in the present
deadlock depends mainly on greater Syrian flexibility. In
view of the growing discord between Syria and Iran, such a
possibility cannot be counted out.
9 1
9 1 This Section (Syria and Iraq) is quoted from Amazia
Baram, "Ideology and Power Politics in Syrian-Iraqi Relations,
1968-1984, in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and
Avner Yaniv, St. Martin Press, New York, 1986, pp 125-139.
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XV. SYRIA AND KHOMEINI'S IRAN
The Irano-Syrian alliance has remained intact for nearly a
decade in spite of very obvious discrepancies between the two
countries: Syria is a socialist republic; Iran is a radical
Islamic theocracy. Syria is strongly supported by Moscow;
Iran is in conflict with the Soviet Union. Syria, by its own
claims, is the most devout bearer of pan-Arabism; Iran opposes
the very concept of a nation-state and is at odds with most of
the Arab World. Syria is motivated by a powerful drive for
social, economic and cultural modernization; Iran, by con-
trast, has revived the social, economic, legal and cultural
patterns of ore-modern periods. Nevertheless, all signs in-
dicate that both parties have been content with their alliance
policies.
Nor has the impact of their relationship on the Middle
East been negligible: (1) Syria's decision in early April,
1982 to plug the pipeline transiting its territory from Iraq,
and thereby prevent Iraq's oil from reaching the Mediter-
ranean, caused a severe blow to Iraq in it. war with Iran,
helping to tilt the balance in the latter's favor. (2) Syria's
support of Iran at a time when Jordan actively supported Iraq
contributed, during the early 1980s, to a further deteriora-
tion of relations between Damascus and Amman. The outcome
has been to limit Jordanian rather than Syrian political
maneuverability. Accordingly, the possibility of achieving a
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breakthrough in tne stagnant Arab-Israeli peace process,
although not having been blocked totally, has been diminished.
(3) Arab, and particularly Saudi Arabian, pressure against
Syrian support of Iran has been ineffective. The fact that
Syria has overcome Saudi pressure has strengthened Syrian
prestige and added weight to its role in inter-Arab relations.
(4) Syrian support of Iranian activities within Lebanon has
worked against U.S., French and Israeli interests in central
and south Lebanon, despite the fact that Washington, Paris and
Jerusalem have, each in its own way, recognized Syrian supre-
macy in Lebanon. Finally, (5) Syria's continued support of
Iran, in spite of worsening relations between Moscow and
Tehran, has tended to demonstrate Syria's capability of pursu-
ing its regional policies independently of the Soviet Union.
Are Iran's relations with Syria only an opportunistic
exploitation of a convenient constellation? Or do these rela-
tions reflect a more fundamental convergence of interests?
For a better understanding of the workings of Irano-Syrian
relations it is necessary to anallze the interest- involved
on both sides.
A. IRANIAN INTERESTS
1. The Assets of the Alliance
Iran's interest in establishing an alliance with Syria
were evident from the very start of Islamic revolutionary rule
and became particularly apparent after the outbreak of war
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with Iraq in September, 1980. Such an alliance offers five major
assets for Iran.
a. Syrian Military Pressure against Iraq
From the very beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the
Iranians have endeavored to bring Syrian military pressure to
bear against Iraq and to tie down as many Iraqi troops as
possible along the Iraqi-Syrian frontier. The Iraniaiis hoped
for Syrian assistance in three different ways: first, the
maintenance of an atmosphere of hostility between Damascus
and Baghdad necessarily meant that Iraq's border ,'ith Syria
could not be kept undefended, which would be an invitation to
Syrian military pressure. Second, Syrian support for opposi-
tional forces within Iraq, particularly Kurdish resistance
groups, could potentially create far-reaching military conse-
quences. Third, Syria could supply Iran with Soviet arms.
Even if the Iranian army was equipped with U.S. and European
arms, Soviet equipment was important, at least, for training
purposes in order to enable a more adequate military response
to the Soviet-equipped Iraqi army.
Syria, in fact, offered assistance to the Iranians
in all three spheres. More concretely, in April, 1981, Syria
made its airfields available for Iranian strikes against
Western Iraq. In April, 1982, Syrian planes violated Iraq's
airspace, thereby enhancing Iraqi fears of Syrian military
action. Syria also enlarged its support of military and other
resistance operations for the opposition parties within Iraq.
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Finally, unconfirmed reports have indicated that Syria has
been supplying Iran with Soviet arms.
b. Syrian Economic Warfare against Iraq
Thzoughout the war with Iraq, a vital Iranian objec-
tive has been to cause the Iraqi economic damage. In a situa-
tion in which the Iranian army has not been capable of break-
ing a stalemate on the battlefield through military means, the
strategy of economic warfare has now become most essential.
The Iraniai., did not spare ary effort in attempting to con-
vince the Syrians to cut off Iraqi oil deliveries via Syria to
the Mediterranean. The direct economic and indirect psycho-
logical effect on Iraq of Syria's turning off the taps early
in April, 1982 was substantial. Although the exact financial
loss of Iraq is difficult to establish, the total capacity of
the closed oil pipeline represents a reduction in potential
annual income of nearly US $6 billion.
The closure of the Syrian pipeline created new needs.
First, Iraq took immediate steps to expand the capacity of the
Traqi-Tlrkish pipeline from F50,000 b/d to 1,000,000 b/d.
This work, previously carried out by Turkish firms, obliged
Iraq to take out a US $20,000,000 Euroloan. Next, with Saudi
help, Iraq started construction of a pipeline to the Saudi
Arabian port Yanbu on the Red Sea. This pipe'.iae was scheduled
to be completed by 1986 and to cost an estimated US $2 billion.
Finally, work on another pipeline, to Zeraa -*n Jordan
and from there to Aqaba on the Red Sea, has progressed beyond
7 )2
the planning stage. The necessary capital investments for
these alternative lines created heavy difficulties for Iraq
at a time when its estimated foreign currency reserves have
fallen from US $36 billion in 1980 to US $4.5 billion in 1982.
The critical economic and financial burden has forced
President Sadam Hussein to introduce a policy of austerity.
The Iranians hope that such measures will gradually decrease
the loyalty of the Iraqi population to its present regime,
and thus contribute to Hussein's fall. The combination of
military pressure and economic warfare should, according to
(optimistic) Iranian calculations, bring an end to the war,
without forcing the Iranian army actually to conquer Iraqi
territory.
c. Preventing a Hostile Arab Union against Iran.
Another reason for the importance to the Islamic
regime in Tehran of Syrian support is to prevent the formation
of a united Arab bloc against Iran. This objective is of
ideological value to the Iranian islamic fundamentalists, but
is of even greater political and diplomatic importance.
Ideologically, Khomeini and his followers have always looked
towards Mecca and Medina as the origin and center of Islam.
In his theoretical writincs and teachings Khomeini has never
made a distinction between Iranian and Arab nationalism; for
him, nationalism per se is a negative concept, derived from
Western thinking. The political framework that is relevant
and legitimate for Khomeini is ummat al-muminin, the
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"community of believers", which comprises all Muslims in the
World. Because of this religious-political concept, Khomeini
has always had pan-Islamic ambitions and repeatedly stressed
the need to bridge the gap between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam.
The occurrence of a united Arab opposition against Iran could
not but undermine Khomeini's credibility at home and under-
score the fact that his political ideas are cut off from
reality.
Related to the ideological question is the political
aspect of Iranian isolation in the face of a united, hostile
Arab front. The alliance with Syria greatly helped Iran avoid
a total political isolation in the Arab World.
As for its diplomatic aspect, the prevention of
hostile Arab unity and the ability of Tehran to play one Arab
state against the other is essential to Iran's standing. The
alliance with Syria has been a major asset in the achievement
of this diplomatic goal.
In November, 1980, shortly after the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq war, the conservative Arab powers led b Saudi Arabia
and Jordan, arranged an Arab summit conference in Amman. The
main aim was to mobilize Arab support for Iraq. The conference,
however, was boycotted by Syria, Algeria, Libya, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen and the PLO. Syria was not strong
enough by itself to prevent the convening of the summit con-
ference, but is opposition combined with that of other Arab
states turned the meeting into an insignificant event.
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In May, 1981, Saudi Arabia succeeded in bringing about
the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which
included Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain and
Qatar. The GCC enjoyed the support of Iraq, Jordan and Pakis-
tan and was able to draw upon support from Egypt, Sudan,
Morocco and also the United States. One of the Council's de-
clared aims was to coordinate efforts to thwart both internal
subversion and external security threats. There was little
doubt, though, that the GCC was created mainly to counter the
threat of direct or indirect Iranian aggression. In this
context, Syria has played from the beginning a major role in
neutralizing the anti-Iranian tendencies of the Council. The
GCC, for its part, has been extremely careful not to alienate
the Syrians. In May, 1982, in the wake of Iranian military
victories in April and May of the same year, the Syrians
succeeded in preventing the convening of an Arab summit con-
ference against Iran. Going even further, Syria arranged a
high-level pro-Iranian meeting in Damascus in January, 1983
that was attended by its own foreign minister as well as
those of Iran and Libya. There can be no doubt that all
these Syrian moves were well appreciated in Tehran.
d. Securing Iranian Presence and Influence in Lebanon
Obtaining influence and, possibly, control over the
Shi'ite community in Lebanon has long been an aim of Khomeini,
even before he seized power in Iran in February, 1979. The
importance of this community for Khomeini's revolutionary
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Islamic fundamentalism stems from a variety of factors. First,
there is the personal attachment of Khomeini to Imam Musa al-
Sadr, the late leader of the Lebanese Shi'ites, a community of
co-religionists that constitutes almost 40 percent of Lebanon's
population. Second, the fact that this Shi'ite community is
politically, socially and economically weak is thought to
increase the intervention capability of the Iranian revolu-
tionary Islamic forces, with the collapse of Lebanon's central
government easing Iranian intrigue and intervention. Third,
that the Shi'ite population lives mainly in southern Lebanon,
adjacent to Israel, offers the opportunity to incite, with
little means and costs, the "popular struggle against Zionism",
and thus demonstrate Iran's specific contribution to the Arab
(and Islamic) struggle against Israel. Despite its importance
for Khomeini, however, such a role for Iran among Lebanon's
Shi'ite community would be utterly impossible without Syrian
consent.
As a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
June, 1982, the Irani&ns at first organized cohorts of
volunteers to fight Israel. The Iranians were permitted by
the Syrians to establish their headquarters and training
center in Ba'albek, in northeastern Lebanon, where they also
trained terrorists from both Lebanon and other countries in a
combination of suicide techniques and Islamic revolutionary
doctrine. The suicidal sabotage acts against the U.S. Marines
and French soldiers of the Multinational Force in Beirut in
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October, 1983, as well as similar attacks later that year
against Israeli troops in Tyre, were reportedly carried out
by members of the Iranian Hizb ul-allah (Party of God).
Although the political and ideological value of such acts is
paramount for the Iranians, they are aware that these
activities can only be performed with at least the tacit
cooperation of the Syrians.
e. Maintaining another Channel towards Moscow
Iran's alliance with Syria has also worked as an
effective instrument for improving relations between Moscow
and Tehran. On one hand, Khomeini and his foreign policy
aids were determined to eliminate, or at least diminish, any
vestiges of Soviet presence and influence in Iran. On the
other hand, they wanted to maintain a correct working
relationship with Moscow, based on Muhammad Mosaddeq's theory
of "negative equilibrium" (movazen-emanfi). Mosaddeq had
argued that the United States and the Soviet Union would each
tolerate a decrease in their direct influence in Iran as long
as the interests of the other superpower were also curbed.
It has been a traditional technique to moderate any
deterioration in direct relations with Russia by
simultaneously maintaining good relations with a third party
friendly to the Russians. Nasr ed-Din Shah in the 1870s and
more successfully, Reza Shah in the mid and late 1920s each
tried to involve Germany as such a third party, to act as a
go-between with Russia. This permitted the Iranians to
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decrease Soviet influence without creating strong opposition
from Moscow.
Khomeini has been employing Syria in a similar func-
tion, aiming mainly to keep the Soviet Union from backing Iraq
in its war with Iran. In the early stages of the war, this
technique worked effectively. Although Soviet interests in
Iran were hit with a variety of measures (for instance,
stopping Iranian supplies of gas to the Soviet Union and halt-
ing almost totally Soviet economic and cultural activities in
Iran), Soviet-Iranian relations were actually if indirectly
improved through Syria. When Saudi Arabia and other GCC Arab
states introduced economic pressures to stop Damascus from
continuing its alliance policy with Iran, the Soviet Union
intervened by increasing economic assistance to Syria, there-
by neutralizing the anti-Iranian Arab pressure.
By 1983, however, the Soviet Union put an end to its
lenient policy towards Iran for two main reasons. First,
Iranian army victories against Iraq created tangible dangers
of destabilization in the region. Second, Iran's purge of
the Tudeh communists, which reached its peak in February,
1983 when 8500 Tudeh leaders and activitists were imprisoned,
convinced the Soviet Union that any real rapprochement
between Moscow and Tehran would be impossible. Moscow then
ostentatiously provided Baghdad with aid and let it be known
that relations with Tehran had markedly deteriorated. Never-
theless, this step had no impact on either Soviet-Syrian or
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Syrian-Iranian relations. Syria's role as a potential bridge
between Tehran and Moscow, in fact, became even more desirable
from the Iranian point of view.
B. THE LIABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE
In spite of the prevalence of very substantial arguments
in favor of an alliance policy towards Syria, such a policy
also posed certain liabilities for the Iranians: economic,
political and religious-ideological.
1. The Economic Liability
The economic disadvantage of Iran's liaison with Syria
can be measured in financial terms. The Irano-Syrian trade
agreements of 1982, 1983 and 1984 provide for the free
delivery of 1,000,000 tons of Iranian oil to Syria. At a
price of US $28 per barrel, the direct cost to Iran amounts
to about US $196,000,000 annually. Syria, moreover, has
reportedly been granted barter conditions and price reductions
of US $3 per barrel, thus costing Iran, on average, a further
US $150,000,000 to US $200,000,000 annually. Given Iran's
economic difficulties as a result of the revolutionary chaos
and the war effort, these amounts are not unimportant.
2. The Political Liability
On the political level, the alliance policy towards
Syria has created heavy restraints in three different
spheres: first, although both the Iranian and Syrian leader-
ships are unanimous in their common opposition to Sadam
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Hussein and his regime, they differ fundamentally on the
question of which opposition group in Iraq should be encour-
aged to take its place. An open struggle broke out between
Damascus and Tehran on this issue after the Iranians had
announced early in 1982 a four-stage plan for the establish-
ment of a new Islamic regime in Iraq, including a Supreme
Islamic Revolutionary Council. The Syrians opposed these
plans vigorously. The Jordanian newspaper Al-Dustur reported
that, owing to Syrian pressure, the Iranians replaced its
designated Chairman of this Council. Although the Iranians
have thus restrained their support for Islamic revolutionary
groups within Iraq in order to preclude open friction with
Syria, the issue represents a major potential source of
conflict.
Second, the Iranians would prefer to follow a far more
activist and radical policy in Lebanon. Iran's immediate goal
of increasing destabilization and radicalization among the
Shi'ite community hardly tallies with Syrian interests.
Recognizing this, the Iranians have in their actions respected
Syrian desires.
A third political disadvantage had to do with Iranian
tourists to Syria. When following the signing of the Irano-
Syrian trade agreement in March, 1982, the first tourist
groups arrived to Syria, they caused some serious clashes.
Immediately after their arrival in Damascus, the Iranians,
who presumably were revolutionary activists being remunerated
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for their services rather than "real" tourists, distributed
posters with pictures of Khomeini and attached religious
Islamic slogans on the walls of the airport and its surround-
ings. The Syrian army was kept busy for over a week pulling
down the posters, cleaning the walls and repainting them.
Many of the Iranians then protested violently against their
accommodations, which they thought were situated in red-light
districts. These disturbances tended to enhance the sense of
isolation among the Iranian revolutionary rank and file, while
at the same time this kind of propagandistic eagerness may
have created second thoughts among the Syria leadership. In
any event, both Iranian and Syrian authorities decreased the
number of Iranian tourists visiting Syria.
3. The Religious-ideological Liability
The "tourist" incidents demonstrate the depth of the
ideological gap separating Tehran from Damascus. In addition,
a historically deeper religious-ideological factor created
further potential liabilities for the Iranians.
A major tactic of the Khomeini regime in appealing to
the semi-educated and uneducated masses is to revive the
memory of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. On the 10th of
Muharram 680, the Imam and his entourage were cruelly murdered
in Kerbela (Iraq) by the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, who ruled his
empire from Damascus. Hussein martyrdom is recalled by
special passion plays and processions performed once a year,
but the story is kept alive during the year by repeated
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tellings, often several times a week. The plays, processions
and stories effectively preach hatred of Sunni Islam. It has
been common usage in the past to accuse certain Iranians as
well as Arab leaders of being the successors to Yazid, who is
represented as the incarnation of evil. Such historical
associations create no immediate danger to the Irano-Syrian
alliance, but in times of crisis, the permanent negative
image of Damascus fostered by Shi'ite tradition may seriously
affect the preservation of the alliance.
The foregoing analysis of the assets and liabilities
of Iran's alliance policy towards Syria suggests a number of
conclusions. From the Iranian point of view, the advantages
derived from this alliance have been substantial, especially
in military matters, in matters of economic warfare against
Iraq, and in matters related to Iran's regional and global
policies. Iranian policymakers have been clearly aware of
these advantages. At the same time, the Iranians have had to
pay both a certain financial price for maintaining the
alliance and make necessary political and ideological conces-
sions. For all its ideological fervor, Iranian policy vis-a-
vis Syria suggests that ideological considerations are
secondary. Management of the alliance from Tehran has been
totally pragmatic. It is true that Iranians did try to
ascertain how far they could go in following specific ideo-
logical and political goals that they knew would not be shared
by the Ba'ath regime in Damascus. When, however, the Syrians
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wanted to stop such endeavors, the Iranians had no difficulty
in restraining themselves for the purpose of promoting
friendly relations with Damascus.
C. THE SYRIAN VIEW OF THE ALLIANCE
Syria's motives for establishing and maintaining the
alliance with Iran are, in many ways, ambiguous. This ambi-
guity can best be illustrated by the following facts. Econom-
ically, Syria has a major stake in the alliance because of the
large quantity of free and discounted oil received from Iran.
Moreover, the blocking of the Iraqi oil pipeline has Leth
taught the Iraqis a lesson and potentialy increased the
economic value of the Syrian pipeline system. In 1976, the
Iraqis had arbitarily stopped the flow of their oil via Syria
to the Mediterranean causing Syria a loss in annual transit
fees estimated at US $136,000,000. In February, 1979, Iraq
resumed oil transit through Syria, but fixed the fee at US
$0.35 per barrel, compared to US $0.445 paid before 1976. In
addition, the Iraqis pumped only 10,000,000 tons via the
Syrian pipeline system during 1979 instead of the average
27,700,000 tons sent annually from 1971-76. Thus, Syria's
temporary closure of the pipeline at Iran's behest might, in
the future, guarantee both higher transit fees and a steady,
maximal supply of oil for the pipeline.
The undoubtedly substantial economic interest in favor of
Syria's maintaining the alliance with Iran is, however, offset
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by certain contradictory economic factors. Reportedly, the
Saudis offered Syria in January, 1983, a one-time payment of
US $2 billion to reopen the pipeline for Iraq; yet the Syrians
refused. The longer the Syrians keep their pipeline system
closed, though, the less leverage they will have because the
Iraqis have been engaged in a search for alternative solutions.
Iraq is investing much effort and money in enlarging the pump-
ing capacity of the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline from 650,000 barrels/
day to 1,000,000 barrels/day. Together with Saudi Arabia, it
is building a pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Construction,
moreover, has also been started on an Iraqi pipeline to Zerga
in Jordan and from there to Aqaba on the Red Sea. In other
words, Syria's decision to prevent Iraqi oil supplies fron
reaching the Mediterranean via its territory may well
boomerang and render the Syrian pipeline obsolete.
Finally, the Syrians have to realize that the moment Iraq
solves its oil transit problem, or perhaps even earlier, their
oil supplies from Iran will be vulnerable. Iranian oil must
pass through the Straits of Hormuz and the Suez Canal.
President Mubarak of Egypt has threatened to stop Iranian oil
from passing through the Canal, and tankers in the Straits
are at the mercy of the Iraqi planes. It may be concluded,
therefore, that Syria's economic stake in an alliance with
Iran is, at best, ambiguous.
Nor is the political dimension of the liaison free of con-
tradiction. The Syrians closed their border with Iraq in
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April, 1982, only several weeks after the serious distur-
bances in Hama in which government troops clashed fiercely
with opposition groups led by the Muslim Brotherhood. There
seems to be little doubt that President Assad was anxious to
present himself, and the 3a'ath regime, to his people as a
supporter and benefactor of religion. A link with Iran could
conceivably legitimize such a posture, enabling Assad to split
the religious opposition to his regime.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, has
historically enjoyed close links with Iraq and opposed
Khomeini's brand of Islamic fundaihentalism. Other Islamic
religious groups with political influence in Syria, moreover,
have shown little empathy for Iran. The anti-Iranian bias of
Islaric religious sects clearly prevails, too, among non-
religious Syrians, for whom the identification with Arab
nat: ±11'lism demands an identificdtion with the Iraqi struggle
against izan. As a matter of fact, Syria's decision to cut
off the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean was followed
in April, 1982 by the setting up of the Iraqi-backed
"National Alliance for The Liberation of Syria"', a coalition
of different Syrian opposition groups. It may be concluded
that Syria's alliance with Iran has actually had a
destabilizing effect in the sphere of internal politics, and
any gains have, at best, been marginal.
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D. THE IRANIAN IMPACT ON LEBANON
It may be argued that one of Syria's goals in Lebanon was
to establish indirect control over the country; for this pur-
pose, Syria employed proxies, such as the PLO, the Druze com-
munity, some Sunni factions, the Faranjiyyah faction among
the Maronites and the Shi'ite Amal faction. The Iranian
presence in Lebanon served the same interest, being particu-
larly useful in that Damascus could use its lever in Tehran
to control Iranian activities. There can be little doubt
that the tactic of Iranian suicide terrorism has served
Syrian interests in Lebanon rather well. The October, 1983
incident against U.S. Marines, French soldiers and Israeli
troops, and against the latter in April and August, 1984
contributed to the withdrawal of th-i U.S. French and Israel
from Lebanon, without creating the demand for a Syrian quid
pro quo. In additon, Damascus has reason _o be pleased about
its ability to discipline the Iranian forces.
Nevertheless, the Iranian presence in Lebanon may turn out
to be a mixed blessing from the Syrian point of view. First,
although Syria may be able to control the Iranians in Lebanon,
it cannot necessarily direct the acts of Lebanese Shi-ites.
Assad wants wholehearttdly to free the Western and American
hostages in Lebanon. The Hezbollah militiamen not only foiled
the Syrian attempts but challenged the Syrians boldly. In
May, 1986, firefights broke out in Baalbek betwecn Syrian
troops ard Hezbollah militiamen. T he next montY, two xembers
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of the Damascus-backed Syrian Social Nationalist Party were
kidnapped by Shi-ites associated with Hezbollah; their bullet-
riddled bodies were found two days later. Five days of fight-
ing followed around the Bekaa Valley town of Mashgara. In
October, when the Syrians arrested two members of the militia
in Mashgara, the Shi'ite radicals responded by kidnapping four
Syrian soldiers. Not until the Syrian army freed its prison-
ers were the soldiers returned. 9 2 This community is involved
in an existential struggle and, under certain circumstances,
is ready to turn against Syria. Second, and not unrelated,
is
that with the decrease, or possibly elimination, of American,
French and Israeli influences over Lebanon, the burden of re-
storing stability in that country will fall squarely on Syria.
E. THE IRANIAN IMPACT ON SYRIA'S POSITION WITHIN
THE ARAB WORLD
Syria has long aimed at playing a leading role within the
Arab World. Its prestige and influence within the Arab community
have always been important factors in Syrian policymaking. The
question, therefore, of whether the alliance with Iran has
affected Syria's standing within the Arab World is exceedingly
pertinent. An answer is not easy.
On one hand, Syrian amour propre and Syrian prestige have
clearly been elevated. In the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war,
9 2 Foreign Affairs, Assad and his Allies, edited by Denise
Brown, vol. 66, No. 1, Fall, 1987 pp 69-70.
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Syria was not the only state to provide Iran with support.
Algeria, Libya, the PDRY and the PLO publicly expressed a
similar stand. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the Arab sheikh-
doms had very little reason to desire an Iraqi victory, even
though they publicly identified with Iraq. In this situation,
Syria succeeded in undermining the Arab summit conference in
Amman in November, 1980. As the war went on, Syria repeatedly
demonstrated that it was powerful enough to prevent any public
condemnation of its alliance policy towards Iran. This was
the case at Arab summit meetings held in Fez, Morocco in 1981
and 1982.
In three meetings of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi
Arabia and the oil shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf took pains
to avoid attacks on Syria, despite its open defiance of
mediation efforts by the GCC in a Syrian dispute with Iraq.
Furthermore, late in December, 1982 and in January, 1983, the
Syrians publicly rebuffed an attempt by King Fahd of Saudi
Arabia to bring about a meeting between Hafez al-Assad, Sadam
Hussein and Fahd himself. In an interview given to Al-
Majallah, Sadam Hussein had personally welcomed an improvement
of relations with Syria. Syria's response was to organize a
meeting in Damascus of the Iranian, Libyan and Syrian foreign
ministers, who publicly denounced the Iraqis.
There may be no doubt that by his consistent policy in
favor of Iran, President Assad gained respect for Syria's
willingness to follow steadfastly a policy of its own. As
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tangible evidence of this respect, he obtained a variety of
offers from different Arab states which tended to boost
Syrian prestige. The Saudis offered money. Other Arab
states expressed hope that Syria might be the one state
capable of mediating between Iraq and Iran. Another plan
involved Syria more directly: Syria would reopen its pipe-
lines to Iraq in exchange for Iraq's refraining from using
its French Super-Etendards against Iran. Taken altogether,
these various proposals added to a general Arab recognition
of and support for Syria's special standing with Iran.
In contrast, Syria's policy towards Iraq produced negative
repercussions. First, its policies were, at least, partly
responsible for a rapprochement between Iraq and Egypt.
Syria's closure of its pipeline to Iraqi oil necessarily
turned Iraq to seek Egyptian goodwill. Iraq's decision to
build pipelines to Yanbu (Saudi Arabia) and Aqaba (Jordan) on
the Red Sea tends to create Iraqi dependence on Egypt tc
permit the flow of Iraqi oil via the Suez Canal to the
Mediterranean, and thus in the long term may strengthen Iraq's
pro-Egyptian inclinations.
Second, support of Iran has put Syria very much on the
defensive in its relationship with all Arab institutions. The
convening in May, 1983 of the Third Conference of the Arab
Parliamentary Union in Baghdad, the capital of Syria's enemy,
constituted a defeat for Syria. Worse was the fact that in
August, 1983, Syria was called before an OAPEC tribunal to
209
defend itself against the implied accusation of treason to
the Arab cause.
If all the gains made by Syria from promoting an alliance
policy towards Iran were, and still are, ambiguous, something
of which Syria cannot be unaware, what then was its true
motive for adopting such a policy?
The answer lies in an idea that has becomre a cornerstone
of political thinking in Syria under Assad: Syria can play a
leading role in the Arab World and the Middle East as a whole
only as long as Egyrt and Iraq are neutralized and kept out
of the Middle Eastern power game. In the words of a Syrian
Ba'aLhist ideologist, "Syria's historical task is to protect
the strategic balance in the Middle East (which has been
upset by Egypt's 'defection' from the Arab camp and Iraq's
preoccupation with Iran), and Syria is the only capable force
willing to do so."
The fall of the Shah and the emergency of an Islamic
revolutionary regime in Iran thus presented a timely gift to
Syria, for these developments weakened Egypt and threatened
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Next, the Iran-Iraq war
promised, in case of prolonged fighting, to neutralize Iraq
in the inter-Arab power game. Syria would be left in a
dominant position. A quick Iraqi victory, on the other hand,
would turn Baghdad and Saddam Hussein into the unchallenged
leader of the Arab World, and thus undermine Syria's and
Assad's ambitions.
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The alliance with Iran, then, was a perfect device from
the Syrian point of view, particularly as Iraq's power
steadily weakened. The alliance policy towards Iran created
a geopolitical situation in which Syria was seemingly the
,n!.~~y Aiab state capable of taking the lead, one way or
another. It is this idea and this experience which has
motivated Syria to hold onto this policy, despite the
extensive degree of incompatibility with a variety of Syrian
interests that the alliance with Iran has entailed.
F, CONCLUSION
In analyzing Iranian and Syrian motives for maintaining
their present alliance, the following conclusions may be
drawn:
1. As long as the Iran-Iraq war goes on, the Iranian motiva-
tion to continue its alliance with Damascus will most likely
persist.
2. As long as Iran assists Damascus in keeping both Iraq and
Egypt from playing a leading role in inter-Arab affairs, Syria
will most probably continue its alliance with Iran, at least
as long as Assad remains at the helm.
3. The Irano-Syrian alliance has been asymmetrical. The
incentives for the Iranians to maintain the alliance were far
more powerful than were the incentives for Syria.
4. Both partners to the alliance have so far been successful
in keeping ideological discrepancies - which are very
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important - from causing any serious friction. As long as
the conditions which have brought this alliance prevail, it
will endure.
5. It appears that Syria has little reason to fear an Iranian
victory in the war against Iraq. Such a develcPment would
turn Syria into the only feasible mediator between Iran and
the Arab World. It might encourage radicalization, thus
putting an end to the peace process with Israel and further
isolating Egypt.
6. As long as Iran does not achieve a decisive victory over
Iraq, time and the flow of oil are working against the Irano-
Syrian alliance. The formation of an Egyptian-Jordanian
alliance in support of Iraq may prevent Iranian oil supplies
to Syria, but more important, it may create an effective
counterbalance against the Irano-Syrian alliance and thus
neutralize the benefits of the alliance policy for the
Syrians. In the long run, the Irano-Syrian alliance depends
on Hafez al-Assad's ability to continue an ingenious balanc-
ing act, which at one and the same time has kept Iraq busy
along its eastern frontier, blocked Egypt from inter-Arab
affairs and neutralized Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the smaller
Gulf states, if not paralyzed them out of fear of the Irano-
Syrian pincer. Assad may be capable for some time of such
Bismarckian diplomacy. It remains doubtful, though, whether
212
any other Syrian leader would be as successful in playing the
93
same game under such severe constraints.
9 3This section (Syria and Khomeini's Iran) is quoted from
Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini'.
Iran", in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner
Yaniv, St. Martin Press, New York, 1986, pp 105-122.
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XVI. THE SYRIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS
A. THE BACKGROUND
Several years following the exchange of direct diplomatic
representatives between Turkey and newly-independent Syria in
1946, relations between these two neighboring countries
remained markedly chilly. Memories of the recent past seemed
to have formed this attitude in no small way: Turks remem-
bered the "treason" of Arab-Syrian nationalist circles during
World War I and the "stab in the back" they suffered from the
Arab revolt; Syrians remembered the misrule of their Ottoman
conquerors and the heavy-handed methods the latter adopted in
attempting to suppress the nascent Syrian-Arab nationalist
movement. More important, Syrians were unable to forget what
seemed to them as the arbitrary transfer of the province of
Alexandretta by the French mandatory authorities into the
hands of the Turks on the eve of World War II. In the eyes
of the Syrians, Alexandretta was the legal property of the
Syrian people, and the Turks were nothing but usurpers.
An unexpected but short interlude of improved relations
occurred in 1949 following the rise to power in Syria of
Colonel Husni al-Za'im, who pledged himself as an avowed
enemy of communism in the area and saw for Turkey an impor-
tant role against Soviet expansionism. Following his over-
throw, however, relations between Turkey and Syria
deteriorated once again. Syria, for one thing, frowned upon
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Turkey's recognition of Israel and newly established relations
with the Jewish state. Secondly, Syria resisted the sustained
efforts made by Turkey to prompt Arab countries into joining
the Western system of alliances. When in early 1955, Faris
al-Kuri's government invited Turkish Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes for discussion on the matter, public resentment
reached such a point that whatever plans existed for Syria's
joining with Turkey had to be abandoned. From then on,
relations gradually drifted into confrontation. Internal
instability and the growing influence in Syria of radical
nationalist and leftist elements, its entry into an alliance
with Egypt and its acceptance of military and economic aid
from the Soviet Union turned Syria, in Turkish eyes, into a
real threat to Turkey's southern border, as well as to Western
interests in the Middle East. During the upheavals in Jordan
in April, 1957, Turkey concentrated troops along the border
with Syria as a measure of warning and intimidation. A more
serious crisis broke out in August when new concentration of
Turkish troops (meant to prevent Syria from strengthening its
ties with the Soviet Union) led to partial mobilization in
Syria, a Syrian complaint to the United Nations and public
warning by the Soviet Union against intervention. Tension
subsided only after the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish
forces.
Although Turkey welcomed the Egyptian-Syrian union in
February, 1958 as a possible means of curbing the Soviet and
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communist influences in its southern neighbor, no significant
improvement in relations occurred. The United Arab Republic
pursued the radical pan-Arab and anti-Western policies that
were pursued earlier in both Egypt and Syria, while Turkey
continued to see itself in the role of guardian of Western
interests in the area.
B. TOWARDS NORMALIZATION AND COOPERATION
Upon the dissolution of the UAR in September, 1961, Turkey
was the second state after Jordan to recognize the new regime
in Damascus, a step leading to an immediate rupture in
Turkey's relations with Egypt. Obviously Turkey hoped, as
she had on several occasions in the past, that quick recogni-
tion of the new regime would help improve relations with its
southern neighbor and that Syria, emerging from an unsuccess-
ful experiment, would be more amenable to Turkish overtures.
Circumstances, however, did not support these expectations.
With a shaky parliamentary regime desperately seeking to cling
to power and with radical Nasserist and Ba'athist elements
still exercising strong influence, Syria held out little hope
for a drastic reorientation of its foreign policy. In fact,
following the ascendancy of the Ba'ath in March, 1963, there
was renewed emphasis on Arab unity, socialism and cooperation
with the Soviet bloc. These policies, especially socialist
and the pro-Soviet orientation, were further accentuated by
the rise to power in February, 1966 of the extreme Ba'athist
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faction headed by Salah Jedid. The new ruling group was to
give the communists, for the first time in Syrian history,
representation in the government.
Despite these developments, there was some positive change
in the nature of Turkish-Syrian relations during this period.
It consisted of the removal of the confrontational element
that had characterized these relations for so long. In the
World arena, an easing of tension between the superpowers was
accompanied by the first sign of Turkish rapprochement with
the Societ bloc. This trend naturally had its effect on
Turkey's view of Soviet allies in the Middle East. Finally,
Turkey's preoccupation during the early 1960s with the ques-
tion of Cyprus gave further impetus to this partial "disen-
gagement "from Arab affairs. The combined result of these
factors was that Turkish-Syrian relations, while still cool,
no longer revolved around the major question of the "destiny"
of the area, but around several relatively 'simple' bilateral
issues. These included, for example, the problems of illegal
border crossings and smuggling, the mutual restriction on the
property of citizens of the other country, the apportionment
of waters of common rivers, and Syria's possible support for
Turkish terrorists. Other issues, such as Alexandretta and
Israel, constituted long-standing irritants, but they, too,
were not allowed by both countries to get out of hand.
Turkey continued, in fact, to express a desire to set
relations with Syria on a healthier basis. The downgrading of
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relations with Israel and the adoption of a more pro-Arab
stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict would, it was thought,
remove a major obstacle in the way of improving relations
with the Arab World. The Middle Eastern crisis of 1967
clearly demonstrated this shift in Turkish policy. Before
the outbreak of hostilities, Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri
Cagloyngil told Arab ambassadors in Ankara that "Turkey still
hoped for peace and stability and that Turkey would not take
any hostile action against her Arab neighbors nor allow NATO
bases in Turkey to be used against the Arabs". He specific-
ally assured Syria that Turkey did not intend to concentrate
troops on the frontier. Following the war, Turkey repeatedly
declared its opposition to the acquisition of territory by
force (this could also have been a possible reference to Arab
irredentism in Turkey). It was imperative for Israel to
evacuate the territories it had occupied, Turkey announced,
adding that the Middle Eastern peace should be re-established
in conformity with Arab interests. Positions reflecting an
even greater pro-Arab stance were expressed later during the
October War of 1973, when Turkey once again pointed out that
it had not allowed its military facilities to be used for
shipping arms and equipment to Israel, that it had, by con-
trast, adopted a "flexible" interpretation of the Montreux
Straits Convention to allow Soviet arms shipments and that it
had even postponed military maneuvers on its Syrian borders
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and supported t;il recognition of the "legitimate rights of
the Palestinians".
Turkey's support of the Arab countries did not escape the
attention of Syria. Speaking on August 21, 1967, the Syrian
Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Makhus, expressed his appreciation:
"Turkish support of the Arabs during recent crisis, both in
and outside the United Nations, has created feelings of
appreciation and gratitude in the Syrian people... and the
continued support of Turke to the just Arab cause will help
to erase the traces of aggression and, in consequence, will
strengthen the friendly and neighborly relations between the
two countries."
A more tangible response, however, was slow to appear. If
Turkish overtures towards the Arabs were expecteo to change
their positions on the Cyprus question, then the results, at
least with regard to Syria, were clearly disappointing. Pre-
ferring, as did other Arab states, the non-aligned Makarios
to NATO member Turkey and her clients on the island, Syria
generally voted against Turkish interests in the United
Nations and in other international bodies. This anti-Turkish
pattern was manifest even in Islamic 2orferencs, in spite of
common religion shared by Syrians and Turks.
Not until the early 1970s were there any significant signs
of change in Syrian policy towards Turkey. The real turning
point in Turkish-Syrian relations, with Syria beginning to
demonstrate a readiness to achieve understanding with its
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northern neighbor, may be linked with the ousting from power
in late 1970 of Salah Jedid and his replacement by the Ba'ath
faction h ded by Hafez al-Assad. Contrary to his predeces-
sor, who had allowed the communists a foothold in the govern-
ment and increased syria's dependency upon the Soviet Union
thereby isolated Syria in the Arab World, Assad opted for a
more f±ixible foreign policy, though he maintained coopera-
tion vith the Soviet Union, he sought to brinq about a recon-
ciliati-- between Syria and the Arab state3 as well as the
West. All thi was bound tc have obvious repercussions on
Syria's policy towards Turkey.
The change towards Turkey was expresseC in various vays:
renewed efforts by the Syrians to bring an end to some of
their bilateral conflicts with Turkey, expansion of mutual
trade, agreements on cooperation in various fields and a
readiness to upgrade the level of contacts between the two
countries. This last aspect was perhaps the most visible and
dramatic. For years, what contacts there were had largely
been held through junior diplomatic officials. Now, a fre-
quent exchange of visits by ministers, including foreign
ministers and other high-ranking government officials, began
to take place.
First of the foreign ministers "to break the ice" was
Turkey's Haluk Bayulken, who flew to Damascus in December,
1972 as guest of Syrian counterpart, Abdal-Halim Khadam.
According to their closing joint statement, the t io ministers
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covered in their talks the whole range of Turkish-Syrian
relations, agreeing to accelerarate work on the solution of
some of the outstanding problems as well as to further
cooperation in such fields as trade, transport, aviation and
tourism. In an important move for Turkey, Syria declared in
the same statement its support for the independence and
sovereignty of Cyprus and a solution based on the rights of
both Greeks and Turks. Khadam reciprocated with a visit to
Ankara in July, 1973 and various agreements for coopera-
tion were reviewed and apparently decided upon. Syria was
willing to express its support for Turkish (as well as Greek)
rights in Cyprus. The reported success of the talks was such
that a Turkish observer characterized Turkish-Syrian relations
as having "jumped" to the level of real friendship. True to
the accord, Khadam and the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan
Gunes, exchanged visits in April and June 1974, respectively;
in May, 1975, the foreign ministers of the two countries met
briefly at Ankara airport.
Thereafter, no exchange of visits between foreign minis-
ters took place for a number of years, and there was a certain
lull in the progress towards cooperation. Turkey was dis-
pleased with Syria's welcome to President Makarios in June,
1975 and its voting record on the Cyprus issue in interna-
tional bodies. Syria's occupation of Lebanon in 1976 and its
continued intervention in Lebanese affairs were also opposed.
In late 1977, Syria closed the railway line with Iraq, a
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measure, as Syria claimed, that was directed against Iraq,
but one that did disrupt important links between Turkey and
Iraq until the line was reopened in early 1979. Finally,
Syria complained that Turkey was giving refuge to some of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition members at a
time of growing agitation in that country against the Ba'ath
regime. Turkey, in turn, angrily pointed to the leniency
shown towards Turkish anarchists operating from Syrian
territory.
Despite these differences, there was little evidence that
either Turkey or Syria had given up their determination to
retain the level of relations which had already been reached.
In June, 1981, Khadam was again in Ankara as guest of Foreign
Minister Ilter Turkmen, and the latter returned the visit in
March, 1983. These meetings seem to have been "political",
largely revolving around the question of terrorism, as well
as other bilateral problems, but an atmosphere of goodwill
was reported to have prevailed during the talks. During
Turkmen's visit to Damascus, the two countries ratified an
extradition agreement and appear to have agreed on "dynamic
cooperation". These renewed contacts between foreign
ministers were "supplemented" by other exchanges, more
economic in nature. In March, 1982, Deputy Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal went to Damascus, where he signed no fewer than
five different agreements on cooperation as well as a trade
protocol. Syria's Deputy Prime Minister Abd al-Qadri Qaddura
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met with a number of Turkish ministers in Ankara in July to
discuss mutual projects.
The hiyh-level contacts between the countries were condu-
cive to reaching agreement on several of the outstanding
bilateral issues as well as to furthering cooperation in a
number of fields. One such field, where progress was particu-
larly evident, was trade. With its new drive to increase
exports and especially to find new markets for its expanding
industry, Turkey systematically sought to increase trade
relations with Syria. A good export opportunity was seen in
Syria's fast developing economy and geographical proximity.
Syria saw similar prospects for itself. In consequence,
periodic agreements were signed that envisaged an increas-
ingly rising volume of trade between the two. Between 1977
and 1981, for example, the value of the Turkish exports to
Syria rose from US $29 million to US $129,412,000. Turkey's
imports from Syria were lower, however. In 1980, they
amounted to US $17,290,000 and in 1981. US $19,024,000. It
should be noted that among the commodities Turkey imported
from Syria were oil and electricity.
Cooperative agreements were reached also in the areas of
transport, aviation, tourism and communications. Of special
importance to Turkey was a further agreement on highway trans-
port that was designed to facilitate the passage of people
and goods through Syrian territory to other Arab countries
with which Turkey maintained strong economic links. Cultural
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agreements concluded between the two countries were similarly
significant inasmuch as they sought to break the barriers of
bias and hostility that existed between the two peoples. It
is noteworthy that the cultural agreement signed in December,
1981 specifically included a paragraph on the need to elimi-
nate expressions of hostility from the school textbooks.
These agreements and cooperative ventures in fields other
than trade seemed, in practice, to lag behind. Nevertheless,
by the middle 1980s, both countries seemed eager to explore
even more avenues for cooperation, and the effort in itself
was significant.
C. SOME CONTINUOUS BONES OF CONTENTION
1. The Border
The delineation of the border between Syria and Turkey
as agreed upon between Kemalist Turkey and France did not, in
itself, give full satisfaction to the two countries. The
Syrian claim over Alexandretta may have generated the most
tension, but was not the sole problem along the 835-mile-long
border that preoccupied the two from the very establishment
of relations between them. One perennial problem was - and
still is - that of smuggling, not a small amount of which
consisted of illegal narcotics. Another was the illegal cross-
ing of people. This latter problem was, in some instances,
"innocent" enough, given the fact that the border in many
places cut across areas inhabited by people of common kinship
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(Turks, Arabs or Kurds) and family, and in some cases even
divided farmers and their lands. In other instances, these
illegal crossings were effected by refugees or by people
deliberately attempting to escape the hand of the law. What-
ever the case, Turkish and Syrian authorities normally coope-
rated in attempting to put a stop to the illegal crossings of
both people and goods. They also showed consideration towards
farmers with property across the border by issuing local
permits allowing them to tend their crops on the other side.
Sometimes, however, the illegal crossings led to
serious incidents. At the height of the tension caused by
the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Syrian authorities imposed
strict control over the movement of Kurdish tribes following
information that they were spying for Turkey, and the Syrian
press carried reports of Turkish propaganda among the Syrian
Turkomans inhabiting the border areas.
Potentially explosive were incidents involving the
armed forces themselves, which increased during military
concentrations or maneuvers on each side of the border. At
the height of Turkey UAR tensions in July, 1958, Turkish
authorities closed the frontiers for a few months and
prevented Syrian farmers from tilling their lands across the
border. Syria reacted by prohibiting its citizens from
travelling to Turkey, and about a year later, Turkey expelled
from the border areas a number of Syrian farmers who held
permits to tend their crops.
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In November, 1961, Turkish and Syrian representatives
met and, among other things, settled questions relating to
crossing permits given to Syrian citizens living along the
border. Although the upsurge of anarchism in Turkey in the
late 1960s and again in the late 1970s increased illegal
crossings and arms smuggling by militants either entering
Turkey from Syria or escaping the hand of Turkish authorities
in the opposite direction, it did not tend to create serious
incidents along the border. Syria, in any event, was careful
not to show support for the terrorists. The most constant
feature of the Turkish-Syrian border remained "regular"
smuggling, which, as estimated for 1981, even surpassed legal
trade in value. The subject was discussed at virtually all
meetings between officials of both countries, and a special
protocol on customs and tue prevention of smuggling was in-
cluded among the agreements signed by Ozal during his visit
to Damascus in February, 1982. Turkey, probably as part of
its drive to increase exports, attempted to "legalize" the
trade that had been going on through smuggling, and by 1983,
smuggling was indeed reported to have lessened. At the same
time, Turkey and Syria, in line with the desire to see their
mutual border reflect peace and cooperation, consented to
accelerate work on demining the area, thereby opening new
tracts of land for farming.
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2. Lost Property
Having lived for many years under the canopy of one
state, it was natural for Turks and Arabs to reside and
acquire property wherever they wished within the Ottoman
empire. The delination of the border between Turkey and
Syria following World War I left large Arab and Turkish
populations on the "wrong" side of the border. Some who had
possessed properties away from their homes now found their
real estate under control of a country not their own. In
some cases, as we have seen, the very lands that farmers had
long been cultivating were now situated across the border.
Whereas, some opted for new citizenship in the place where
they lived, others chose to migrate to their "national homes",
selling their property or leaving them behind. The Treaty of
Peace concluded betw(en the great powers and Turkey in
Lausanne in July, 1923 referred to such cases.
In effect, however, this separation between persons
and their properties led to numerous legal and practical
difficulties. Moreover, friction between the two countries
resulted whenever legislation in one country threatened to
infringe upon the rights of the other country's citizens.
Thus in April, 1953, Turkey invoked the Treaty of Lausanne
after Syria had legislated to prohibit non-Syrian citizens
from purchasing agricultural land. A more serious contro-
versy erupted in September, 1958 after the UAR had promul-
gated a special land reform law for the Syrian region that
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affected, of course, Turkish landowners as well. Turkey did
not lodge a formal protest, but, subsequently, began to
exercise repressive measures against Syrian landowners in
Turkey. Syrian farmers with land in Turkey were reported to
be pressured to exchange their property with Turks owning land
in Syria, and to be prevented from tending their crops on the
other side of the border. These measures were intensified in
1966 following the ascendancy of the extreme socialist
Ba'athist faction under Jedid. This time, the Turkish govern-
ment reacted sharply by ordering the requisition of land and
property belonging to Syrian citizens in the Hatay (Alexan-
dretta) province. In retaliation, Syria froze all movable and
immovable assets of Turkish citizens in Syria and curtailed
decisions concerning transactions involving Turkish assets.
The "lost property" issue thus assumed the character
of a new crisis between the two countries. Being unwilling
during this period to accentuate conflicts needlessly between
them, however, Turkey and Syria soon began a joint search for
a solution. The talks dragged on for a number of years.
Syria, clearly unwilling to forego the stipulations of its
land-reform laws, made not very lucrative offers for the
compensation of Turkish landowners. Turkey's Foreign Minister
Caglayangil was impelled to warn in January, 1969 that should
an agreement on the matter fail, Turkey would distribute
Syrian lands to Turks who had property in Syria. Finally, in
early 1970, there were reports of a breakthrough. In May,
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1972, a property-compensation agreement was initialed and was
duly signed in December, 1972 during Foreign Minister
Bayulken's visit to Damascus. A special commission was
charged with implementing the agreement. Henceforth, the
question of property ceased to occupy an important place in
bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria. The actual
compensation to landowners and the removal of restrictions
were destined, however, to be negotiated for many years to
come; as late as early 1983 (when a new protocol was signed),
these issues had not been fully settled.
3. The Apportionment of River Waters
National and political divisions superimposed on the
realities of nature forced Turkey and Syria to share the
benefits of rivers flowing through the territory of both,
making one country or the other dependent on the goodwill of
its neighbor. Development projects carried out in one
country that aimed at using more river water for either
irrigation or hydroelectric power were destined to create
uneasiness in the other and did, in fact, intermittently
constitute a source of contention between the two.
Chronologically, the Asi (Orontes) River, which flows
through Syria in a generally northern direction and then
enters the province of Hatay (Alexandretta) and bears south-
west towards the Mediterranean, was the first to cause
controversy. In 1956, Syria accelerated planning for the
Al-Ghab Valley project, which involved drying its swamps and
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opening new areas for cultivation, the additional water to be
made available for irrigation from a new dam on the Asi.
Turkey announced its opposition, claiming that the project
would inflect losses on Turkish farmers. No serious bilateral
talks ensued, and the question remained unsettled. The issue
did come up in later talks, in connection with the utilization
of the waters of the Euphrates River, when Turkey was reported
to have demanded an overall settlement that would include the
Asi (and also the Tigris), but the demand was rejected.
Of the two other major rivers shared by Turkey and
Syria, the Tigris and the Euphrates, the latter, in particu-
lar, appears to have been the object of large-scale, highly
prestigious development plans in both countries. The
Euphrates originates in the eastern highlands of Turkey, flows
southward into Syria, and then heads towards Iraq and the
Gulf in a southeasterly direction, actually making it the
possession of three states. In 1974, Turkey completed a
major irrigation and power project, the Keban Dam on the
river and was preparing plans for three more dams to be built
in the course of 20 years. Syria's main development project
for the Euphrates was the Tabqa Dam, partially completed in
1973 and similarly used for irrigation and power production.
Iraq, naturally, had long been a prime benefactor of the
Euphrates waters and had its own plans for further exploiting
them. Being the third country through which the river flowed,
it was primarily Iraq that became concerned at the development
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projects of the two other countries. Syria's own concern at
Turkey's plans, however, was also quite obvious.
Tripartite talks on the proper apportionment of the
waters of the Euphrates River were held intermittently during
the early 1960s. In 1966, Turkey appears to have committed
itself to supplying both Syria and Iraq with 300 cubic meters
per second of the waters. The issue, however, came to the
foreground in a more serious fashion in the early 1970s, when
the Turkish and Syrian dams were nearing completion. Iraq,
in particular, voiced its fear of a possible loss of water,
and its differences with Syria on this matter accentuated its
already existing points of conflict with that country. But,
when in March, 1974 Turkey began filling the Keban Lake in
preparation for the operation of its power plant, both Syria
and Iraq complained that Turkey had considerably reduced the
flow of the river to well below the agreed quantities. When
Turkey informed its neighbors that it could not, for a few
months, allow more than 100 cubic meters per second to pass
through the dam, Syria and Iraq retorted that they were in
equal need for increased supplies to their respective lakes
at Tabqa and Habaniyya. Only after Turkey resumed the river's
normal flow, did the controversy largely abate, although
Syria continued to demand a tripartite conference for finally
determining the apportionment of the Euphrates waters.
With the approaching completion of Karakaya, Turkey's
second major dam on the Euphrates, and its preparations for a
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third in the early 1980s, Syria once again began to voice
apprehensions. The second dam alone, it was feared, might
reduce by no less than 27 percent the supply of water to
Syria, as well as to retain most of the valuable slit in
Turkish territory. Turkey, reported to be ready to give
assurances to Syria, seems at the same time to have used the
Euphrates issue as leverage in discussions over Armenian and
Kurdish terrorism. By the middle 1980s, a clear long-term
solution to the issue had not yet been found. Given the
ongoing projects in all three countries for the exploitation
of the Euphrates River, the prospects for further friction
remain high.
4. Terrorism
Syria's possible aid to Turkish anarchists constituted
the most recent issue in the bilateral relations between Tur-
key and Syria. The late 1960s witnessed the rise of various
radical, especially leftists, military groups in Turkey that
took more and more to outright terrorist activities. Turkey
suspected that many of the anarchists had received training,
arms and other means of support in Palestinian installations
in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, or else had found refuge in
these camps after fleeing from Turkey. Fearful of plots by
outsiders to overthrow the Turkish regime but careful not to
accuse Arab countries directly of cooperating with terrorism,
Turkey voiced its concern to the Arab governments and demanded
that they not extend their protection to Turkish terrorists.
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Much of Turkey's concern was directed at Syria,
especially after Jordan had eliminated Palestinian bases on
its territory late in 1970 and Syria, together with Lebanon,
has become the Palestinians' main base of operations. Follow-
ing the assassination of Israeli Consul-General Ephraim Elrom
in Istanbul in May, 1971, Turkey's Prime Minister Nihat Erim
explicitly stated that although there was no proof of a link
between Turkish terrorists and the Arab countries, it was
clear that militants had in fact, bee n trained by the Fat~h
in Syria. Syria rejected all charges of complicity in Turkish
terrorist activities denying even the existence of operation
bases on its soil. It was only when Turkish terrorism
gradually declined for a time in the mid 1970s that this new
strain on Turkish-Syrian relations somewhat abated.
After the military coup in Turkey in September, 1980,
and particularly during 1982-83, Syria was implicated once
again in anti-Turkish activities. Turkey's ruling generals
had been fairly successful in eradicating both left- and
right-wing terrorist organizations, but now found it difficult
to cope with a new wave of Armenian terrorism, which operated
mostly abroad and against Turkish diplomats. To a lesser
extent, the generals also faced growing signs of Kurdish
separatism. To the Turks, Syria seemed to play a certain
role, at least by turning a blind eye to Armenian and Kurdish
activities from Syrian territory (or from Syrian-occupied
Lebanon). The Turkish press carried many reports of such
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activities, some of these accounts implicating official
Syrian bodies. In fact, Turkey was not content with protests
and warnings, but took care to supply the Syrian government
with relevant evidence. Denying again any corplicity, Syria
responded that it had never allowed, and would never allow,
aiti-Turkish activities to be conducted in or from its terri-
tory. But as Foreign Minister Turkned put it, "Syria always
promises, but the information is different."
The two countries did, however, sign an extradition
agreement in 1981 that came into force, as has teen mentioned,
after Turkmen's visit to Damascus in March, 1983. Allowing
extradition of persons sought for crimas committed against
Turkey, the agreement did not, however, cover "political"
cases. Indeed in the mid 1980s, Syria's possible role in
facilitating Armenia and Kurdish operations against Turkey
came to constitute the greatest strain on Turkish-Syrian
relations.
Regarding itself as the cradle of Arab nationalism and
its main torchbearer, Syria finds it difficult tc forget not
only the conflicts of the past, but also the very -eal wound
of Alexandretta-Hatay. The province seems to stand as a
reminder that accounts between Syria and Turkey, or between
Arab nationalism and Turkey, have not yet been fully settled.
Although the issue has remained politically dormant, there is
no question that psychologically it has exercised a strong
impact on Syr-an attitudcs. This attitude that Turkey's
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Foreign Minister Caglayangil may have referred to in February,
1968, when he said that whereas Turkey was constantly trying
to improve its relations with the Syrians, Syria continued to
use the question of Hatay for "political purposes".
Frustrated with Turkey's failure to persuade President
Assad to change his position on a particular matter, a Turkish
diplomat once commented that there was little that could be
done: "Damascus does not like us."
9 4
9 4This section (The Syrian-Turkish Relations) is quoted from
David Kushner, "Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish-Syrian
Relations," in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner
Yaniv, St. Martin Press, New York, 1986, pp 85-103.
235
XVII. THE SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS
One of the most striking features of Syria's rise to the
status of an important regional power has been its success in
exploiting its relations with the Soviet Union for advancing
its own interests. The Soviets are not averse to Syria's as-
cent, since in broad terms, any gain in stature and influence
by their ally would also be regarded as a gain for themelves.
Nevertheless, the march of the Syrians towards a position of
regional power has occasionally faced the Soviets with exceed-
ingly difficult situations.
The growing Syrian involvement in the Lebanese imbroglio in
the course of the 1970s is a good case in point. Moscow was
not at all opposed to the increase in Syria's influence in
Lebanon. When, however, the situation there brought the
Syrians into open conflict with Israel, the United States and
the PLO, the Soviet Union at times faced the difficult prospect
of a major confrontation that could harm not only its own posi-
tion in the region, but also its global standing. Even the
well-being of the Soviets in the most immediate sense could
have been affected. On these occasions, the Soviets must have
wondered whether or not their great investment in Syria made
them capable of stopping the Syrians from moving ahead.9 5
9 5 Freedman, Robert 0., "Moscow, Damascus and the Lebanon
Crisis," in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner
Yaniv, St. Martin Press, New York, 1986, p. 224.
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The events proved that there were limitations on their
ability to do so.
The relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union is
typical of patron-client ties between major powers and devel-
oping countries. While the patron seeks influence through
provisions of economic and military assistance, the client
retains the initiative in defining the terms of the relation-
ship and in pursuing policies consistent with its core
interests. Syria has received generous amounts of Soviet
assistance in terms of credits, military hardware, and
economic aid; on many occasions, however, the Soviets have
been unable to dissuade Damascus from taking actions which
were inconsistent with Moscow's objectives. Within the con-
straints of the Soviet-Syrian relationship, it is the Syrians
who clearly have the upper hand in defining their joint in-
96
terests in the Middle East. Each country provides a vital
service for the other. The Soviet bloc is Syria's only
source of weapons: it rebuilt Syrian air defenses after the
1982 Lebanese war and spent 2 billion dollars on Syria's
behalf between 1979-85. Syria offers Moscow its sole if
restricted opportunity to influence events in the Middle
East. The USSR remains unable to persuade Syria to reconcile
9 6Ramet, Pedro, "The Soviet-Syrian Relationship," Problems
of Communism, vol. No. 35, ISS, No. 5, September/October, 1986,
pp 35-46.
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with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat or to resolve differences
between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'athist parties. 97
A. SOVIET POLICY OBJECTIVES
Soviet objectives in the Third World have been a matter of
some disagreement among Western observers, particularly with
respect to whether Soviet policy is motivated more by Soviet
national interests or by ideology. Adherents of the former
view tend to see Soviet activities in the Third World as
deriving primarily from the USSR's quest for great power
status and promotion of traditional state interests, while
those who emphasize the ideological bent see the spread of
communism as more of a driving force. Elements of both are
no doubt present in Soviet policy motivations and, whatever
the genesis, can give rise to behavior equally threatening to
U.S. interests.
98
After the end of World War II, the Soviet Union emerged
with global ambitions. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
has stated that no problem in the world can be resolved with-
out Soviet participation, a statement indicating that Moscow
has a rather broad conception of its own security concerns.
97Walker, Martin, "A Marriage of Necessity," Sout 155-63,
January, 1986, pp 23-24.
98Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolf, "Soviet Policy and
Practice toward Third World Conflicts," D. C. Heath and Company,
Lexington, Massachusetts; Toronto, 1983, p. 127.
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The Soviets have signed friendship treaties with a dozen or
so countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East (including
Syria), all of which imply a considerable degree of commit-
ment to the security of those far-flung countries.
9 9
B. HOW DID THE SOVIETS PENETRATE INTO SYRIA?
While usually accepting the anti-imperialist teniet of
Marxism-Leninism, the Syrians have usually rejected such
other basic tenets of the Soviet doctrine as the supremacy of
the working class, dialectical materialism, and atheism -
indeed, the identification of the Soviet Union with atheism
has proved to be a major obstacle to the spread of Soviet
influence through the predominantly Muslim Middle East where
religion plays a major role in every day life, a role that
100
has increased in importance since 1970. But the Arabs,
especially the states of confrontation with Israel were beset
with Zionism. To the Arabs, Zionism is more abhorrent than
atheism. In 1950, when the Syrians became frustrated of
Washington's unstinting support to Israel, they declared
their famous statements that they would rather become
"Sovietized" than "Judaized" and that it was proper to
collaborate with the Soviet Union as "an enemy of their
9 9 Zagoria, Donald S., "Soviet Policy in East Asia," Yale
University Press, New Haven and London, 1982, p. 1.
1 0 0Freedman, Robert 0., "Soviet Policy toward the Middle
East since 1970," Praeger Publisher, Third Edition, 1982,
p. 3.
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enemy," i.e. of the U.S., in the same way that the Arabs had
collaborated with Nazi Germany as the enemy of Britain.
1 0 1
Although the Soviet Union played an important role in the
creation of the State of Israel, Russia proved that she is
more flexible and skillful than the West in general in
ameliorating her problems with the Arabs and in starting a
new era with them since 1955. For the Russians, the Arabs
enmity with Israel was a very small price for their friend-
ship with the Arab states.
In its efforts to weaken and ultimately eliminate Western
influence from the Middle East, and particularly from the Arab
World, while promoting Soviet influence, the Soviet leadership
has employed a number of tactics. First and foremost has been
the supply of military aid to its regional clients. Next in
importance comes economic aids: the Aswan Dam in Egypt and
the Euphrates Dam in Syria are prominent examples of Soviet
economi. dssistance. In recent years, Moscow has also sought
to solidify its influence through the conclusion of long-term
friendship and cooperation treaties, such as the ones with
Egypt (1971), Iraq (1972), Syria (1980) and Somalia (1974).
Repudiations of the treaties by Egypt (1976) and Somalia (1977)
indicate that this has not always been a too successful
10 1Lenczowski, George, "The Middle East in World Affairs,"
Fourth Edition, p. 331.
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tactic. Moscow has also attempted to exploit both the
lingering memories of Western colonialism and Western threats
against Arab oil producers. Another tactic has been the
establishment of party-to-party relations between the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the ruling parties
in a number of Middle Eastern one-party states. It has
offered the Arabs diplomatic support at such international
forums as the United Nations and the Geneva Conference (on an
Arab-Israeli peace settlement). Finally, Moscow has given
the Arabs direct military aid for use against Israel. This
last, though, has been limited in scope because Moscow con-
tinues to support Israel's right to exist both for fear of
unduly alienating the United States, with whom the Russians
desire additional SALT agreements and improved trade relations,
and for maintaining Israel as a convenient rallying point for
potentially anti-Western forces in the Arab World.l1/
C. THE SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SYRIA
The Soviet military aid to Syria is of different types.
On December 11, 1955, the Syrian outposts east of Lake
Tiberias were subjected to a terrible Israeli attack. Fifty-
six Syrian lives were lost.1 0 3 The Syrians determined to
acquire sophisticated weapons from the West, but they were
1 0 2Freedman, Robert 0., "Syria under Assad," p. 225.
1 0 3George Lenczowski, p. 340.
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rebuffed. The Syrians now had no choice but to turn toward
the Soviet bloc and concluded a barter deal with Communist
Czechoslovakia whereby Syrian wheat and cotton were to be
exchanged for undisclosed quantity of heavy military equip-
ment and munitions. After this deal, the Soviet Union became
the main source of weapons to the Syrian army. The quality
and quantity of Soviet military aid to Syria were increased
gradually and cautiously since 1956.
Alongside with the arms delivery, the Soviets sent mili-
tary advisers and technicians to assist essentially in three
functions: the delivery, assembly, and maintenance of mili-
tary equipment; the training of local personnel in the opera-
tion and maintenance of equipment; and the instructing of
indigenous military officers in staff and operational units.
It is estimated that there are between 5,000 to 8,000 Soviet
advisers and technicians now.
D. PRICES AND TERMS
Mulcl C .z t 'f Soviet military assistance
has been due to the comparatively low prices and favorable
terms offered by Moscow. The prices charged to Syria have
varied with the type and condition of the equipment, but on
the whole, Soviet prices have been substantially below
Western prices for comparable equipment. For example, the
price of the new U.S. F-15 fighter charged Israel averaged
about $12 million per craft, while the price of a Soviet
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MIG-23 fighter reportedly averaged about $6.7 million. The
price for an MIG-21 fighter reportedly listed at $2 million,
while that of an F-4 was $5.7 million. While the types of
aircraft cited are not fully comparable in terms of character-
istics and capabilities, the wide variation in reported prices
serves to illustrate the point.
Besides low prices, the Soviets have offered attractive
financial terms to recipients. Credits generally have been
made available at 2 percent interest, with repayment periods
averaging 10 years, following a grace period of one to three
years. Moreover, to clients hardpressed for foreign exchange
like Syria, Moscow frequently has permitted repayment in
local currency or commodities. In addition, Moscow often has
postponed payment when Syria has been unable to meet her
scheduled obligations. Discounts from list prices have been
an intrinsic feature of military assistance. Such discounts
reportedly have averaged about 40 percent of the value of
Soviet contracts. 104
E. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY AID IN RELATION TO SOVIET
OBJECTIVES
Of the various types of foreign assistance employed by the
Soviets - military, economic, and technical - "military" aid
1 0 4Donaldson, Robert H., "The Soviet Union in the Third
World: Success and Failures," Westview Press, Inc., U.S.
Second Printing, 1981, p 386, pp 393-94.
243
has proven to be the most dramatic and consequential. Besides
directly contributing to the emergence, growth, and survival
of nonaligned regimes like Syrian regime, arms aid has
fostered an image of the Soviet Union as a benign but powerful
anti-colonialist power. Furthermore, military aid has often
provided the opening wedge for a variety of diplomatic, trade,
cultural, and other contacts which would have been difficult
or impossible to achieve. Through the military aid, the
Soviets emerged as an advocate of a recipient's national
aspirations and was able to facilely exploit this position to
the detriment of Western interests. Arab-Israeli tensions
are examples of opportunities which were initially ripe for
Soviet exploitation.
In addition to the broader objective of undermining West-
ern influence in recipient countries like Syria, the Soviet
leadership has used military assistance and sales to affect
Western strategic interests and to eliminate Western military
facilities and alliances adjacent to Soviet borders.1 0 5
Syria was a great help to Moscow to neutralize the Baghdad
Pact and disrupted partially the West's "northern tier"
defenses against her.
1 0 5 Robert H. Donaldson, p. 394.
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F. THE SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO SYRIA
Syria is among the countries which are heavily indebted to
the Soviets for political, military and economic assistance.
In 1956, Czechoslovakia won a contract for the construction
of the first Syrian oil refinery at Homs. From that time on,
most of the economic and industrial projects were achieved by
the assistance of the Soviet bloc. Among the great projects
which were achieved by the Soviet's assistance were the
construction of a big dam on the Euphrates River in 1966 and
the development of Syria's oil fields in Suwaidiyah, Karachuk,
106
and Rumailan. We can hardly find any economic project
achieved in Syria without Soviet help.
G. ECONOMIC AID AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES
The economic aid program is a prominent compDnent of a
broader tactical shift in foreign policy designed to extend
Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries. There are
at least two significant aspects to the recent growth of
Soviet influence and power. One is the increasing ability to
deflect the policies of the underdeveloped countries in
directions favorable to Soviet objectives. The second is the
weakening of the influence of the West. The Soviet leaders
recognized that to aid business is an effective weapon in
achieving the upper mentioned objectives. Moscow used it
10 6 George Lenczowski, p. 342, p. 344.
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effectively in Syria. The sheer weight of the Soviet
economic aid in the Syrian economy may be sufficient for the
Soviet bloc to acquire a considerable measure of influence.
H. THE TERMS OF THE PROGRAM
Of all the advantages the Russians advertise in their aid
program, perhaps the one that has made the greatest impact is
the assertion that aid s given with absolutely "no strings
attached". The very expression has become part of a formula
used by leaders of underdeveloped countries in public state-
ments on their aid negotiations with the USSR Minister of
Economy. Kallas of Syria praised the USSR for having given
aid "with no conditions" attached. The very novelty of the
Soviet program is itself an advantage; it offers promising
new prospects and breaks what many recipient nations saw as
the United States' virtual monopoly of aid giving. Moreover,
to many people in the underdeveloped countries including
Syria, the USSR does not appear to be the aggressive villain
of the world drama usually portrayed in the West. The Soviet
authorities have fashioned the terms of their aid program so
as to mitigate the latent fears of the recipients and to
107
appeal to many of their aspirations. The details of the
1 0 7Berliner, Joseph S., "Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid
and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," New York,
1958, pp 14, 17, 37, 137, 163.
246
interest and paymenL of this program are the same as that of
the military aid and have been explained earlier in detail.
I. THE SOVIETS INVOLVEMENT IN SYRIA'S REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
In 1956, the U.S. government was determined to saddle the
Middle East countries with treaties based on the Eisenhower
Doctrine. Many of them, Syria included, refused military
cooperation with the United States. To break down Syria's
resistance, Washington commenced to prepare armed interven-
tion. TurKey massed an army of 50,000 supported by 500 tanks
on the Turkish-Syrian frontier. At the same time, Israel
organized border incidents. The Syrian government raised
strong and well-publicized objections to the massive placing
of Turkish and Israeli troops on the border, accusing Turkey,
Israel and the United States of planning armed intervention.
Soviet assurances of assistance to Syria, coupled with
threats to Turkey, were gratefully acknowledged by the Syrian
108
propaganda agencies. At that time, the Soviet influence
reached its apogee and Syria barely missed becoming a Soviet
satellite.
The period of union betw-en Egypt and Syria (1958-1961)
was the darkest days to the Syrian communists in particular
and the Soviet influence in general. The Syrian communist
leaders included Khalid Bakdash who fled the country to live
1 0 8 George Lenzowski, p. 338.
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in exile in the Soviet bloc while some of the operative lead-
ers like Faraj Allah al-Hiliw and Said al-Drooby were elimi-
nated, the former by liquidating him in acid and the latter
by strangling him. Although the communists survived despite
all the torture they incurred during the Union in Syria, they
could not rehabilitate themselves to play the political role
that they did before the Union. Although they were represen-
ted in the National Front and in the Syrian cabinet by two
portfolios, this representation is nominal and their politi-
cal activity is curtailed by law.
J. THE RUSSIANS REACTION TO THIS SUPPRESSION
The Soviets did not and wotld not criticize the Syrians
openly consistent with their principle or commitment not to
interfere in the national affairs of the Syrians but implicit-
ly they are very angry with the Arab behavior in general and
the Syrians in particular.
The Soviets are like an octopus; when it looses one arm,
it can survive by the other arm; not only that but the severed
arm can grow up by time. Although the Soviets interests were
affected by the or£2al of the Syrian communists, they did not
loose their influence in Syria completely because of their
diversified aids. But this does not mean that the Syrians
yielded to Soviets blindly and helplessly. On many occa-
sions, the Syriars ignored the Soviet tdvice and warning and
followed their natural and regional interests.
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From 1961 to 1963, Syria was ruled by a pro-Western Con-
servative regime. Like all the former Constitutional pro-
Western regimes, the Conservatives were not in complete
control. The Syrian communists were not in a hurry to rush
into the political arena and the Soviets were waiting and
watching to see who would be the real masters of Syria.
On March 8, 1963, the Ba'ath Party seized power in Syria.
The first Ba'athist government was headed by Salah al-Bitar
and represented the right wing of the party. This wing was
famous in their hatred of the West and the Soviets as well.
The rightists considered Britain, France and U.S. as repre-
sentatives and champions of Western Imperialism and the
Soviets the champions of Eastern Imperialism and sometimes
they looked on the new Soviet imperialism as worst than the
traditional one.
To the joys of the Syrian communists, the right wing of
the Ba'ath did not last long in power. The left wing under
the leadership of Salah Jedid usurped the power promptly.
The leftists aimed at more drastic socioeconomic transforma-
tions in Syria to conform to their socialist model which was
tinged with a good deal of Marxist thought. They nationalized
more than 200 industrial enterprises in 1965. At this period,
the Syrian communists returned to Syria and enjoyed some type
of political freedom. General Salah Jedid, dared to declare
that the only way to emancipate Palestine from Zionism is by
adopting Marxism and concluding a military pact with Russia
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of the same model of the pact between the Soviets and Eastern
Europe. In the sector of foreign policy, the regime displayed
considerable hostility toward the United States, largely
because of its pro-Israeli stance, and, by the same token,
favored more iitimate relations with the Soviet Union and the
socialist bloc. This pro-Soviet attitude found its expression
in the generous Soviet economic and military aids aforemen-
tioned in this paper. On the political level inside Syria,
the radicals of the Ba'ath Party opened the door to the reha-
bilitation and cooperation with the Syrian communist party.
Thus, Syria's exiled communist leader Khalid Bakdash was
allowed to return from exile (he spent a number of years in
Russia) while at the same time two communist leaders, Sami
Attiyah and Ahmad Murad, were given ministerial posts in the
cabinet in charge of communications and economics, respect-
ively. This golden and fertile period to communism lasted
till 1970 when General Hafez Assad usurped the power from the
leftist in a military coup. In 1967 war with Israel, Syria
was defeated bitterly, and here again, the Soviets poured
their largess on the Syrians on all levels.
In 1970, the Syrians sent a tank brigade across the border
to northern Jordan to help the Palestinian Fedayeen in their
war against King Hussein of Jordan. There was a distinct
possibility of escalation, with the Soviet Union, the princi-
pal arms supplier of Syria and the United States, the protec-
tor of King Hussein, likely to intervene if their respective
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clients were to find themselves in serious difficulties.
Thus, an international conflagration of major proportions was
narrowly avoided. 109
General Hafez Assad, supported by his military colleagues,
ousted General Jedid and the leftist government. For the
Syrian communists, this political movement was a terrible
blow. Assad actually was not a moderate; he was a rightist
Ba'athist and he was still famous for his suspicions towards
communism. Although the communist leaders are represented in
his National Front and Cabinet, the party is suppressed under
his regime. In 1973, Assad with Sadat launched a war against
Israel without any coordination with Russia. But each limited
war between Israel and Syria proved to be in the Soviet favor.
The Soviets are not gullible in politics. They know that
Assad is not a loyal ally to them. Assad extends his hands
to the Soviets only when he needs them. Assad always favored
a limited relationship with the Soviets. When he overthrew
Jedid in November, 1970, a marked cooling of Soviet-Syrian
relations took place. Soviet support to Syria during the
1973 war helped to warm relations again, but the Syrian
refusal to attend the Soviet cosponsored Geneva Peace Confer-
ence in 1973 and the successful shuttle diplomacy of Henry
Kissinger which led both to a separation of forces agreement
on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria and the
1 0 9George Lenczowski, p. 353.
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re-establishment of Syrian-American diplomatic relations,
again chilled Soviet-Syrian ties. Yet another change in
relations occurred in 1975 when Syria turned again to the USSR
after the Sinai II agreement, only to clash violently with Mos-
cow the following year when the USSR both criticized Syria's
military intervention in Lebanon and delayed promised shipment
of arms. Soviet-Syrian relations warmed up again, however, in
1977 and Moscow was able to profit from the regional isolation
of Syria following the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the
renewal of the feud between Damascus and Baghdad, and the
eruption of a feud between Jordan and Syria, as well as by the
growing instability within Syria to extract from the Syrians
the long desired Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which
Moscow saw as giving her a formal presence in the strategic-
110
ally located state. Yet one can raise some questions
about the ultimate value of such a treaty to both nations.
Its value depends upon the broad objectives of the two nations
and upon the content of the treaty to meet these objectives.
The broad Soviet objectives are the spread of communism
and the quest for great power status, while the Syrian
objective is the defeat of Zionism and the emancipation of
Palestine. The following step is the analysis of the Soviet-
Syrian Treaty of Friendship.
1 1 0Robert 0. Freedman, "Soviet Policy toward the Middle
East," p. 436.
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K. INTRODUCTION OF THE TREATY
On October 8, 1980 the Soviet Union and Syria signed a
friendship and cooperation treaty. The treaty-signing raised
considerable apprehension and curiosity on a number of issues.
How would the new treaty influence the intensity of political
and military relations between the USSR and Syria? How would
it affect Damascus' military strength and freedom of
political
and military action regarding other Arab countries and Israel?
What new possibilities now arose regarding Syrian-oriented
Soviet military involvement in the region and the enhancing
of Soviet military alignment in the Middle East in general?
The answers to these questions are of cardinal signifi-
cance for the strategic considerations and calculations of
Israel, the United States and Arab countries in the region.
1. Background to the Signing of the Treaty
As a prelude to understanding the reasons for the
signing of the treaty as well as its influence on the two
countries'relations, we must attempt first to describe the
two sides' expectation from it.
2. The Syrian Viewpoint
For years, despite continued pressures from Moscow,
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had avoided signing a friend-
ship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union. In the
early 70s, Assad himself had denounced similar agreements
signed between the Soviet Union, Egypt and Iraq. As late as
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the end of 1979, Assad again rejected Soviet proposals for an
agreement.
Shortly thereafter, however, a number of new domestic
and external considerations led the Syrian president to recon-
sider his objections. On the domestic plane, unrest throughout
.980 produced an immediate threat, organized subversion by the
Muslim Brothers was increasing and the Syrian middle class was
becoming increasingly agitated.
In these circumstances, a friendship and cooperation
treaty would appear to be the logical way out. The pact would
tie Moscow to Assad's regime and would provide the foundation
for a possible request by Assad for active Soviet intervention
if matters should deteriorate further.
On the external plane, the agreement would help deter
Israel from exploiting the Syrian domestic situation and taking
the military initiative. In the event that Israel were not
deterred and initiated an offensive, the treaty would ensure
the defense of those primary assets which the regime considered
necessary for its survival - the capital, the bulk of the army
and strategic facilities and infrastructures.
In this context, the agreement could possibly be ex-
ploited as a deterrent cover against Israel to facilitate new
Syrian initiatives in Lebanon.
Over and above all, however, was Syria's growing re-
gional isolation and fear that the strategic balance was tip-
ping against her which formed the backdrop to Assad's agreement
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to enter into a formal tie with the Soviet Union. The
Israeli threat was looming ever larger, while Syria's strate-
gic rear support was weakening, if not disappearing altogether.
Egypt has withdrawn from the war effort; Saudi Arabia was
extending its links with the U.S., Jordan was aiding the
Muslim Brothers inside Syria in their struggle against the
regime and the U.S. was increasing its strength and influence
in the Middle East by leading the peace process, while its
"clients", led by Egypt and Israel, were reaping the largely
military benefits. A Syrian-Soviet agreement could balance
Syria's military and political isolation, and perhaps even
afford Syria some possibility of building a genuine military
option.
The damage caused by the agreement in the inter-Arab
sphere - and particularly among the anti-Soviet Arab regimes -
would, Assad hoped, be cancelled out by an aggressive propa-
ganda campaign. This would portray the agreement as the only
way open for Syria to prevent Israeli military superiority
and perhaps even an Israeli offensive against Lebanon and
Syria, and as an important tool for breaking the Camp David
process which in all steadfastness, Front countries opposed.
3. Soviet Viewpoint
In the bilateral Soviet-Syrian sphere, Moscow's con-
siderable investment in Damascus was in danger. The Alawite
regime was at one of its lowest points; its capacity for
dealing with growing manifestations of internal unrest and
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violence was in doubt. The alternative to Assad, from
Moscow's vantage point, was poor; the Muslim brotherhood was
Islamic extremist and anti-Soviet. In the Arab-Israeli
sphere, the USSR perceived its main "client", Assad, to be at
a considerable disadvantage. Following Egypt withdrawal from
the war front with Israel, and as Israel's military activity
in Lebanon increased to the extent of genuinely provoking the
Syrian forces there, Syria found itself isolated, threatened
and insecure, and felt increasingly that its Soviet ally had
become unreliable.
On the regional plane, the Soviet Union was loosing
prestige and legitimacy throughout the Arab World due to its
involvement in Afghanistan.
In the realm of superpower relations, the USSR was
witness to the Carter administration's clumsy yet somewhat
successful efforts at establishing a Middle East intervention
capability with the aid of military facilities provided by
friendly Arab or Muslim countries (Egypt, Oman and Somalia)
regionally and U.S.-based mobile air and naval forces.
Against this multi-layered geopolitical backdrop, a
Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation treaty appeared to
be a decidedly positive move from the Soviet standpoint. It
would strengthen President Assad and his wobbly regime, and
simultaneously obstruct Assad from seeking to effect a
reorientation toward the West and Washington - whether to
obtain economic and military aid, or to join the U.C.
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sponsored peace process. Moreover, an agreement might bal-
ance out at least some of the damage caused by the Soviet
Union's controversial involvement in Afghanistan. It could
bring about more active Syrian support for the Soviet
position on Afghanistan at various inter-Arab forums by
lending an Arab-Muslim stamp of legitimacy to the Soviet
move. Then, too, such an agreement might provide a further
indication to Syria's ally, Iran, regarding the Soviet desire
for more intimate relations with the Khomeini regime. The
agreement might also signal Iraq, which was turning increas-
ingly to the West, that Soviet power in the Middle East was
not easily dispensed with.
Israel, for its part, would have to take notice of
the deterrent dimensions of the Soviet-Syrian treaty.
Accordingly, its anti-Syrian provocations in the Lebanese
arena would be reduced and the danger of general Israeli
offensive against Syria lessened. As a consequence, Moscow
might be able to restrain and moderate Syrian actions in
those circumstances where Syrian involvement could endanger
Soviet interests. And, finally, the treaty would to some
extent constitute a Soviet reply to American activities in
the region, and particularly to the U.S. entrenchment in
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It would enhance the Soviet
reliability as a friend and ally to client states and allow
them, if they so desired, to enlarge the physical
infrastructure required for Soviet military intervention in
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the Middle East with additional naval, air and other
facilities.
L. STRATEGIC POLITICAL COORDINATION
It would seem reasonable to expect that a friendship and
cooperation treaty that raises the level of strategic political
relations between its signatories to a new, higher level would
be reflected in a significant increase in the two sides' stra-
tegic coordination and mutual support, both in anticipation
of and during important military and political events. During
the treaty's first year, a number of such events took place.
By examining them, we may shed the light on the depth and
nature of the two countries coordination and support, as well
as related expectations which both attached to the agreement.
M. THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN CRISIS
On November 25, 1980, a month and a half after the signing
of the Syrian-Soviet agreement, Syrian military units were
deployed along the northern border with Jordan. There was no
indicaLion that Damascus had coordinated with Moscow its
initial deployment of forces along the Jordan border. Just
as they had had no foreknowledge of the Syrian invasion of
Lebanon a few years earlier, so in the Jordan border crisis,
the Soviets were again presented with a Syrian fait accompli.
Thus, judging by what is known of the Soviet-Syrian aspect
of the crisis, the USSR would have to conclude that it could
not depend on Syria to avoid dragging it into military crisis
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without prior coordination, while Damascus could not depend
on Moscow's automatic backing even when Syria's political and
security interests were endangered.
N. THE MISSILES CRISIS IN LEBANON
The Soviets displayed somewhat more complex behavior in
the Lebanese missile crisis. The missiles were deployed imme-
diately after downing of the Syrian helicopters (on April 29-
30, 1981), and there are no indications that the Soviets were
asked about the matter, or were even informed in an orderly
fashion.
0. THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
From the very beginning of Israeli-U.S. contacts over
strategic cooperation (in September, 1981, during Prime Minis-
ter Begin and Defense Minister Sharon's visit to Washington),
Damascus grasped the anticipated cooperation agreement as a
direct threat to Syria and a violation of its strategic
parity with Israel. A high-level delegation led by Defense
Minister Mustafa Talas departed for Moscow on September 9,
1981 for preparatory talks on "strategic cooperation with the
Soviet Union". The Syrians admitted for the first time that
their friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviets was
not equal to the proposed agreement between Washington and
Jerusalem. In one interview, Assad even revealed some of the
difficulties which had been raised by Moscow in this context:
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"The Soviet Union stands by us and aids us .... but that does
not mean that USSR arms stores are open to us."
P. THE DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ASSAD REGIME
AND THE SYRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
In early November, 1981, on the eve of elections to the
Syrian Peoples Council, a rift developed in relations between
the Assad regime and the Syrian Communist Party. The latter
is one of the more important communist parties in the Arab
World, and enjoys particular close links with Moscow. A
leaflet put out by the party criticizing internal security
measures in Syria was confiscated by the government. In that
leaflet, the party nicely summed up their complaints: "When
the French ruled this country (from 1920 to 1946), they failed
to divide it like this regime. This regime rests on two
bases: sectarianism and despotism. The citizens must contend
daily with the corruption of the men in authority without
seeing these people held accountable."
i1 1
In retaliation to the government confiscation of the party
leaflet and other underground pamphlets, the party newspaper
Tariq al-Sha'b published a front page article which sharply
criticized Assad's domestic policies. The newspaper issue was
also confiscated, and the Syrian Communist Party expelled from
the National Progressive Front (the central political
lllReed III, Stanley F., "Dateline Syria: Fin De Regime,"
Foreign Policy, No. 37, Summer, 1980, p. 179.
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organization in Syria, which is led by the Ba'ath Party and
which the communists joined in 1972, thereby paving the way
for their representation in the government). All eight
communist party members were striken from the list of Front
candidates for Peoples Council elections, and all - including
the wife of the Party leader - were subseaiently defeated.
Evidently, Assad perceived the criticism leveled at hiii by
the communists as having been Soviet inspired. It seemed to
be signaling Moscow's desire to keep the sister Syrian party
a safe distance away from the negative, unpopular image
attached to Assad and his Ba'ath Party and to pave the commu-
nists' way into a new Syrian regime. Assad's treatment of
the Syrian Communist Party hardly reflected an idoal picture
of close, stable political ties with the Soviet Union.
Q. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
During the years since the Yom Kippur War, Israeli ana-
lysts arrived at the estimate that the Soviet Union's commit-
ment to Syria is limited, from the military standpoint, to
parameters of defense-survival: the Soviet Union can be
expected to intervene directly only in order to assure the
very survival of the Syrian regime. As far as external (as
opposed to Syrian domestic) threats are concerned, this
Soviet military involvement will be probably effected on two
planes; if Syria is attacked, the USSR will deploy Soviet
units for designated defense tasks: anti-air-craft (SA
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missiles and combat aircraft to intercept attacking enemy
planes); electronic warfare (early warning, jamming, counter-
measures against enemy electronic warfare), etc.
If the situation detariorates to a point where the regime
itself is endangered (conquest of the capital, massive civil-
ian losses or infrastructure damage, etc), the Soviet Union
will deploy its deterrent force and, if necessary, will
employ its potential f- actual intervention.
After the agreement was signed, there were no significant
changes in the number of Soviet military ?disers or in the
form and content of the Soviet undertaking in the direction
of more comprehensive interve.ntion than previously thought
probable.
R. BASES, FACILITIES, EMERGENCY STORES
No less i!-ortant a dimension, in conjunction with Soviet
intervention capability in Syria, is the physical infrastruc-
ture for the Russian presence. For years, Damascus has con-
sistently avoided granting Moscow bases ir Syiia. The long-
standing Soviet naval presence in the ports of Tartu.- and
Latakia has been maintained under the rubric of "facilities
and services" rather than "bases". There are no indications
that Soviet combat supply dumps have been established in
Syria after the signing of the friendship and cooperaticn
agreement.
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S. JOINT EXERCISES AND MANEUVERS
In order to avoid serious breakdowns, if not failure, if
and when the presumed Soviet undertaking to intervene mili-
tarily is implemented, it is of utmost importance to practice
using the various components of the intervention apparatus:
transport, landing, fire cover, deployment and actual combat.
Since the signing of the friendship and cooperation
treaty, only one such exercise has been held. On July 6,
1981, a Soviet landing exercise commenced on the Syrian
coast. The force which landed on the beaches of Syria did
not number more than 300-400 troops.
U.S. and Israeli reactions were similar: the maneuver
was intended primarily for political, rather than military
purposes. This joint exercise was of considerable political
value. It was the Soviets' way of signaling the Arab coun-
tries that - in view of the American strategy in the region,
and following joint maneuvers held by the U.S. and Egypt -
the Soviet Union was also well placed on the Middle East map
from the military standpoint, and had no intension of main-
taining a passive role in the race for strategic bases.
T. ARMS SUPPLY
The increase in supply of sophisticated weapons to Syria
during the year following the signing of the agreement centers
on three categories: Mig-23 and Mig-25 aircraft (it is
reported that Syria Yas Mig-27 and Mig-29 now) and T-72
2 r, 3
tanks. In these three categories, the quantity supplied
during the first year of the agreement reached approximately
60% of the total supplied during all the years that preceded
the agreement. However, since delivery of all three weapons
systems commenced no more than a year or two prior to the
agreement, the actual increment after the agreement is in
fact more or less identical to the annual rate of delivery in
previous years. Therefore, the conclusion is: following the
signing of a friendship and cooperation agreement between
Syria and the USSR, the qualitative and quantitative increase
in advanced Soviet weaponry in the Syrian army did not exceed
112
what had been expected in any case.
U. SYRIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER GORBACHEV
ASCENSION TO POWER
On April 26, 1987, President Assad visited Moscow. Assad
made his visit at a time when he began to appear less the
leading figure than the leading obstruction to Soviet policy
in the region, putting pressure on Soviet-Arab unity with his
intrigue against Arafat and defying it with his alliance with
1 1 2All this information of the "Soviet-Syrian Friendship
and Cooperation Treaty," quoted from Amiram Nir, The Soviet-
Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: Unfulfilled Expec-
tations, Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University, 1983.
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Iran against Iraq, who is also a major recipient of Soviet
113
arms.
Assad's visit could hardly have been pleasant, despite
Soviet promises to heighten still further Syria's "defense
potential" and warm rhetoric about mutual cooperation. Eager
to play a larger role in the region, Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev reminded Assad in that visit that billions of dol-
lars have been wasted on war in the region "without achieving
anything". Between 1981-1985, Moscow provided Damascus with
more than $8 billion in weapons. Though the Soviets have writ-
ten off some $4 billion in economic loans to Damascus and re-
scheduled its military debt at generous terms, they have also
114
criticized Assad for his inept handling of the economy.
The Soviets were putting conspicuous public pressure on
Assad. Even as the Syrian president was meeting with Gorba-
chev, the Palestine National Council had convened in Algiers
against Syria's strong objections. Some of the dissidents
Assad had supported for years returned to Arafat's side
despite Assad's efforts to keep them away. The Soviets had
been strong supporters of the conference, and Assad was
expected to endorse the process. The Soviet news agency
11 3Dickey, Christopher, "Assad and his Allies: Irrecon-
cilable Differences," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1, Fall,
1987, p. 74.
1 1 4Chua-Eoan, Howard G., "Opening the Road to Damascus,"
Time, Section: World, July 20, 1987, p. 46.
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reported him agreeing with Gorbachev on the need to restore
the unity of the Palestinian resistance. But unity under
Arafat's leadership could not have been what Assad had in
mind. Adding insult to injury, the Soviets also made over-
ures to Israel while Assad was in Moscow. Assad, whose
relations with Israel remain frozen in hostility, implicitly
deplored the Soviet overtures by denouncing Israel.
1 15
What appears the most remarkable twist in Assad's maneu-
vering occurred a few hours after he left the Soviet Union on
April 27, 1987. At a remote air base in Jordan, Assad met
with his most bitter rival, Iraqi President Sadam Hussein.
The timing of the Assad-Hussein meeting, only hours after
Assad completed his visit to the Soviet Union, suggests that
it took place under pressure from Moscow. Moscow appears to
have demanded a series of gestures from Assad, and he was
expected to comply. With regard to Moscow, it seems unlikely
that Assad wants to do more than buy himself back a little
breathing room and assert once more, quite clearly, his in-
ependence. Perhaps with this in mind, the Syrians hax let
it be known to the French and others that they are interested
in diversifying their sources of supply for arms, moving away
116
from their now almost total dependence on Soviet weaponry.
11 5 Dickey Christopher, pp 73-74.
1 1 6 Ibid., pp 74-75.
266
V. CONCLUSION
The Russians have dreamt for a long time to have a foot-
hold in the Middle East. They have two main objectives in
the region: a) to establish and protect their national
interests; b) to promote their ideology.
The Soviets are skillful strategists and great opportu-
nists. They seized the opportunity of the Arab-Israeli
conflicts and allied themselves with the Arabs establishing
their foothold in Syria since 1950. After each Arab-Israeli
war, the Soviet influence emerged stronger and more
influential.
The Soviets penetrated into Syria through three types of
aids: a) political or diplomatic, b) military, and c) eco-
nomic. The Soviets used their aids effectively in Syri and
the Syrians are heavily indebted to the Soviets. Through
their military aid, the Soviets emerged as an advocate of the
Syrians national aspiration and were able to facilely exploit
this position to the detriment of Western interests. Through
their economic aid, the Soviets were able to deflect sometimes
the Syrian policies in directions favorable to Soviet objec-
tives, e.g. the Syrian endorsement of the Soviet role in
Afghanistan.
On different occasions, the Soviets threatened to inter-
fere militarily to back up Syria against its enemies.
The Syrians were pushed by the West to establish strong
ties a.,d relations with the Soviets. The Syrian objective of
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this relation is to acquire advanced weapons from the Soviets
to defeat Zionism.
In 1980, Syria concluded a treaty of friendship and co-
operation with the Soviets hoping to bind the Soviets with
military commitment. The Soviets evaded craftly to bind
themselves militarily on the Syrian terms. Therefore, the
treaty came out devoid of obligatory significance in the eyes
of both signatories.
From the Soviet standpoint, the treaty served to institu-
tionalize the relations and obligations which have been
already established between the countries.
The quality and quantity of Soviet military aid to Syria
after the treaty did not differ appreciably from the predict-
able and steady annual aid parameters established during the
years which preceded the treaty.
Certainly, neither side can be taken for granted by the
other. Syria wil continue to pursue its interests on the
basis of its own assessments, will not bend its foreign and
defense policies to Soviet pressures or considerations, and
will not assume in advance that in case of difficulties, it
will receive Moscow's full backing. Foi its part, the Soviet
Uni-- will continue to decide anew at every opportunity on
the parameters of support and backing it wishes to grant
Damascus - without feeling obliged to provide aid according
to Syrian expectations or demands.
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Israel's confrontation with Syria continues to operate
under the constraint of anticipated Soviet intervention pre-
venting a decisive Israeli victory. Essentially, this con-
straint existed even in 1973; today, the probability of the
Soviets realizing their intervention potential is higher.
Clearly, the web of relations between the USSR and Syria
is far deeper and more complex than the ties analyzed in this
paper. In seeking to understand the strategic considerations
of highly centralized and closed regimes, there exists an
obvious difficulty: the process of deliberation, planning
and decisionmaking are concentrated in the hands of a few
leaders; information on these matters is outside the public
domain.
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XVIII. THE UNITED STATES-SYRIAN RELATIONS
A. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF U.S.-SYRIAN AMITY
For approximately 400 years, the Ottomans ruled Syria with
unlimited authority. Although impoverished by Ottoman rule,
Syria continued to attract European traders who for centuries
had transported spices, fruits and textiles from the Middle
East to the West. With the traders from the West came
missionaries, teachers, scientists and tourists whose govern-
ments began to clamor for certain rights. Among aforemen-
tioned intelligentsia were great American educators and
missionaries.
The influence of the Western intelligentsia on Arab
thought in general and Syrian thought in particular was very
great, productive and positive. By the mid 29th century,
Syria began to experience nationalist stirrings which the
Palestinian author George Antonius called an "Arab awakening".
According to Antonius, the activities of American educators
and missionaries helped fuel this awakening which began in
1847 with the founding in Beirut (then part of Syria) of a
literary society under American aegis. American Protestant
missionaries opened schools in various parts of Syria, the
most famous being the American University of Beirut. "The
missionaries," wrote Antonio, "put their shoulders with vigor
1 1 7Nyrop, Richard F., "Syria-A Country Study,", 1978,
p. 22.
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to the task of providing an adequate literature." In that,
they were the pioneers, and because of that, the intellectual
effervescence, which marked the first stirrings of the Arab
revival, owes most to their labors.
1 1 8
The American productive activities toward Syria were not
limited to the educational level but went beyond it to the
political field. The King-Crane Commission is an American
commission sent to the Middle East by President Wilson after
World War I. The task of the Commission was to ascertain the
desire of the populations "directly concerned" in the mandate
system. Between May and July, 1919, King and Crane made a
six weeks' tour of Syria and Palestine, held hearings, and on
August 28, presented their report.
On the basis of their investigation, King and Crane recom-
mended an American mandate for Syria, or as a second alterna-
tive, a British mandate, and a British mandate for Mesopotamia.
The commissioners favored constitutional Arab monarchies under
the mandatory system and fully endorsed Faisal, the son of
Sheriff Hussein of Mecca, for the kingship of Syria. Further-
more, they voiced serious opposition to the establishment of
a Jewish state in Palestine. They recommended "that only a
greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace
Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated,
11 8Seely, Talcott W., "U.S.-Arab Relations: The Syrian
Dimension, 1985, p. 2.
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that Palestine become part of a united Syrian state and that
the holy places be internationalized."
1 19
The Syrians made it clear to the King-Crane Commission
that they did not want any foreign tutelage, but if it was
going to be imposed upon them anyway, they would favor an
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American mandate. In the U.S., Syrian Americans provided
strong support for such a mandate. At the same time, the
U.S. government was uninterested in becoming politically
involved in Near Eastern affairs.
1 2 1
This great American contribution in addition to President
Wilson's advocacy of "self-determination", created a reservoir
of goodwill among many Syrians. Up until the U.S. (actually
President Truman made this decision, not the Departments of
State and Defense) announced its support for the 1947 U.N.
Partition Plan for Palestine and, thereafter, its recognition
of the new State of Israel, the attitudes of most Syrians
toward Americans were overwhelmingly positive.
B. SOURCES OF FRICTION: THE SYRIAN VIEW
The two main sources of friction between the U.S. and
Syria are: a) Israel; b) Lebanon. All the political ana-
lysts agree that Zionism is the deadlock that poisoned the
11 9Lenczowski, George, p. 92.
1 0Ibid., p. 315.
1 2 1Seely, Talcott, p. 2.
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relations between the Arabs and the West. The stage for the
first act in the American-Syrian drama was set on August 31,
1945, when President Truman addressed an appeal to the
British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, asking for immediate
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admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. On
November 29, 1947, a date memorable in Jewish history, the
General Assembly voted to recommend the partition of
Palestine, with an economic union as proposed by the majority
of its members.
Thirty-three states voted for this motion; 13 voted
against and ten abstained. Among the big powers who favored
partition were the United States, the Soviet Union and France.
The Arabs felt particularly resentful toward the United
States since they believed it was this country whose presence
or influence helped to rally enough votes for the partition.
They also reproached Americans for "betraying" many promises
made both by President Roosevelt and President Truman to the
effect that no basic decision on Palestine would ever be taken
without the agreement of both parties directly concerned. 123
Syria's tendency to question American credibility has been
reinforced by the belief that the U.S. reneged on two agree-
ments it negotiated with Syria. The first instance that
Syrians cite is an alleged pledge made by President Carter to
1 2 2Lenczowski, George, p. 404.
1 2 3 Ibid., p. 405.
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President Assad in Geneva in 1977 to secure a regional peace
settlement that would include a solution to the Palestine
problem and the return, in whole or in part, of the Golan
Heights. The second case concerns the Syrian-Israeli cease-
fire agreement negotiated by Ambassador Philip Habib shortly
after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. In January, 1949, the
American government granted Israel full de jure recognition
and appointed a well-known pro-Zionist, Dr. James G. McDonald,
as first United States Ambassador in Tel-Aviv.
On September 10, 1952, the West German Republic agreed to
pay Israel in the course of 14 years, $822 million in goods
as reparations for the damages inflicted upon European Jewry
by the Nazi regime. For some time, Arab states contemplated
an economic boycott of West Germany in reprisal, but eventu-
ally they desisted from doing so on the ground that, in their
view, Germany was not a free agent in this transaction,
having been prodded into it by the United States.
1 2 4
In January, 1950, Syria followed a tortuous path in its
relations with the U.S., vacillating between negotiation
concerning limited technical assistance and loud denunciations
of Washington because of its pro-Israeli policy. In Syria,
as in other Arab countries, there was a feeling of frustration
and disenchantment regarding America. This caused some promi-
nent members of the Syrian government to declare themselves
1 2 4 Ibid., p. 422.
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publicly in favor of pro-Soviet policy. The recurrent theme
of these statements was that the Arabs would rather become
"Sovietized" than "Judaized" and that it was proper to colla-
borate with the Soviet Union as "an enemy of our enemy", i.e.
of the United States, in the same way that the Arabs had
collaborated with Nazi Germany as the enemy of Britain.
1 2 5
The United States legation's protests against the anti-American
tenor of Syrian editorials in 1950 provoked an even stronger
press campaign against what was termed American interference
with the freedom of the press. Repeated pronouncements of
American public figures about Israel as the "principal
stronghold of democracy and American ideology" in the Middle
East had the effect of keeping Syrian anger alive. On June
7, 1951, the Syrian Prime Minister Khalid el-Azem publicly
rejected American technical aid under the Point Four Program.
On December 11, 1955, Israel attacked the Syrian outposts
east of Lake Tiberias savagely. Fifty-six Syrian lives were
lost. The pent-up resentments against Zionism and imperialism
found new expression in the mass demonstrations that accom-
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panied the burials of victims of Israeli aggression. The
anti-Western campaign reached its climax when ten political
figures in Syria were put on trial on December 11, 1957, for
participation in an "American plot" to overthrow the
12 5Ibid., p. 331.
1 2 6 Ibid., p. 340.
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government. During the trial, numerous witnesses testified
to the deep involvement of Ameiican embassy personnel and
intelligence agencies, citing names, dates and places.
On February 23, 1966, the left wing Ba'ath under the
leadership of General Salah Jedid seized power in Syria. In
the sector of foreign policy, the regime displayed consider-
able hostility toward the United States, largely because of
its pro-Israeli stance, and, by the same token, favored more
intimate relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist
bloc.
On June 6, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Jordan and Syria
and defeated them badly. Syria severed its diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States, Britain and West Germany for
their support of Israel and Zionism according to the Syrian
allegation.
In September, 1970, during the Jordanian civil war between
King Hussein and Palestinian Fedayeen, Salah Jedid and his
doctrinaire civilian allies in the Syrian government decided
to intervene in that war against King Hussein and to this
purpose they dispatched a tank brigade across the border to
northern Jordan. There was a distinct possibility of escala-
tion with the Soviet Union, the principal arms supplier of
Syria, and the United States, the protector and backer of
1 2 7 Ibid., p. 344.
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King Hussein, likely to intervene if their respective clients
were to find themselves in serious difficulties.
On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.
During the first days of the war, Israel was defeated or pre-
cisely retreated before the Arabs, thanks to the massive air-
lift of weapons by the Americans which prevented the collapse
of Israeli resistance. As a result of this massive aid, the
United States designated by the Arab governments as the
principal hostile power, was exposed to an oil embargo along
with Portugal and Holland. The oil embargo gave Americans an
occasion to consider the consequencies of identification with
Israel in terms of military security and economic well-being.
This is not the first time that American aid saved Israel.
After the June war, the United States gradually became the main
supplier of arms and military equipment to Israel, while
continuing to provide generous economic assistance The Con-
gress repeatedly authorized deliveries of very sophisticated
American weapons systems to Israel. The General Accounting
Office (GAO) report on aid to Israel and Thomas Stauffer's
article on United States aid to Israel estimate that the
direct (economic and military) and indirect (investment,
private borrowing, technology transfer) United States aid to
Israel reached $12 billion in 1983-1984. This would mean
that each Israeli family of five received nearly $20,000 each
or, put another way, United States aid to Israel paid for all
of Israel's imports. Such vast amounts of aid mean the
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continued United States support of the industrial expansion
of Israel and Israel's continued need for additional land and
128
water resources.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was brought to a close by a final
cease-fire on October 24. What followed was step-by-step
diplomacy in which the United States played an active mediat-
ing role. On May 29, 1974, a disengagement agieemeiL was con-
cluded between Syria and Israel under American auspices. It
provided for the retreat of Israeli forces from the additional
areas captured in the course of the October War as well as
from a certain stretch of the initially occupied Golan Heights
and for a new demarcation line, again with a neutral zone
separating the forces.
The signing of this disengagement agreement opened the way
for a gradual restoration of relations between the United
States and Syria, which had been severed after the 1967 war.
In mid June, while on a tour of the Middle East, President
Nixon paid a brief visit to Damascus and, two months later,
the first American ambassador appeared in Syria after an
interval of seven years. Furthermore, in a move calculated
to restore a modicum of normalcy between the two countries,
the United States in January, 1975 granted Syria $25 million
for development within the so-called Middle East Contingency
1 2 8Current History, vol. 83, "Syria in the Maelstrom," by
Robert Olson, January, 1984, pp 25-26.
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Fund. It was the first financial aid extended by Washington
to Damascus since 1965. In spite of this progress in peace-
making and in restoring relations with the U.S., Syria's
leadership looked with considerable distrust on what became
known as America's "step-by-step" diplomacy. This policy
aimed at the gradual achievement of a peace settlement in the
Middle East by a series of separate agreements to be concluded
in succession by Egypt, Syria and Jordan with Israel under
American auspices. Syria's government feared that another
step giving Egypt sonL. gains in the Sinai Peninsula might
reduce Egyptian eagerness to fight for broader Arab causes
and, in particular, Egyptian willingness to defend the rights
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of Syria thus possibly leaving it alone to face the enemy.
Lebanon is another major source of friction between the
U.S. and Syria. American policy towards Syria has witnessed
over the past few years sudden shifts in different directions:
from deep mutual suspicion to what could be described as
normal diplomatic dialogue and then, again, to frustration
and hostility and even the use of military force. These
turnabouts have been the result of the dramatic and bloody
events in Lebanon since the mid 1970s. Whereas American-
Syrian relations evolved primarily in other contexts - super-
power rivalry and the festering Arab-Israeli conflict - since
1 2 9The bulk of the "U.S.-Syrian Relations" is quoted from
Lenczowsky, Chapters VII, VIII, IX, X, XI.
279
1981, and more so since 1982, they have been inseparably
intertwined with political and strategic developments in
Lebanon. Paradoxically, it was precisely Syrian involvement
in Lebanon since 1975 which created bridges between the two
countries and helped, to a limited extent, to smooth relations
between Washington and Damascus, but from 1982 onwards led to
a straining of relations. Lebanon and Syria's involvement
thee eventuailiy L-.rced the U.S. to face some disturbing and
always frustrating dilemmas regarding the use of American
force as an instrument of foreign policy. Yet, it is again
the situation in Lebanon that, ironically, recreated a new
dialogue between the U.S. and Syria. This convoluted inter-
action between the two countries is all the more fascinating,
as it involves relations between a superpower and a small
regional power. As will be seen in this part, however, the
power that has been more constrained in the use of its
military capabilities was the United States.
C. AMERICAN POLICY ON LEBANON AND SYRIA'S ROLE
One after the other, American administrations have per-
ceived the Lebanese situation as an issue of secondary
importance. Until the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in
1975 (and except for the brief intermezzo of the 1958
American intervention), Lebanon played a negligible role in
American considerations. It is instructive to note that the
main reason for the initial growth of American interest was
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not the internal affairs or fate of Lebanon per se but rather
the threat of another Syrian-Israeli war. Indeed, until 1982,
Lebanon and its related problems continued to be treated by
Washington as secondary to the larger issues of the Middle
East: the Soviet encroachment, developments in the Gulf area
and Israel's relations with the leading Arab states. Only with
deepening American commitment to Amin-Jumayyil's regime did
Lebanon itself become worthy of a major American initiative.
In the first stages of the Lebanese civil war which began
in April, 1975, the Ford administration kept a low profile,
with the obvious intention of maintaining the status quo in
Lebanon. Because of the marginality of Lebanon in the
American assessment of Middle Eastern problems, there was no
readiness to get actively involved in resolving the difficult
situation developing there. Thus, for example, although
Kissinger reaffirmed U.S. "interest in Lebanon" in a letter
to Prime Minister Rashid Karami on November 6, 1975, his
phrasing clearly indicated America's disinclination to become
directly involved.
American concern began to increase in September, 1975,
when there were indications that Syria and Israel might
intervene militarily in Lebanon. These signs prompted the
U.S. to make clear its strong objection to any military moves
by these other parties. On September 30, 1975, after a
meeting between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Takla of
Lebanon, the State Department issued a communique that served
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as a warning to both Israel and Syria to refrain from
military intervention.
The United States, however was preoccupied with far more
important issues regarding the Middle East during 1975, the
primary one being the search for further improvement in the
Israeli-Egyptian relationship. In September, 1975, the U.S.
succeeded in bringing the two to sign the Sinai-2 Agreement.
That major move stabilized relations between Isc-1 and Egypt
and created together with Sinai-i, the foundation for Sadat's
peace initiative in late 1977. It also led to a deeper divi-
sion in the Arab World and to a great concern in Syria which
felt isolated vis-a-vis Israel. Indeed, Syrian reaction to
the agrement, to Egypt and to the U.S. was very hostile, which
initially appeared to make the American-Syrian dialogue that
had commenced a short time earlier that much more difficult.
Interestingly enough, however, the U.S. and Syria found
ways soon afterwards of reaching some understanding with
regard to Lebanon. This was accomplished by two
complementary strategies: first, a parallel decision in both
Damascus and Washington to "decouple" the Lebanese complex
from the overall American-Syrian relationship; second, a
shared effort to prevent the Sinai-2 Agreement from putting a
halt to their general diplomatic dialogue. Thus, it appears,
a Syrian compromise proposal presented to the Lebanese
warring factions in December, 1975 received tacit or even
explicit backing from the U.S.
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January, 1976 became a critical month in the Lebanese
civil war after the Christian leadership had rejected Syria's
proposal. There was a major escalation in military activity,
accompanied by Christian threats to partition the country.
The deteriorating situation forced Syria to become even more
active in attempting to manage the situation. First, Syrian
Foreign Minister Khadam threatened intervention; subsequently,
intensive Syrian diplomatic activity took place in Beirut.
Syria worked out a new formula with Lebanon's President
Faranjiyyah for political reform that accommodated some of
the demands of the Muslim-radical Palestinian coalition (the
National Front) while basically maintaining the political
system of the country. By late January, the Christian forces
that were cooperating within the framework of the Lebanese
Front accepted this proposal.
Khadam's threats of intervention raised concern in Israel,
which had by then developed a strategy of deterrence against
Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. To forestall the
danger of direct military confrontation between the two re-
gional powers, the United States adopted a complex strategy;
on the one hand, Washington kept signalling its opposition to
hasty and extreme moves by either Syria or Israel. On the
other hand, the administration tried to delineate areas of
shared interest in Lebanon between the two regional powers.
Thus, a complex three-actor game developed: Syria, diplo-
matically active in Lebanon, also kept signalling the
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possibility of military intervention, yet sought indirect or
tacit endorsement by the U.S. for such a move. That endorse-
ment, though, had to include Israel's "acceptance". Israel,
on its part, issued deterrence threats against any Syrian
military intervention, yet began signalling its readiness to
accept some Syrian military move, provided it was conducted
within specific limits. The U.S. became one of the main
channels through which Israel and Syria communicated their
intentions.
Israeli readiness to "accept" some Syrian intervention
crystallized once it became apparent in February-April, 1976
that, frustrated by Muslim-Palestinian opposition to its
diplomatic efforts, Syria had turned against the latter and
sided with the Christians. The U.S. communicated to Syria
the Israeli "red lines" defining the limits of Syrian
intervention.
The Syrian invasion of Lebanon that began on the night of
May 31 until October certainly succeeded in constraining the
National Front and in imposing some order in the country. A
state of controlled semi-anarchy persisted, but there was no
recurrence of the civil war. Thus, one American objective had
been secured: the instability in Lebanon was reduced and
there appeared to be no threat of a new round of escalation.
This impressed upon the administration in Washington the view
that Syrian activity in Lebanon was basically of a stabilizing
nature. More important from the American point of view was
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the success of the Israeli-Syrian tacit understanding about
the deployment and use of force in Lebanon. To be sure, that
success was due in the first place to the coincidental recog-
nition by both regional powers that the costs involved in a
military confrontation far outweighed the benefits. Never-
theless, the U.S. was active in contributing to that calculus
and came to view it as an important asset.
Throughout the Carter presidency (1977-80), the U.S. con-
tinued to see Syria's role in Lebanon as a stabilizing one.
Syria, however, vehemently opposed the Camp David accord,
regarding it as leading to its total isolation. There is no
doubt that the forceful American role in the Camp David
treaty exacerbated differences between Washington and
Damascus.
D. REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY
A much more pronounced change in American-Syrian relations
appeared with the coming to power of the Reagan administration
in Janu.iry, 1982. From the outset, that administration
adopted a strongly anti-Soviet posture. Indeed, the conflict
with the USSR became the main organizing principle of American
policy in regard to the Middle East. To be sure, the Carter
administration, under the impact of the fall of the Shah, the
miserable episode of the hostages in Tehran, and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, had already begun to formulate a new
Middle East policy. One element was the creation of the
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Rapid Deployment Force (later to be renamed Rapid Joint
Deployment Force), another, the formation of the Carter
Doctrine for defending the Gulf area against a possible Soviet
attack. There were also the beginnings of an attempt to
create a new set of regional defense arrangements in coordi-
nation with America's regional friends.
The Reagan administration strongly emphasized these
policies and, in some respects, went beyond them. The first
and guiding assumption of Reagan's 1,fiddle East policy was
that the main danger faced by the U.S. in that region was the
extension of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. Secondly,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, now perceived as less salient and
destabilizing than had previously been assumed, was to
receive less attention. American efforts were to focus on
the more urgent problems in the Gulf. Reagan did not change
past American principles for the ultimate resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict - that is, an Israeli territorial with-
drawal in exchange for peace; in this respect, the Camp David
process remained imnoortant. But the Reagan administration
perceived that the momentum could be maintained with a lower
investment of American effort. T.;e third element of the new
U.S. policy, directly related to the first two, consisted of
a conceptual division between the Gulf area and the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It was assumed that the systems of inter-
action among states in these two areds were separate and that
there was little spill-over between them. Hence, the two
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areas lent themselves to separate American policies. Given
this assumption and the assumed urgency of any threat to
American interests in the Persian Gulf, it was decided that
the U.S. could neglect the Arab-Israeli conflict area and
concentrate instead on the Persian Gulf.
Fourth, the Reagan administration assumed that the foreign
policies of regional powers were primarily organized around
the question of East-West relations. According to this con-
ception, which to a certain extent underlay much of the Reagan
approach, regional problems were of only secondary importance
to Middle Eastern leaders; decisionmakers in Riydh, Cairo and
Jerusaler were preooccupied with the Soviet threat. Converse-
ly, Syria's behavior was directed by the Soviet Union.
Finally, and in the specific context of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the administration harbored strong animosity
towards the PLO. In contrast to the Carter approach, the
Reagan administration was adamant in its condemnation of
international terrorism; it viewed the PLO as a threat, not
only within the Middle East, but also in the world at large.
The rrain operational conclusion from these assumptions was
the attempt to build a new regional defense orqanization
oriented to the West. This policy, which had been initiated
under Carter, was christened the "strategic consensus", and
its main objective was to defend the Gulf region. The
policy seemed to the Americans to possess great potential; it
promised to free American foreign policy from involvement in
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the entangling complexities of intraregional disputes and, at
the same time, to catch all client states in the inclusive
sweep of an anti-Soviet axis. A second operational conclu-
sion, which again was a continuation of a Carter initiative,
was the accelerated build-up of the RJDF. Finally, in direct
contrast to the Carter approach, there emerged a certain
neglect of the Arab-Israeli issue and, primarily, of the Camp
David process.
The U.S. policy soon ran into major problems. Haig's
visit to the Middle East in April, 1981, which was supposed
to lay the foundations of the "strategic consensis", led to a
series of disappointments. Regional leaders, although con-
cerned about Soviet threat, emphasized nevertheless problems
of a more regional nature. The Saudis talked about the
Palestinian problem and the dangers emanating from revolu-
tionary Iran. Israeli leaders were primarily concerned with
Syrian behavior in Lebanon. In addition, the Americans
witnessed in this period a series of Israeli actions, some of
them provocative, that seemed to demonstrate the potency of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of importance in this context
were the Israeli, Maronite and Syrian actions and over-
reactions in the April, 1981 missile crisis, Israel's limited
incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 1981, the attack on
the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli annexation of the
Golan Heights.
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By early 1982, it had become clear that the sweeping
"strategic consensus" could not in itself obtain all of Wash-
ington's regional goals for the Middle East; there remained
the necessity for a more traditional, if more complex,
approach in dealing with the intrinsic conflicts and problems
of the region. In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict
required more attention. Furthermore, the distinction that
had been drawn between tne Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli
conflict zones now seemed to be less valid. The operational
outcome of these conceptual readjustments was to devote
energy to the Camp David accord and, most urgent of all, to
secure the last phase of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.
Indeed, Haig's visit tc the Middle East in early 1982 was
designed to underline America's continued interest in the Camp
David process. The American view had certainly undergone a
change; however, they remained in flux and lacked focus and
coherence.
E. AMERICAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS AND THE 1982 WAR
The Reagan administration's initial attempts to build a
Middle Eastern "strategic consensus" added to the growing
animosity between Syria and the U.S. Even the successful
American effort in April-May, 1981 to stop Israel from attack-
ing Syrian missiles in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley did not improve
Washington's worsening relations with Damascus. By early
1982, the situation was described by one American official as
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having reached its nadir. Since 1973, U.S. policy on Lebanon
also had developed an anti-Syrian strain in its emphasis on
the need for the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces
(meaning also Syrian) from Lebanon and the formation of a
"strong central government".
The change in attitude should now be placed within the
general context of American policy towards the Middle East. By
1982, two variants of that policy had developed, each sharing
the same basic assumptions mentioned earlier regarding the Sov-
iet threat and ways to handle it, but different in its assess-
ment of the relative importance of Israel and the Arab states
to American interests. One group of decisionmakers, led by
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, emphasized the impor-
tance of the moderate Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia, The
other group, led by Secretary State Haig, emphasized Israel's
role as an important asset for the U.S. To be sure, the oif-
ference here was more a question of emphasis than a manifesi.-
tion of different policies. Nevertheless, it had its impact
on specific decisions during the evolving crisis in Lebanon.
It should be noted that below the level of decisionmakers,
most American officials who dealt specifically with Syria and
Lebanon saw the solution to the Lebanese equation as lying
firmly within an Arab context. They assumed that a concerted
Arab effort, led by Saudi Arabia, would ultimately bring about
Syrian withdrawal and the formation of a strong independent
Lebanese government.
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While American views of the Syrian role in Lebanon were
changing, the concern over an Israel-Syrian military confron-
tation remained high, since such a conflict might result in
uncontrolled escalation and possibly even lead to a superpower
crisis. Notwithstanding, the Reagan administration's firm
anti-Soviet posture and rhetoric, a direct crisis with the
Soviet Union was regarded as undesirable and dangerous. In
this attitude, the Reagan administration was following the
behavior pattern of previous administrations: deterrence of
Soviet military initiatives in the Middle East coupled with
caution and a "crisis management" approach. Hence, the
American efforts to dissuade Israel from striking at Syrian
missiles in the Bekaa Valley in April, 1981, and to stop
Israel from invading Lebanon at several points in time
between December, 1981 and June, 1982.
Once the war in Lebanon did break out on June 6, 1982, the
U.S. adopted a "damage limitation" approach limiting the cost
of negative reactions from America's Arab allies, especially
Saudi Arabia and Eygpt; minimizing Soviet inroads into the
Arab World; and avoiding the danger of an American-Soviet
crisis. Together with this strategy, there was also a recog-
nition of the possible benefits of this war. Although the
U.S. was not in collusion with Israel in regard to the
latter's 'big plan' in Lebanon, the war presented the
possibility of implementing American political objectives:
withdrawal of all foreign forces - Syrians and the PLO (and
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of course the Israelis, as well) - and the establishment of a
strong central government. Indeed, Haig defined these
American objectives soon after the war started. Another bene-
ficial consequence seemed to be the blow to Soviet prestige
in the Middle East resulting from a Syrian and PLO set-back.
During the first few days of the war, an ambiguity persis-
ted regarding its scope. When Israel assured the U.S. that
it intended to implement only its "little plan", a military
confrontation between Israel and Syria appeared to be avoid-
ble, giving American diplomacy room to maneuver. The U.S.
pursued its diplomacy in Lebanon primarily through the media-
ion of Philip Habib, who arrived in Israel on the second day
of the war. His first task was to mediate between Israel and
Syria. On June 8, he carried an Israeli ultimatum to
Damascus; but even before he met with President Assad, the
Israelis had launched their strike against Syria in the
Bekaa.
Immediate American efforts ensued at the highest level to
secure a cease-fire, prompted by the fear that the "damage
limitation" strategy might collapse because of Israeli-Syrian
military escalation. A Soviet note delivered to President
Reagan, though relatively moderate in tone, nevertheless
injected a feeling of further grave consequences at the super-
power level. Moreover, Arab criticism of the Israeli opera-
tion and what appeared to be American acquiescence to it was
mounting. By Friday, June 11, the U.S. succeeded in forcing
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Israel to accept a general cease-fire. In fact, however,
fighting ended only in the eastern sector where the main
Syrian units had been engaged by Israel. Battles continued
in the western and central sectors, where Israel fought both
PLO and Syrian units. These were areas not directly affect-
ing the area always considered strategically crucial to
Syria, the Bekaa Valley.
After mediation lasting about ten weeks and conducted
against the background of the Israeli siege of Beirut, the
U.S. succeeded in securing an agreement for the withdrawal of
PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut. The negotiations were
conducted with the participation of many parties, Syria being
one of the main actors. At the time of the negotiations, the
Syrian position was relatively weak. Syria had suffered a
limited military defeat (primarily in the air); it had failed
to mobilize meaningful Arab support; and its political allies
in Lebanon had either suffered military defeat or, as in the
case of Lebanon's President Sarkis and part of the Maronite
community, lowered the profile of their relationship.
Against that background, Syria became more flexible and
eventually agreed to the American plan.
Prior to the Beirut agreement, American-Syrian negotia-
tions seemed to have created a somewhat relaxed medium for
overall American-Syrian relations. Yet, subsequent events
changed that mistaken perception. The U.S. became involved
in a series of policy steps and initiatives that appeared
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threatening to Syrian declsionmakers. At the same time,
Syria gradually strengthened its position in Lebanon and
vis-a-vis Israel. The coirbination of these developments
precluded, for the time being, the possibility of a meeting
of purpose between the U.S. and Syria.
The Beirut agreement created a new peace-keeping force -
the Multinational Force (MNF) - of which the American contin-
gent was the largest. Deployed in Beirut, the MNF withdrew
after a while, but returned following the massacre in
September by Phalangist troops of Palestinians in the Sabra
and Shatilla refugee camps and the Israeli withdrawal from
West Beirut. At that time, the U.S. assumed a posture of
deep commitment to a specific policy regarding Lebanon. As
mentioned earlier, the U.S. had never considered Lebanon to
be of much intrinsic political or strategic interest. By
autumn 1982, that position had changed. The U.S. now became
involved in Lebanon per se and developed a commitment to the
new regime headed by Amin Jumayyil. The new policy was not
the result of a change in the relative strategic importance
of Lebanon, rather it was a combination of external factors
and the dynamics of intervention and commitment. By that
time, American-Syrian relations had become completely depen-
dent on developments in Lebanon.
The position of the U.S. was that Syrian forces should
withdraw from Lebanon as a part of a general plan for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops. Next, the U.S. assumed the
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role of the main external backer of Amin Jumayyil's regime in
Beirut. In order to accomplish its new objectives in Lebanon,
the U.S. pressed ahead with negotiations to secure an agree-
ment between Israel and Lebanon. It was assumed - wrongly as
it turned out - that following such an agreement, negotiations
would begin with Syria and that Syria would be ready to with-
draw, as well. The American diplomats relied on several ra-
tionales for this assumption. For one thing, Syria had
repeatedly declared a willingness to withdraw once Israel had
done so and given a request of the Lebanese government.
Second, it seemed that the Syrian presence in Lebanon involved
Syria in high costs, especially after the Israeli deployment
along the Lebanese-Syrian border at a distance of only 20-odd
kilometers from Damascus. Since the Syrians were apprehensive
over the possibility of an Israeli shelling of Damascus, a
symmetrical Israeli-Syrian withdrawal would seem to offer
Syria a clear dividend. Finally, the U.S. trusted Saudi
Arabia to exploit its position as Syria's main financial
backer in persuading the Syrians to evacuate Lebanon.
The Americans decided, therefore, that prioriLy should b1
given to negotiations between Israel and Lebanon and that its
own negotiations with Syria be postponed to a later stage.
This proved to be a grave tactical mistake. The Israeli-
Lebanese talks finally culminated in the agreement of May 17,
1983, and it appeared as if the next stage would be relatively
easy to accomplish. And indeed, Israel declared its readiness
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to withdraw completely from Lebanon. Syria was now expected
to follow suit, in consonance with previous declarations. But
hero lay a fundamental misunderstanding of Syrian interests.
By mid 1983, it had become clear that for Israel the costs
of deployment in Lebanon were beginning to outweigh by far the
benefits. Syria was keenly aware of this change. In addition,
Syria's perceived need of maintaining a military presence in
the Bekaa Valley, and the considerable political influence it
enjoyed throughout Lebanon as a result, made Syrian willing-
ness to withdraw fully less and less keen. Finally, the
Israeli-Lebanese agreement included several elements that
clearly affected Syrian interests adversely. The Syrians,
consequently, became convinced that the U.S. was backing a
strategy that would allow Israel a prominent position in
Lebanon. Unable to tolerate this possibility, Damascus pro-
ceeded to frustrate its negotiations with Washington by delay
tactics, and maintaining persistent ambiguity. These tactics,
in turn, deepened American suspicions concerning Syria's true
objectives in Lebanon. The obstinate Syrian position was
also influenced by the internal situation in Lebanon itself.
The Lebanese opposition, made of Shi'ites, Druzes, the Sunni
elite of the Tripoli area and even some Christian notables
(most prominently, Faranjiyyah), refused to accept Amin
Jumayyil's plans. Frustrated by his inability to bring about
political reform, they formed a tactical alliance. Their
natural external backer was Syria. In addition, the
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deployment of a Soviet-manned air-defense system increased
Syrian deterrence against any military move by Israel and
thus boosted Syria's self-confidence.
The change in the Syrian position on withdrawal, together
with the aid it extended to groups opposing Jumayyil's govern-
ment in mid 1983, led to a change in the American perception
of the Israeli role in Lebanon. Washington had seen the
potential Israeli threat to Syria as an important bargaining
card in the negotiations with Assad. But by the summer of
1983, it had also become clear that the Israeli withdrawal
from parts of Lebanon would enable the opposition forces in
these regions to coalesce and turn against the central govern-
ment. An ironic paradox now emerged: Israel, becoming less
and less enchanted with its role in the area, was anxious to
withdraw, at least from the Shouf mountains. On the other
hand, both Jumayyil and the U.S. were eager for Israel to
extend its stay there.
F- THE DILEMMA OF THE USE OF FORCE
When Israel eventually withdrew from Shouf in September,
1983, and Druze and Shi'ite units subsequently began pushing
towards Beirut, the U.S. was forced to contemplate the possi-
bility of the direct use of force in defense of the Lebanese
government. By that time, the Americans had assembled a con-
siderable force off the shores of Lebanon to back up its MNF
contingent of marines in Beirut. Washington's high military
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profile was intended to signal American commitment and
resolve to the Jumayyil government. It was, however a
passive military posture and soon proved untenable. When
Druze units, backed by PLO fighters and Syrian artillery,
attacked Souk al-Garb, the suburb controlling the south-
eastern entrance to Beirut, it placed Lebanese army units in
a precarious situation, and then the U.S. decided to use
limited force. American naval units opened fire and helped
block the advance on Beirut.
The U.S. attempted to delineate parameters for its use of
force; the basic posture was one of defense and deterrence;
accordingly, direct attacks on the marines or infringement of
a "red line" around Beirut would be met with measured re-
sponses. Major problems arose in the application of this
policy. Military actions against the American forces, such
as the bombing of marine headquarters in Beirut that killed
240 men, aroused the urge for revenge beyond the measured
pursuit of defense and deterrence. The problem was that the
identify of factions acting against the marines was often
difficult to establish; similarly, Syrian involvement in
these attacks was indirect and seemed not to provide grounds
for retaliation. Furthermore, whereas operations against the
Syrians might perhaps be helpful in the negotiations, their
political cost would be considerable. Consequently, the
American response was primarily periodic heavy naval shelling
of areas from which fire had been directed at Beirut or at
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the American units themselves. The targets were mainly Druze
and Shi'ite militia units or, in rare instances, Syrian
artillery. In only one case did American aircraft go on the
attack, striking at Syrian SAM deployments.
In the final analysis, it seemed that American military
force would be unable to obtain Washington's objectives in
Lebanon. Amin Jumayyil proved inept in bringing about national
reconciliation, and Syria's backing of ccpposition groups
undermined the government. In such circumstances, the rapid
translation of American force into political assets seemed
impossible. Washington was forced, once again, to reconsider
its interests and strategy in Lebanon.
The starting point for the Reagan administration's recon-
siderations was the recognition that, whereas the American
military presence in Beirut served as a guarantee the Jumayyil
government would not fall, the actual application of military
force could not coerce the majority of Lebanese to back the
central government. Moreover, as unpalatable as the thought
was, the U.S. had to recognize the painful fact that Syria
could play a useful role in the slow and tortuous process of
reaching an accommodation among Lebanon's warring communities.
This recognition developed only gradually against the back-
ground of U.S. public displeasure at the uncertainty of
purpose surrounding the deployment of the marines in Beirut.
Perhaps even more important than the sway of public opinion
was the old-new recognition that Lebanon was not an important
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interest for the U.S. There was no point in shedding blood
and being involved in a messy and sordid domestic situation,
when no clear advantage in terms of hard interests could be
secured.
Thus, the U.S. decided to pull its contingent of marines
out of Beirut and to lower the profile of her commitment to
Jumayyil. This development contributed to and was in turn
affected by Jumayyil's decision to renew the old alliance
between the Maronites and the Syrians.
Therefore, from mid 1984, the U.S. returned, at least
partly, to her 1976 policy. American officials reached the
conclusion that Syria could contribute more to the stability
of the central regime in Beirut than an American military
presence, so much so, that one official went as far as to
suggest that the Syrian role could be considered "helpful"
within the context of Lebanon.
American-Syrian relations will probably be affected by the
Lebanese context for some time to come. But with the decline
in importance of Lebanon in American considerations about the
Middle East, Syria will probably be perceived increasingly
within more important contexts: superpower competition and
the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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1 3 0This part, the "United States-Syrian Relations in
Lebanon" is wholly quoted from Yair Evron, "Washington,
Damascus and the Lebanon Crisis," in Syria under Assad,
edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, St. Martin Press, New
York, 1986, pp 209-222.
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G. SOURCES OF FRICTION: THE AMERICAN VIEW
Official U.S. attitudes toward Syria have been critical
and uncomplimentary. Here are some of the salient American
grievances against Syria:
1. Syria's media and official spokesmen including Assad
have continuously indulged in hyperbole, bombast and slogan-
eering against the U.S. The rhetoric, regularly reported by
the American media, has led American public to liken President
Assad to Libya's Qadhafi.
2. Another important source of U.S. grievance against
Syria is the misperception that Syria is a Soviet satellite,
a kind of Middle Eastern Cuba.
3. Another reason for U.S. anti-Syrian attitudes is a
belief that the ideological orientation of Syria is leftist,
even neo-Marxist.
4. Another reason for official U.S. negative feelings
toward Damascus has been the perception that Syria opposes
peace with Israel, especially the 1982 Reagan peace initia-
tive. (At the time of writing this paper, the news showed
that Syria cooperated with Secretary of State Shultz concern-
ing his recent peace initiative, NBC, CBC American news.)
5. U.S. anti-Syrian attitudes have also been influenced
by heavy-handed and intemperate actions by the Assad regime.
The most spectacular example was the February, 1982 killing
of some 15,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood banned party
by security forces in Hama.
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6. Another action which provoked official U.S. concern
was the sudden massing of Syrian troops on the Jordanian
border during an Arab summit meeting in Amman in late 1980.
7. Syria's alliance with the Khomeni regime further
tarnished the image of Damascus in the U.S.
1 3 1
13 1For more details of Sources of Friction between the
U.S. and Syria, see Talcott Seely, "U.S.-Arab Relations: The
Syrian Dimension," 1985, p. 15.
302
XIX. CONCLUSIONS
To politicians and cartographers, Syria is an invention
of the 20th century. To scholars and to the Syrians,
however, the term also refers to a once vast, occasionally
powerful, always proud empire.
When Syria became independent in 1946, she was in many
respects a state without being a nation-state, a political
entity without being a political community. As with so many
countries born in the past 50 years, Syria's modern history
has been a saga of coups and countercjups. From 1946 to 1958,
the traditional Syrian politicians put Syria for adoption and
squabbled and wrangled among each other for selecting the
proper foster parent. In 1958, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel
Nasser won the bid and merged his country with Syria to form
the United Arab Republic but the union lasted only three and
one half years. In 1963, the Arab Socialist Resurrection
(Ba'ath) Party overthrew President Nazem Koudsi and seized
power in Damascus.
After leading a bloodless coup in 1970, Hafez Assad took
over. He has trod through the carnage of Middle Eastern
politics with the cunning and stealth of a big cat. He fought
the Yom Kipper War and signed a disengagement agreement with
Israel over the Golan Heights in 1974. He sent his army into
Lebanon in 1976 to save the Maronite Christians from defeat by
the PLO and a coalition of leftist Muslim forces. He told
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Time Correspondent Wilton Wynn in 1977 that he was ready to
make peace with the Israelis if they would withdraw from the
territory they had captured in the 1967 war. He sabotaged the
Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty that the U.S. brokered. He was
disenchanted with U.S. diplomacy and believed that foreigners
had trifled with Syria long enough. He established himself as
a regional power broker indicating that anyone wanting to
accomplish something in the Middle East would have to deal
with him. According to one Middle East insider in Washington,
Assad told the American envoy Bud McFarlane, "When the feathers
hit the fan, your Egyptian and Jordanian buddies cannot help
you whereas I can." Why did Assad come through? "He wants
to be recognized as the most important power broker in the
Middle East, someone who must be dealt with if anything is to
be done," says a White House senior aide, noting that Assad
had no place in the Camp David Agreement, or the Shultz-engi-
neered Lebanon-Israel accord of May, 1983, or in the current
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Hussein-Mubarak-Arafat effort.
The Syrian Goals. The standard articulation of Syria's
long-term aspirations, be it by President Assad, one of his
more prominent colleagues or through the official organs of
the Ba'ath Party, suggests limitless or at least exceedingly
far-reaching goals. Syria, according to such proclamations,
1 3 2 National Review, "Letter from Washington," July 26,
1985, p. 14.
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wishes to consolidate its society, its economy and its
political structure, with a view to casting a long shadow
over the entire Middle East. Such statements of the country's
goals imply a relentless drive towards the creation of a
Greater Syria. If such aspirations, which are normally
presented as if they are not a matter of either choice or
necessity but something amounting to a historical and moral
imperative, were realized, Syria would become the single most
important factor in Middle Eastern regional politics. She
would dominate the Arab League. She would succeed in off-
setting the overbearing influence of Egypt. She would be in
an excellent position to realize the dreams of pan-Arabism,
she would advance Arabism, and she would advance the Arab
World towards the grandeur and status it has always sought in
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the World arena.
What the Syrians want is precisely what nationalists have
always wanted in every part of the world: an integrated
(Syrian) society, which is industrialized, modernized, cen-
tralized, socialized and populated by proud and spirited
masses who enjoy benefits of economic prowess and who are cap-
able of sustaining independence in the anarchic, chronically
unstable, pervasively violent and breathtakingly convulsive
Middle East. Assad's predecessors in Syria, especially
13 3Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, "The Syrian Paradox," in
Syria under Assad, pp 251-252.
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leaders such as Adib Shishaqli, may have ultimately shared
the same vision. But under Hafez al-Assad, this vague and
distant dream seems to have been converted, with dogged
determination and impressive skill, into a tangible, opera-
tionally palpable agenda, which, in spite of formidable con-
straints, has already begun to be implemented.1 3 4 Assad's
regime won a series of impressive domestic and external suc-
cesses. Following a long period of endemic instability in
Syrian politics, Assad succeeded in establishing a compara-
tively stable and coherent regime. True, the underlying
sources of past instability were not fully eliminated and the
urban Sunni population continued to denounce the regime as the
illegitimate rule of a sectarian Alawi group. But the effec-
tive domestic strategy formulated by Assad, his personal
leadership, the aura of success and the unprecedented cohe-
siveness of the new ruling group served to cushion and
mitigate the effect of such destabilizing factors.
This domestic success served as a solid foundation for the
regime's foreign policy which contributed, in turn, to the
regime's prestige and legitimacy. 13 5 Assad has become the
strongman of the Middle East. The more the United States
opposes him, the stronger he becomes, albeit at the price of
134Ibid., p 253.
1 3 5 Rabinovich, Itamar, "The Foreign Policy of Syria: Goals,
Capabilities, Constraints and Options," Survival, vol. 24,
JL/Ag, 1982, p. 175.
306
LI
moving ever closer to his great protector, the Soviet Union.
He has no serious rivals, at the moment. As it was mentioned
earlier, he has fought his way to the top largely by negative
means, by blocking or destroying rivals, by derailing agree-
ments that did not include him or that gave him a lesser
place than he felt entitled to, and above all, by incredible
tenacity against severe odds and strong enemies.
Negative acts are not sufficient to give Assad the posi-
tion of supreme leader, the "Arab hero" role that Abdul Nasser
and Anwar Sadat sought in vain. For that, a great positive act
will be necessary, which would obviously be to tackle success-
fully the Arab-Israeli problem. Assad will not be in a great
hurry to approach that goal. His style has been gradual,
methodical, detailed preparation by intricate maneuvers combin-
ing daring action with a desire to take minimal risks. What
remains to be seen is whether, in the event he lasts long
enough, he will try to deal with that supreme problem by taking
the road of war or diplomacy. There are grave risks involved
in both. 1 3 6  "No war is possible without Egypt, and no peace
is possible without Syria," Henry Kissinger once said. It is
a measure of how far Syria has come under Hafez Assad; while
1 3 6 Neuman, Robert G., "Assad and the Future of the Middle
East," Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, Winter 83/84, p. 253.
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the first part of that statement is no longer completely
valid, the last part rings truer than ever.
1 3 7
United States diplomacy has little choice but to face up
to the vastly changed situation in the Middle East. Both
Syria and the U.S. should have an interest in gradually
improved relations in order to give the Syrians an option
other than total and exclusive dependence upon the Soviet
Union. This might worry Israel but might not be totally
unacceptable provided American diplomacy proceeds with care,
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skill and balance. The possibility of such diplomacy
would also be enhanced if the U.S. government takes Nahum
Goldman's advice to President Jimmy Carter. Nahum Goldman
traveled to Washington to meet the President. Cyrus Vance,
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mark Siegel were also present as the
82-year-old Zionist leader and former head of the World
Jewish Congress offered his own experienced and very candid
opinion on how the Carter administration might best pursue
its peace efforts in the Middle East. Goldman urged them to
"break the Jewish lobby in the United States." 1 3 9 On ABC
News Meet the Press, the former President Richard Nixon
similar advice.
137Kelly, James, Time, December 19, 1983, p. 34.
1 3 8Neuman, Robert G., p. 255.
1 3 9Tivnan, Edward, "The Lobby", Simon and Schuster, Inc.,
1987, pp 120-121.
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President Nixon said, "Israel should be pressured for achiev-
ing a just peace in the Middle East." 14 0
The dramatic ideological, political and economic changes
which swept Eastern Europe at the end of 1989 and the begin-
ning of 1990, in addition to the ongoing thaw in superpower
relations convinced President Assad that we are living in a
changing world and in a changing time. The erosion of U.S.-
Soviet bipolarity and the improving East-West climate made
the two superpowers review their priorities. As part of that
rapprochment, Washington and Moscow have backed away from
unstinting support of their respective allies in the Middle
East. The superpower retreat has had the most dramatic
impact on Syria and Israel. U.S. officials speak of a "rough
synntetry" between Moscow's announced intention to draw down
its military support for Syria and Washington's cooling
approach toward Israel. In Damascus, Moscow's moderating
attentions have curbed President Assad's hopes of achieving
strategic parity with Israel. In the past the Soviets
funneled enough hardware into Syria to leave the country with
a $15 billion military debt; now Moscow speaks of Assad's
need for "reasonable defensive sufficiency."
As a skillful statesman, President Assad had already
prepared himself for such a terrible shock. To that end, he
has been cultivating a more moderate image in the West. In
1 4 0ABC News, "Meet the Press", April 10, 1988.
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March, 1990, he told former U.S. President Jimmy Carter that
he was ready to enter into bilateral negotiations with
Israel. He has been working arduously to improve and project
the Syrian humanitarian image by helping the release of some
of the Western hostages in Lebanon. Former U.S. President
Ronald Reagan and President George Bush thanked him for his
efforts. President Bush announced that "good actions beget
good actions." President Assad definitely is waiting for
President Bush to translate his rhetoric words by substantial
tangible deeds. 141
Peace in the Middle East remains a vital and necessary
concern for America, the entire West, and for Japan, which
depends so much on that region's strategic importance and
resources. America's yuodwill to approach that goal has been
strong, but its skill and ability to play a constructive role
has not been much in evidence. Any American President's
policy cannot possibly succeed without a strategy that bears
priorities and realities firmly in mind. Among those reali-
ties are the continued central importance of the Palestinian
problem and the need for successive American administrations
to view Middle Eastern problems in a regional rather than a
predominantly East-West context. 142
141"Stumbling Toward Armageddon?," Time, World,
April 16, 1990.
1 4 2Neuman, Robert G., p. 255.
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At last, but not least, the Arabs and the Israelis should
recognize the full scale of the military tragedy that affects
both sides. It is a tragedy that has no end that will favor
either side. Time and the arms race are not on anyone's
side, and God is neither Israel's estate agent nor the Arab
World's general.
1 4 3
14 3 Cordesman, Anthony H., "The Middle East and the Cost
of the Politics of Force," The Middle East Journal, vol. 40,
No. 1, Winter 1986, p. 8.
311
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abd-Allah, Umar F., The Islamic Struggle in Syria, Mizan
Press, Berkeley, 1983.
Abu Nab, Ibrahim, "Jordan: Be Prepared," Middle East Inter-
national, Issue 202, June 10, 1983.
Amiram, Nir, The Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty: Unfulfilled Expectations, Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv
University, 1983.
Baram, Amazia, "Ideology and Power Politics in Syrian-Iraqi
Relations," in Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz
and Avner Yaniv, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Batatu, Hanna, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of
Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its
Dominance," Th. Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, Summer,
198
Berliner, Joseph S., Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and
Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, New York, 1985.
Blancle, Ed, "Syria and Iraq," Associated Press, Section:
InternaLional News, Nicosia, Cyprus (AP), June 15, 1987.
Brown, Denise, "Assad and His Allies," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
66, No. 1, Fall, 1987.
Chua Eoan, Howard G., "Opening the Road to Damascus," Time,
Section: World, July 20, 1987.
Conroy, Elizabeth L., "Syria and Lebanon: The Background,"
The Syrian Arab Republic, edited by Anne Sinai and Allen
Pollack, New York, 1976.
Cordesman, Anthony H., "The Middle East and the Cost of the
Politics of Force," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 40,
No. 1, Winter, 1986.
Dicky, Christopher, "Assad and His Allies: Irreconcilable
Differences?", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1, Fall,
1987.
Donaldson, Robert H., The Soviet Union in the Third World:
Success and Failures, Westview Press, Inc., U.S. Second
Printing, 1981.
312
Dyer, Gwynne, "World Armies," Syria, ediL:d by John Keegan,
Gale Research Company, Book Tower, Detroit, Michigan 48226,
1983.
Evron, Yair, "Washington, Damascus and the Lebanon Crisis,"
Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Faksh, Mahmud A., "The Alawi Community of Syria," Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, April, 1984.
Fitzgerald, Benedict F., The Syrian Army: An Activist Mili-
tary Force in the Middle East, Carlisle Barracks, PA,
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 30,
1982.
Freedman, Robert 0., "Moscow, Damascus and the Lebanon Crisis,"
Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Freedman, Robert 0., Soviet Policy toward the Middle East
since 1970, Praeger Publisher, Third Edition, 1982.
Heller, Mark A., "The Middle East Military Balance [Syria],"
The Jerusalem Post, West View Press, Jerusalem 91000,
Israel, 1985.
Hijazi, Ihsan A., "Jordanian Prime Minister to Visit Syria,"
The New York Times, Section A, p. 3, column 4, November
12, 1984.
Hirschfeld, Yair, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and
Khomeini's Iran," Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz
and Avner Yaniv, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Hosmer, Stephen T., and Wolf, Thomas W., Soviet Policy and
Practice toward Third World Conflicts, D. C. Heath and
Company, Lexington, Massachusetts; Toronto, 1983.
Jenkins, Loren, "Rapprochement Seen Dooming Peace Move,"
The Washington Post, First Section A10, December 24, 1985.
Karpat, Kemal H., Political and Social Thought in the
Contemporary Middle East, Paraeger Publisher, U.S.A.,
1982.
Kawar, Samira, "Hussein Curbs Fundamentalists," The
Washington Post, Section A21, December 27, 1775.
Kaylani, Nabil M., "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'ath," Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1,
January, 1972.
313
Kelly, James, Time, Section: World, December 19, 1983.
Kraft, Joseph, "Letter from Syria," The New York, June 17,
1974.
Kushner, David, "Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish-Syrian
Relations," Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and
Avner Yaniv, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World affairs, Fourth
Edition, 1980.
Long, John S., "Is the Protector of Lions Losing His Touch?",
World Report, November 10, 1986.
Maoz, Moshe, and Yaniv, Avner, Syria under Assad, St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1986.
Mehdi, S. N., "Ba'athist Syria and Iraq: A Comparative
Approach - An Outline of Political History," Islamic
Revolution, December, 1981.
Moritz, Charles, Current Biography Year Book, The H. W. Wilson
Company, New York, 1975.
Neuman, Robert G., "Assad and the Future of the Middle East,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, Winter, 83/84.
Nevo, Joseph, "Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion,"
Syria under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Nordland, Rod, "The Syrians are Coming," News Week, June 17,
1985.
Nyrop, Richard F., "Syria - A Country Study," The American
University, Washington, D.C., Third Edition, First
Printing, 1979.
Olson, Robert, "Syria in the Maelstrom," Current History,
Vol. 83, January, 1984.
Perera, Judith, "Assad's Secret War," The Middle East,
Section: Monitor, August, 1985.
Perera, Judith, "Iraq and Syria: a Thaw?", The Middle East,
Section: Monitor, July, 1986.
Perera, Judith, "Syria Loses its Grip in Lebanon," The Middle
East, March, 1987.
374
Rabinovich, Itamar, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in
Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue and an Instrument," Syria
under Assad, edited by Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Rabinovich, Itamar, "The Foreign Policy of Syria: Goals,
Capabilities, Constraints and Options," Survival, Vol. 24,
JL/AG, 1982.
Ramet, Pedro, "The Soviet-Syrian Relationship," Problems of
Communism, Vol. 35, ISS No. 5, September/October, 1986.
Reed, Stanley F. III, "Dateline Syria: Fin de Regime,"
Foreign Policy, No. 37, Summer, 1980.
Seely, Talcott W., U.S. - Arab Relations: The Syrian
Dimension, 1985.
Sievers, Marc J., "Student Notes; The Ideology of the Ba'ath
Party and Syrian Politics," Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer, 1980.
Tivnan, Edward, The Lobby, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York,
1987.
Torrey, Gordon H., "The Ba'ath Ideology and Practice," The
Middle East Journal, Vol. XXIII, Autumn, 1969.
Van Dan, Nikolaus, The Struggle for Power in Syria, London,
1979.
Van Dusen, Michael H., "Political Integration and Regionalism
in Syria," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XXVI, Spring,
1972.
Walker, Martin, "A Marriage of Necessity," Sout ISS.63,
January, 1986.
Yaniv, Avner, "Syria and Israel: The Politics of Escalation,"
Syria under Assad, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986.
Zagoria, Donald S., Soviet Policy in East Asia, Yale
University Press, New York, 1986.
ABC News, Meet the Press, April 10, 1988.
CATO, "Letter from Washington, National Review, July 26, 1985.
"Saladin's Shaky Successors," Time, World, December, 1983.
315
The Associated Press, Section: International News,
September 21, 1985.
The Military Balance 1986-1987, The International Institute for




1 . Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Attn: Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School 2
Monterey, California 93943-5000
3. Thomas C. Bruneau, Code NS/BN
Professor and Chairman
Department of Nartional Secruity Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
4. Ralph H. Magnus, Code NS/MK
Associate Professor
Dept. of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. John W. Amos II, Code NS/AM
Associate Professor
Dept. of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943




Washington, D.C. 20301-6111 202-373-3341
7. RADM P.J. Coady, USN
Director, Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division
OP-61/PNT Room 4E572
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1
Washington, D.C. 20350
8. Antun Attallah 2
973 Margaret Street
Monterey, CA 93940
317
